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Through the close examination of five novels that are popularly thought of as examples of ‘dystopian’ 
science-fiction, this thesis sets out to reconfigure Foucault’s notion of the heterotopia, and in doing 
so revitalise the increasingly marginalised concept of the utopia and the utopian literary tradition. 
Having theorised a version of the heterotopia that differs somewhat from that postulated originally 
by Foucault in that it is dynamic and transgressive, I locate and examine what I consider to be 
prototypically heterotopian spaces in what are generally portrayed as archetypically dystopian texts – 
Evgenii Zamiatin’s We (1924) and George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949). Having identified key 
features of these spaces – they are inherently ambiguous, in that they encompass and display both 
utopian and dystopian features, and are as much of a threat to the individual as they are a refuge for 
them – I then move on to an examination of the narratively constituted individual and the ways in 
which it is enabled – and undermined – by what I believe to be the predominantly heterotopian spaces 
of Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash (1992), Nick Harkaway’s The Gone-Away World (2008) and Michael 
Marshall Smith’s Only Forward (1994). Throughout the course of my analysis of these texts, I argue 
that the heterotopia offers the means by which the progressively redundant utopia / dystopia binary 
and concomitant dualisms can be dismantled, and new spaces that make allowances for the oft-
conflicting needs, desires and narratives of the individual, and reflect more accurately the hybrid 

















Introduction: Utopia, Dystopia, and Heterotopia 
 
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times; it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of 
foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it 
was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had 
everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all 
going direct the other way. 
A Tale of Two Cities – Charles Dickens. 
 
In any discussion of utopia it seems that banal truism about one person’s utopia being 
another’s dystopia is bound to be aired. And if we consider the history of the utopia and of utopianism, 
this appears to be sound reasoning. Discussions of what utopia should and shouldn’t be, what it ought 
to be, what it actually is, and what it’s attempting to achieve abound not only in literary and cultural 
theory, but in every-day modern society. Is not the ‘global war on terror’ ultimately a war over whose 
version – or vision – of utopia is the right one? That the subject – let alone composition – of utopia 
(and dystopia) is polarising is demonstrated in both the literature that reflects the attitudes of the 
context in which it is written, and in attempts to enact supposedly utopian visions in ‘the real world.’ 
This conflict is enshrined in a literary tradition that can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle and 
continues unabated today, not only in literature, but also, I would suggest, in the increasingly popular 
representation of dystopia in mainstream cinema. In asserting the heritage of the literary utopia (and 
dystopia), I refute J. C. Davis’ assertion that “utopian writing is not a tradition of thought” (4, emphasis 
in original); as Frederic Jameson notes in his Archaeologies, “what uniquely characterizes this genre is 
its explicit intertextuality: few other literary forms have so brazenly affirmed themselves as argument 
and counterargument. Few others have so openly required cross reference and debate within each 
new variant” (2). This statement is borne out by a cursory examination of the literature. Sir Thomas 
More wrote the ‘original’ Utopia as a considered and self-conscious response to, amongst other 
things, Plato’s Republic and Lucien’s True History; similarly, it is possible to discern traces of Utopia in 
Sir Francis Bacon’s The New Atlantis (1627), and the influence of both More and Bacon in Jonathan 
Swift’s 1726 satire, Gulliver’s Travels. Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward (1888) was written in 
dialogue both with previous utopian fictional writers, and near-contemporaneous utopian theorists, 
such as August Bebel and Robert Owen. In turn, Bellamy’s vision spawned “a host of imitators, 
‘sequels,’ and responses” (Wegner, 63); in particular, it was “indignantly repudiated” (Kumar, 47) by 
William Morris’ News From Nowhere (1890). And so on, and so forth. A similarly self-referential vein 
can be found in the dystopian and anti-utopian strains of this genre, as illustrated in miniature by the 
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relationship between H. G. Well’s A Modern Utopia (1905), Evgeny Zamyatin’s We (1921), Aldous 
Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), and George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949). The influence of 
these texts can still be felt today; one of the more recent (and readable) examples is Hugh Howey’s 
Silo series (2011-2013).  
The utopian tradition and the ongoing deliberation on the social sphere that it offers through 
both conventional and new mediums reveals an ever-increasing suspicion of spaces that are labelled 
‘utopian.’ In a global, postmodern age where one can view images of war and famine from the peace 
and safety of a dinner table replete with food, it is increasingly difficult to accept let alone comprehend 
the idea of a place that is wholly good and idyllic. If we return to our truism, what this suspicion 
exposes is the basic assumption that utopia and dystopia are two entirely different things – that they 
form a binary where one is ‘the good place’ and the other is, to borrow an Orwellian phrase, the 
‘doubleplusungood place.’ By virtue of this dualistic interpretation, utopia and dystopia can be 
thought of as the Jekyll and Hyde of the literary – and real – world; they can inhabit the same place, 
but never at the same time. Although this binary continues to hold true in the majority of texts, both 
cinematic and literary, that depict utopian or – more frequently – dystopian spaces, there are a few 
critics of utopian theory who are, however grudgingly, beginning to recognise that this apparently 
ineluctable binary is not as clear-cut as once assumed. This thesis proposes to first build upon the work 
of these critics, and to then interrogate (literary) texts that I believe begin to dismantle the utopia / 
dystopia binary, offering instead an alternative lens – which takes into account the diverse nature of 
the modern world – through which to view them.   
In her 2005 Worlds Apart? Dualism and Transgression in Contemporary Female Dystopias, 
Dunja Mohr notes the emergence of what she chooses to call a “new subgenre: that of feminist 
‘transgressive utopian dystopias’” (3) within the utopian literary tradition. Seeking to challenge 
established conventions that read texts such as the first two novels of Suzy McKee Charnas’s Holdfast 
series and Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale as traditionally dystopian narratives, Mohr 
identifies these texts instead as dystopias with “a utopian undercurrent…[that] criticize, undermine, 
and transgress the established binary logic of dystopia” (3). Mohr’s theory, which she builds on with 
the article ‘Transgressive Utopian Dystopias: The Postmodern Reappearance of Utopia in the Disguise 
of Dystopia’ (2007), provides an intriguing synthesis of the work of Tom Moylan (1986, 2000) and Lucy 
Sargisson (1996, 2000) on, respectively, the critical utopia and transgression. It also, I believe, goes a 
long way towards answering Lyman Tower Sargent’s call for an examination of “the possibilit[ies] of a 
‘critical dystopia’” (1994, 9), and reinforces our understanding of the dystopia as an integral part of 
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the broader utopian literary tradition.1 Nevertheless, I would suggest that the term that Mohr employs 
– ‘transgressive utopian dystopias’ – does not in fact dismantle the utopia-dystopia binary but rather 
emphasises it. By virtue of that label, the texts she discusses may contain traces of utopia but they are 
still, to all extents and purposes, dystopias. I propose instead to utilize the label ‘heterotopia’ when 
identifying and discussing textual spaces that are inherently transgressive, containing the essence of 
both utopia and dystopia. Before I expand upon heterotopia as a concept, however, it is important 
that I clarify a few terms, and address, if only briefly, the utopian literary tradition from which it both 
springs and perhaps seeks to transcend.  
 
 Although it might entail falling into the category of “sinners” (2) that Lyman Tower Sargent so 
deplores, it is not my intention here to obsessively classify and define utopia, dystopia, or any of the 
sub-categories and literary variations of the utopian tradition. I am interested in these insofar as they 
are useful as umbrella terms; as generalisations that are indicative of a broadly wholesale approach 
to the depiction and understanding of purely ‘good’ or wholly ‘bad’ societies that facilitates and 
enforces stasis and homogeneity, leaving no room for the possibilities and potential of difference. 
Even umbrella terms, however, require clarification; it is not enough to merely assert that we know 
what utopia is when we see it, or when we perceive its lack. Although Filio Diamanti has noted quite 
correctly that there is no general agreement amongst scholars as to the exact definition of the term 
(116), Krishan Kumar (1991), Lucy Sargisson (1996), Michael Foucault (2009) and Sargent (1994) all 
seem to agree that ‘utopia,’ as coined by Thomas More, means – etymologically, at least – a good 
place that is no place.2 Sargisson goes on to add that utopias “stem always from discontent with the 
now and gesture always towards a better life” (2009, 26). As the opposite of utopia, dystopia is simply, 
as Walter Russell Mead so artfully described it, “a place where everything is bad” (13). It is important 
when considering these definitions not to confuse dystopia with anti-utopia, although I acknowledge 
that there can be a certain amount of coalescence between the two. The former merely represents 
the inverse of the utopian impulse, in that it still details an imagined ‘other’ place – however 
unpleasant it might be – the latter, as Ulhenbuch notes, “refers to works that critique the utopian 
impulse, utopias and their writers” (128). That is, the dystopia represents a continued engagement 
with the utopian tradition whilst the anti-utopia represents a rejection of that impulse entirely. It is 
also important to note that I am quite deliberately steering away from any use of the word ‘perfect’ 
                                                          
1 See also Darko Suvin’s ‘Theses on Dystopia 2001’ (2003) and M. Keith Booker’s The Dystopian Impulse in 
Modern Literature (1994). 
2 It is not even completely certain whether More actually intended this term to be as ambiguous as it is. A close 
examination of More’s correspondence shows that he himself tended to use ‘no-place’ as his interpretation of 
the term; Elisabeth Hansot points this out in passing in the introduction to her Perfection and Progress: Two 
Modes of Utopian Thought (1974). 
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in respect to my definition of utopia, despite its prevalence in many dictionary and critical definitions. 
Whilst not agreeing with all his reasons for rejecting the conflation of ‘utopia’ and ‘perfection,’ I think 
that Sargent is right to do so, although I also believe that he does not give full consideration as to why 
perfection came to be equated with utopia, or why that association is once again being rejected (by 
literary critics and utopian scholars in any case).3 These definitions are – especially if we return once 
again to the aforementioned truism, and the inherently subjective nature of a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ place – 
of necessity particularly and infuriatingly vague. I will give fuller consideration to these definitions, 
and to the status of perfection in conjunction with utopia – and dystopia – when I return to elaborate 
on the concept of heterotopia; for now, suffice it to say that although utopia is a good place, it is in no 
way meant to be a perfect place. 
 The representation of utopia (and dystopia) in the utopian literary tradition as a whole is just 
one aspect of what Sargent calls the “broader phenomenon” (1994, 3) of utopianism. Sargent goes on 
to identify what he calls the “three different forms” (4) of utopian expression (literature, 
communitarianism, and social theory), but I am unconvinced by his declaration that that is necessary 
to keep them completely separate; it is hard to escape the observation that, particularly in the case of 
utopian literature and utopian social theory, one frequently informs, reflects, and meditates upon the 
other.4 ‘Utopianism’ is, however, a far more complex phenomenon than mere social dreaming; leaving 
it at that enables, if not actively encourages the (admittedly somewhat justified) criticisms of 
utopianism which became particularly fashionable in the mid to late-twentieth century. Tacitly 
acknowledging this, Krishan Kumar notes that utopianism is “never simple dreaming. It always has one 
foot in reality” (1991, 2). Thus, it is also necessary to incorporate into any understanding of 
‘utopianism’ Ruth Levitas’ notion that it is “the expression of the desire for a better way of being” 
(1990, 8).5 How this is expressed is not as important as the act of expression itself yet here, naturally, 
I will be more concerned with utopianism as it manifests in fictional literature.6 ‘Utopianism,’ then, is 
(social) dreaming that articulates the yearning for a better way of being in the world. This definition 
is, again, of necessity vague; although Bloch sought to move away from the perception of utopianism 
                                                          
3 I find Sargent’s reliance on authorial intention, and his assertion that the intentions of authors of utopian fiction 
“are in principle knowable” (‘Three Faces,’ 6) to be deeply problematic. In all fairness, he is not the only scholar 
to base his utopian scholarship on the notion of authorial intent; Peter Stillman (‘Utopia as Practical Political 
Philosophy’) is another who appears to agree with this (perhaps outdated) view.  
4 Following the precedent set by Ernst Bloch, Ruth Levitas and Fredric Jameson in particular comment upon the 
heuristic potential of utopian literature. 
5 Levitas also returns to this definition of utopianism in her chapter ‘Utopian Function’ (27), in Barbara Goodwin’s 
(ed) The Philosophy of Utopia (2001). 
6 If one is to believe the stance occupied by Ruth Levitas, Judith Shklar, and Laurence Davis (amongst others), 
the act of utopian expression (what Davis calls the “vivid exercise of ethical imagination” (57)) and its heuristic 
function is of the utmost importance.  
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as “unregulated…wishful images” (1986, 13), he was also aware that not all utopianism was driven by 
perspicacity or the desire to better the lives of others (33-34).  
More importantly, however, this definition begins to emphasise both the ‘purpose’ of utopia 
and the utopian tradition (insofar as any fictional construct can be said to have a purpose), and some 
of the foundational – and perhaps necessary – tensions inherent in utopianism, and, indeed, in any 
expression of utopian desire. Frederic Jameson writes of the “fundamental dynamic of any Utopian 
politics” (xii) as resting in the “degree to which such a politics aims at imagining, and sometimes even 
at realizing, a system radically different from this one” (xii). Writing almost a century earlier, H. G. 
Wells – rather more lyrically – captures both the flavour of that ‘fundamental dynamic’ and 
simultaneously reveals the necessary tension at work in it in the early pages of his ground-breaking 
1905 novel A Modern Utopia: 
 
Our business here is to be Utopian, to make vivid and credible, if we can, first this facet and 
then that, of an imaginary whole and happy world. Our deliberate intention is to be not, 
indeed, impossible, but most distinctly impracticable, by every scale that reaches only 
between to-day and to-morrow. We are to turn our backs for a space upon the insistent 
examination of the thing that is, and face towards the freer air, the ampler spaces of the thing 
that perhaps might be, to the projection of a State or city ‘worth while,’ [sic] to designing upon 
the sheet of our imaginations the picture of a life conceivably possible, and yet better worth 
living than our own.  
             (6) 
 
What Wells and Jameson both identify is the uneasy relationship between the expression of utopian 
possibilities – the social dreaming aspect – and the expediency of those possibilities. And, particularly 
in light of some of the more horrific elements of twentieth-century history, it became – and to a certain 
extent still is – popular to dismiss, as Karl Popper did, any form of utopianism or utopian theory – he 
describes “Utopian engineering” (1966, 157) – as a “dangerous and pernicious” (1986, 5) theory and 
one that inevitably and invariably “leads to violence” (5) and “a strong centralized rule of a few” (1966, 
159). Popper is not alone in his condemnation of utopianism; Leszek Kolakowski and Isaiah Berlin are 
but two of the more famous names who, in different ways and from different critical positions, echo 
his unstinting denunciation of all forms of utopianism. But is their ire justified? As Laurence Davis 
somewhat dryly remarks, “these champions of the open society are apparently rather immoderate in 
their unqualified equation of utopianism and totalitarianism” (56). If their vehemence is not justified, 
it is at least understandable; all three men – Popper and Berlin especially – suffered in one way or 
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another at the hands of the “totalitarian tyranny” (Kumar, 1987, 381) of the regimes of Adolf Hitler 
and Josef Stalin.7 Their negative experiences aside, however, Popper, Berlin and Kolakowski’s 
condemnations of utopia and utopianism are ultimately based on a basic misapprehension of the 
nature of utopia(nism) – that it is the desire to engineer the perfect, unchanging society.8 In his 
remarkably gentle and thoughtful dismantling of Berlin’s arguments against the utopianism of William 
Morris, Davis observes that even though Morris’ utopianism is, in fact problematic, “the defining 
feature of utopian thought is not the quest for ethical perfection, but the vivid exercise of ethical 
imagination” (57). 
Although many of the arguments made by the likes of Popper and Berlin may have been 
discredited or moderated, their anti-utopian rhetoric remains persuasive – as Judith Shklar notes, 
“utopia and utopian have mostly come to designate projects that are not just fantasies but also ones 
that will end in ruin” (1994, 41, emphasis in original). Shklar is not alone in this observation; Levitas 
comments that “there is a tendency to think of utopia as being one of two things: either a totalitarian 
political project, or a literary genre of fictions about perfect societies” (2001, 27). More recently John 
Gray has identified a highly negative strain of Right Wing utopianism in the policies of Margaret 
Thatcher in the late eighties and early nineties, and of Tony Blair and his American counterpart, George 
W. Bush, at the turn of the century and in the years following the 9/11 attacks (74-106). Although 
Russell Jacoby launches an unexpectedly spirited defence of utopianism in the conclusion to his 
depressingly-titled The End of Utopia: Politics and Culture in an Age of Apathy, arguing compellingly 
that neither Hitler nor Stalin (and their respective regimes) were utopians, and that “the bloodbaths 
of the twentieth century can be as much attributed to anti-utopians – to bureaucrats, technicians, 
nationalists and religious sectarians with a narrow vision of the future” (166), he acknowledges 
nonetheless that the idea of utopia as a positive force is in trouble: “the traditional criticism that 
utopias lack any pertinence has not abated. If anything, it has intensified…The notion, first advanced 
by conservatives, has nowadays been accepted by virtually everyone: armed with blueprints and floor 
plans, utopians would wreak havoc to establish their private vision – and they have” (166).  
 
                                                          
7 Ruth Levitas offers an interesting, if regrettably brief marginal commentary on the (erroneous) ways in which 
the biographies and regimes of these two dictators have been retrospectively intertwined by twentieth and 
twenty-first century historians and biographers (‘Utopian Function’). 
8 When he finally gets to around to accusing Plato of totalitarian leanings, Popper tends to skirt around the use 
of the word ‘perfect’ in conjunction with utopianism and “Utopian systems...of social engineering” (1966, 24), 
preferring to use the synonym ‘ideal’ instead; however, he draws the link between perfection, stasis and utopia 
very early in his book when he addresses Plato’s “aim to escape the Heraclitean flux, manifested in social 
revolution and historical decay…[which] can be done by establishing a state which is so perfect that it does not 
participate in the general trend of historical development” (24-25). 
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Is there a way to rehabilitate how depictions of utopia are received? And, the more important 
question might be, should we try? Although scholars such as Laurence Davis (2001) and Elisabeth 
Hansot (1974) have sought to distinguish ‘modern’ utopias – typified by dynamism and a plurality of 
ethics – from their ‘classical’ antecedents, which are characterised by what Davis terms “value 
monism” (76), many of the early-to-mid modern utopias still display a tendency towards a static 
dualism; the dominant ideology – the utopian blueprint, as Popper would probably call it – is good, 
and anything different – if difference is even remotely countenanced – is invariably bad. This is 
noticeable even in the text that Hansot and Davis see as beginning the modern utopian tradition; 
Thomas More’s Utopia.9 For example, whilst Jameson has claimed that More’s Utopia displays what 
he terms a “processual dynamism” (22), the society that is portrayed shows no inclination – or 
institutional ability – to accept or consider the possibilities of change. Individuals may be able to 
choose what trade they desire to practise – and can seek “permission to learn another” (More, 56) – 
and may, in the silences of their souls, hold alternate religious beliefs (98-102) but these are freedoms 
of perception rather than reality, since the possibilities open to Utopians are still tightly controlled 
and circumscribed; they are subject to what Jacoby aptly described as “monolithic discipline” (169). 
Their recognition and acceptance of Christianity is similarly open to criticism, given that, as Hythloday 
himself says, “Christianity seemed so very like their own principle religion” (More, 99). In reality, there 
is little room in even this seemingly most utopian of spaces for that which does not fit perfectly with 
the tightly constrained ‘good’ place. In light of this, and in the attempt to preserve the recognition of 
the utopian spirit – if not the name – I would propose another kind of space, a space that does not 
replace or provide an alternative to the utopia and/or dystopia so much as it encompasses and at least 
partially reconciles them. This space is the heterotopia. 
Postulated almost as an afterthought by Michel Foucault in 1967, the heterotopia, with its 
enactment in “real spaces” (2009, 63) seems like an ideal auxiliary to the “fundamentally unreal” (62) 
utopia.10 Foucault saw the heterotopia as “a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, 
all the other real sites that can be found within the culture are simultaneously represented, contested, 
and inverted. Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate 
                                                          
9 It is important to note that although More’s depiction of the first Utopian nation depends on stasis and the 
binary of the good place (itself) versus the bad place (everywhere that doesn’t subscribe to its ideology) to 
maintain itself, it is not as static as many of its successors. 
10 In her 1997 article ‘On the Need for Ethical Aesthetics: Or, Where I Stand between Neo-Luddites and 
Cyberians,’ Deborah J. Haynes mistakenly attributes the inception of the term ‘heterotopia’ to Gianni Vattimo 
in The Transparent Society (p77). Although Vattimo has – as I shall explore – undoubtedly contributed to the 
growth of this concept, and, crucially, helped associate it with postmodernity, Foucault – who wrote ‘Other 
Spaces’ some thirty years before Vattimo published The Transparent Society, and first mentioned the term 




their location in reality” (63). It should be noted here that the heterotopia I am theorizing here 
diverges at times from that envisaged by Foucault, who posited them as either sites of crisis, or as sites 
of deviance (63-65), but always as sites of division, exclusion and stratification. I would contend, 
instead, that they are both and neither; and can instead be conceived of as constituting very real sites 
of accepted difference, whose potency and resilience stems directly from their nature as unsettled 
and ambiguous – that is, neither completely utopian or dystopian, but inclusive of both – and thus 
inherently transgressive when we consider the customary divide between either utopia or dystopia, 
and the role that these spaces have played in reinforcing the socially subjective dualisms that they 
perpetuate, particularly the arbitrary demarcation between what is ‘good’ or ‘right’ and what is ‘bad’ 
or ‘wrong.’  As Marco Cenzatti has noted, the role of the heterotopia in creating ambiguity and in 
questioning arbitrary binaries is implicit in its origins as a medical term that indicates a condition 
whereby normal and healthy tissue grows in unexpected places and ways (76).  
This reading of the nature of heterotopia problematizes the definition that Fátima Vieira 
offers: “within the context of dystopian literature, heterotopias represent a kind of haven for the 
protagonists, [one which is] very often to be found in their memories, in their dreams or in places 
which, for some reason, are out of the reach of the invigilation system which normally prevails in those 
societies” (18). This definition, as Raj Shah points out, likens heterotopias to utopias, and fails to 
acknowledge that heterotopias are, first and foremost, real spaces (702); it reinforces, in the first 
instance, the dualistic nature of utopia and dystopia when, I believe, the heterotopia challenges that 
binary. It cannot be stressed enough that the heterotopia is not a utopian space; as I will demonstrate 
when I analyse my texts, the heterotopia is a perilous, almost capricious site, and one that can 
represent and exude a sense of menace as readily as it does sanctuary. Kevin Hetherington (1997) 
notes that the heterotopia, which he conceives of as a marginal space (after Marin) can be a space of 
control, or freedom, or both (42); that is, that the heterotopia can be conceived of as a space which is 
as dystopic as it is utopic, and thus is always a site of ambiguity and tension. That Foucault considers 
that “the heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that 
are in themselves incompatible” (2009, 65) merely adds to its ability to transgress and question and 
at the same time facilitate and reconcile, not only spaces and people, but ideas about how people and 
spaces can utilise themselves and each other. It would also suggest, contrary to the impression that 
Foucault gives, that the heterotopian space is one that is in a constant state of flux. The heterotopia 
that Foucault imagines is one that is, much like the utopia, by and large locked in stasis. He writes that 
heterotopias have a “precise and determined function” (64), and whilst an argument might be made 
for his heterotopian sites of crisis to be ones of change and animation, he also believes that they are 
“disappearing” (64). His use of an average, every-day mirror to demonstrate what he means by the 
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term heterotopia shows this. Although a mirror may invert and reflect an image, it in no way alters or 
challenges that image; it merely reveals what is already there. This is not to be confused with the 
concept of carnivalesque mirrors, those distorting or ‘funhouse’ mirrors most frequently found at 
carnivals or fairs which are, on many levels, the opposite of their every-day counterparts. And 
although Foucault’s closing vision, with his depiction of the ship as “the heterotopia par excellence” 
(68, emphasis in original) might suggest that his heterotopia is dynamic with fluid boundaries – it is 
both enclosed upon itself, and open to whatever port or far-away land it might encounter – I would 
suggest that although this is true to a point, it, along with his telling use of the term “colonies” (68), 
merely reinforces the inflexibility of his heterotopia; the ship, after all, is the site and enabler of that 
most cataclysmic and controversial of utopian projects – colonisation. 
In his Archaeologies of the Future, Fredric Jameson, analysing Samuel Delany’s Trouble on 
Triton, refers to the heterotopia as a “Foucauldian alternative of Utopian spaces and enclaves” (144, 
my emphasis). This is a particularly suggestive word and one I wish to seize upon, not only for its 
evocation of the concepts of multiplicity and difference, but for the ways in which it calls to mind 
images of collectives of like-minded or ethnically similar individuals who have banded together to 
pursue a common purpose. This aspect of heterotopianism will become particularly pertinent when I 
begin to examine my second ‘cluster’ of texts – the more modern SF visions of Michael Marshall Smith, 
Nick Harkaway, and Neal Stephenson.  Although she does not engage with this concept, Lisa 
Swanstrom’s model of encapsulation, rupture and penetration – and the tensions between these – in 
Stephenson’s Snow Crash, with its (networked) clusters of seemingly encapsulated and isolated 
enclaves (54-55) comes remarkably close to the depiction of heterotopia that I posit. It also begins to 
address, however inadvertently, some of the more problematic characteristics of the heterotopia that 
are suggested by my focus on the word ‘enclaves’ in conjunction with heterotopias in society; in 
particular, it addresses the isolation and fragmentation that the term implies.11 Building on Lieven de 
Cauter’s brief – and perhaps overly simplistic – work in ‘The Capsule and the Network: Notes Toward 
a General Theory’ (2004), Swanstrom posits that the ostensibly isolationist – or, to use de Cauter’s 
terminology, ‘encapsulated’ – society depicted in Snow Crash, which is characterised by a series of 
inwardly focused and selectively populated enclaves – known as ‘Burbclaves (a neologism presumably 
arrived at by combining the words ‘suburb’ and ‘enclaves’) and “FOQNEs, Franchise-Owned Quasi-
National Entities” (Stephenson, 14) – is in fact one in which the penetration of peripheries occurs 
constantly, creating an effect of rupture and flow that transgresses and overcomes the rules of 
fragmentation and arbitrary boundaries (Swanstrom, 58-60):  
                                                          
11 It also provides a key building block for the relationship and effect/affect that heterotopia and the individual 




The gate flies open as if by magic as the security system senses that this is a CosaNostra Pizza 
vehicle, just making a delivery sir. And as he goes through, the Kourier – that tick on his ass – 
waves to the border police…like he comes in here all the time!  
He probably does come in here all the time. Picking up important shit for important TMAWH 
people, delivering it to other FOQNES…that’s what Kouriers do. Still.12    
                               (Stephenson, 14) 
 
Although there are gates, borders and border police within the city (which presumably is Los Angeles), 
these can be, and are, traversed. And even in these opening scenes of the novel, both the delivery 
driver – the playfully named Hiro Protagonist – and the Kourier have the ability to move through the 
borders of Stephenson’s fragmented society with ease, and do so continuously; as Swanstrom notes, 
the two initially meet in a ‘Burbclave which neither of them are a member of (58). This flow between 
what de Cauter terms the “real capsules” (95) of every day or ‘real life’ existence – ‘Burbclaves and 
FOQNES, bimbo boxes – is mirrored in (and by) the “virtual capsules” (de Cauter, 95) that also populate 
the novel, particularly the Metaverse.13 It is important to note, however, that the ‘Burbclaves depicted 
in SC are not necessarily idyllic or all-welcoming; although The Mews at Windsor Heights acts as an 
“innocuous [safeguard] of middle-class values” (Swanstrom, 57), other ‘Burbclaves are more 
ambiguous. Fleeing from a gang of taxi cab drivers after breaking Y.T. (the aforementioned Kourier) 
out of the Clink, Y.T. and Hiro’s refuge options are limited: “Hiro is black, or at least part black. Can’t 
take him into New South Africa. And because Y.T. is a Cauc, they can’t go to Metazania” (Stephenson, 
77). New South Africa is, much like the White Columns ‘Burbclave, an exclusively white and highly 
racist neighbourhood. This rupture of the flow between borders creates a (necessary) tension and 
incertitude; whilst the heterotopia, as I posit it, is characterised by borders which are at least semi-
permeable, this is not ubiquitous and thus continues to encourage differences to flourish, however 
problematic and morally ambiguous some of those differences may appear to be. 
 
This (altered) vision of heterotopia, then, becomes one of dynamism and multiplicity, and 
owes its conception, in this regard at least, as much to Swanstrom and to Gianni Vattimo’s work in 
The Transparent Society as it does to Michel Foucault. Although Vattimo is primarily concerned with 
the transition from modernity to postmodernity and the effect that transition then has on art and 
aesthetic experience, his work is directly relevant to the ongoing development of what I identity as 
                                                          
12 TMAWH – The Mews at Windsor Heights – is one of the many ‘Burbclaves in SC.   
13 Bimbo boxes are “family [minivans]” (Stephenson, 8) in SC.  
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heterotopian fiction. Central to that relevance is his acknowledgement of the “proliferation…of world 
views” (5), and his insistence on the “multiplicity” (69) of modern life, which rejects out of hand the 
“totality” (80) that traditional utopian concepts remain inextricably bound up with: “the term utopia 
concerns the realization of an optimal reality by way of rational design, whether it be oriented 
metaphysically…or technologically” (79, my emphasis). The crux of Vattimo’s point here lies in his use 
of the singular; in traditional utopian literature, the depicted utopia is utopia: there is no room – or 
need – for other versions. But as Jameson reminds us, any utopia is only ever one model amongst 
many (143). Synthesising the thought of Foucault, Vattimo, and Swanstrom, the heterotopia as I 
postulate it offers not just an alternative, but a “multiplicity of models” (Vattimo, 70) that provides 
the potential for endless alternatives to the utopian blueprint that Popper disparaged. In this regard 
at least, it is the direct successor to the utopia that Lucy Sargisson imagines in her discourse with Ruth 
Levitas, one that “[changes] the ways in which we think: about thinking our way around alienation, 
duality, polarizations, competition, separation, and oppositional thinking…this is (perhaps) achievable 
through a utopianism that takes Utopia as a place in which to explore alternatives” (2003, 17). The 
difference is that the heterotopia can represent multiple spaces and multiple points of view in which 
alternatives to the status quo and the subjectivity that it imposes can be explored concurrently, rather 
than singly. In utopian fiction, then, the heterotopia stands in opposition to, and transgresses the 
expectations of what Philip Wegner has termed the “cognitive maps” (185) of utopian desire. Whilst 
Vattimo chooses to call them instead “rational design[s]” (79) – which are almost invariably large-scale 
and scientific in nature, if not application – these ‘cognitive maps’ are the means by which the singular, 
universal utopia (whichever version you care to imagine) can be, and will be realised. The Party in 
Nineteen Eighty Four, the OneState of Zamiatin’s We (along with their literary predecessors in the 
guise of Jack London’s Iron Heel); even the Jorgmund Company of The Gone-Away World and the 
monopolist L. Bob Rife in Snow Crash exhibit this kind of grand-scale thinking, which I prefer to label 
‘cognitive blueprints’ both for the technical and scientific connotations, and, more importantly, for 
the implicit association with the late nineteenth and early-to-mid-twentieth century, when many of 
these grand designs were being hypothesized. 
 
Throughout the course of this thesis, I will examine my chosen texts in conjunction with this 
reconstructed version of the heterotopia. The first chapter, in which I will explore two traditionally 
‘dystopian’ texts – Evgenii Zamiatin’s We and George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (NEF) – will seek 
to locate the heterotopia within the broader utopian literary tradition. I will contend that whilst both 
of these texts are still largely dystopian in both structure and outlook, they also contain spaces within 
them that display what I identify as prototypically heterotopian tendencies. Beginning – somewhat 
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fittingly, given its ascribed role as the god-father of modern dystopian fiction – with Zamiatin’s We, I 
will situate the novel within both a broader and specifically Russian (utopian) literary tradition before 
moving on to an exploration of those themes that I see as distinctly heterotopian in outlook. These 
themes, along with the dualisms that they begin to dismantle, will be examined in the context of the 
main character, D-503 and the evolution of his experiences in and relationship with the building known 
as the Ancient House. Fundamentally heterotopian and ambiguous, the Ancient House and what it 
signifies will feature prominently throughout not only the first chapter, but the body of the thesis. My 
analysis of NEF will build upon my analysis of We, and through the examination of spaces that fulfil a 
similar function to that of the Ancient House and the interaction of Winston Smith with these spaces, 
will contend that despite the apparently dystopian closure exhibited by the novel, this is also a text 
that displays heterotopian tendencies.  
The second chapter of this thesis will begin by introducing the concept of an individual that is 
narratively constituted. I will provide a brief overview of the theory that informs my conception of the 
individual, subjectivity and self, before moving onto a consideration of the ways in which heterotopian 
spaces both enable and undermine the narratives by which the individuals that inhabit and comprise 
them constitute their selves. This will form the basis of my exploration of Neal Stephenson’s Snow 
Crash (SC), which, I will contend, is more pervasively heterotopian in outlook and composition than 
either of the worlds depicted in We and NEF. I will examine the figure and narratives of Hiro 
Protagonist in conjunction with two complementary heterotopian spaces – Reality and the Metaverse. 
As my analysis will reveal, however, the heterotopian potentials of SC are limited and – somewhat 
ironically – undermined by the dualisms that the narrative arc of this novel, in the end, clings to. 
 In my third and final chapter, I will examine two texts that I see as being fundamentally and 
perhaps even definitively heterotopian, not only in their composition but also in the ways that the 
heterotopian spaces within them begin to dismantle the dualisms associated with the utopia / 
dystopia binary. In Nick Harkaway’s The Gone-Away World (TGAW), this is achieved by the 
heterotopian spaces of the novel, particularly the substance known as Stuff, that foster the 
exploration of multiple narratives of self and in doing so begin to destabilise arbitrary – and binary-
derived – assumptions about what is ‘right’ and what is ‘wrong’; about what is ‘human’ and what is 
‘not.’ My analysis of Michael Marshall Smith’s Only Forward (OF) builds upon the conclusions that I 
draw from TGAW, and is centred upon the figure of Stark – who, I contend, is representative of the 
burgeoning individual that heterotopia makes possible where utopia and / or dystopia does not – and 
his association with the heterotopian spaces of this text. The first of these spaces, known as Stable, 
demonstrates the varied nature of the transgressive heterotopian space. The second, known as 
Jeamland, completely dismantles the same dualisms that Stuff began to destabilise. These spaces 
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demonstrate conclusively not only the ambiguous and hybrid nature of the heterotopia and the 
individual that it enables, but also its suitability as a lens through which to view a world that is 
progressively inimical to what Wegner calls the “abstracting, universalizing forces” (185) that utopia 

































Chapter One: ‘Dystopian’ Antecedents of the Heterotopian Impulse – We and 
Nineteen Eighty-Four 
 
Not progress denied but progress realized, is the nightmare haunting the anti-utopian novel. 
‘The Fiction of Antiutopia’ – Irving Howe. 
 
Much of what Wells has imagined and worked for is physically there in Nazi Germany. The 
order, the planning, the State encouragement of science, the steel, the concrete, the aeroplanes, are 
all there, but all in the service of ideas appropriate to the Stone Age. Science is fighting on the side of 
superstition. 
‘Wells, Hitler, and the World State’ – George Orwell 
 
In both the critical and popular imagination, the ever-increasing dependence on and 
veneration of science and technology – those ‘forces of progress and modernisation’ that Wegner 
identifies – in the early twentieth century, alongside the growing disillusionment with the 
potentialities of utopia and utopian visions, oversaw and facilitated the rise of utopia’s Other: the 
dystopia.14 Although there is a well-established critical tendency – thanks largely, I believe, to 
Sargent’s almost reductive insistence on the endless sub-categorisation of utopian literature in 
general – to distinguish between dystopia and anti-utopia in particular, I am, as I have already stated, 
largely uninterested in such distinctions. Whilst they can be a useful tool for coming to grips in the 
first instance with what is, after all, a vast and unwieldy genre, I am unsure of whether they are, in the 
end, necessary. Raffaella Baccolini and Tom Moylan in particular are an example of the 
aforementioned tendency – and, indeed, owe much of their delineation between the two forms to 
Sargent. In their introduction to Dark Horizons, they defend and reiterate Sargent’s definitions, stating 
that “dystopia is distinct from its nemesis, the anti-utopia, and its generic sibling, the literary eutopia” 
(4). They gloss very quickly over the constitution of anti-utopia noting only, in accordance with 
Sargent, that as a term it “should be reserved for that large class of works…which are directed against 
Utopia and utopian thought” (5, my emphasis), whilst dystopia is to be understood as the nightmare 
aspect of utopian social dreaming (5). Many of the differences that they observe between anti-utopia 
and dystopia are structural in nature; in particular, they note in dystopian fiction the frequent use of 
strategies such as textual estrangement, and narrative and counter-narrative. What Baccolini and 
Moylan – and Sargent – overlook, however, is what the dystopia and anti-utopia have in common, and 
                                                          
14 Margaret Atwood comes to a similar conclusion in her introduction to Brave New World when she declares 
that “the First World War marked the end of the romantic-idealistic utopian dream in literature” (x).  
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what they both exhibit: a fundamental dissatisfaction with and suspicion of the wholly good, perfect 
place and those who would believe in it; that is, the utopian, and utopianism more generally. This 
scepticism and disappointment manifests itself in the philosophy of liberal plurists and democrats such 
as Isaiah Berlin and Karl Popper; it is also expressed, naturally enough, in popular fiction and 
literature.15 Two of the more popular and enduring examples of what I choose to recognise as the 
dystopic strain of the utopian impulse in the early-mid twentieth century – George Orwell’s Nineteen 
Eighty-Four, and Evgenii Zamiatin’s We – will be examined in this chapter. It has been argued 
elsewhere that both of these novels are anti-utopian, rather than dystopian although it is, perhaps, 
telling – and even somewhat ironic – that Baccolini and Moylan identify both texts as representative 
of the “classical, or canonical, form of dystopia” (1). Adrian Wanner (1997), Robert Russell (2000), Gary 
Kern (1988), Jameson (2005) and Kumar (1987) are all examples of the critical predisposition to read 
these texts as anti-utopian, whilst those who prefer to identify NEF and / or We as dystopian include 
Tomo Sava (2012) Gormon Beauchamp (1973), Goodwin and Taylor (2009), Claeys and Sargent (1999), 
M. Keith Booker (1994) and, tentatively perhaps, Suvin (1979). Tony Burns (2008) understands We as 
neither. However, it is Phillip Wegner’s discussion of We as a new form of (critical) utopia that I find 
most interesting, and which lays some of the groundwork for my contention that, far from being 
straightforwardly dystopian – or, if you must, anti-utopian – We and Ninety Eighty-Four instead display 
precursory heterotopian functions and tendencies; in particular, although to differing degrees, they 
take up the mantle of H. G. Wells and set the scene for the emergence of the heterotopia by posing a 
series of challenges to the homogenous depiction of static, totalising utopias whilst focusing anew on 
individuals as discrete units and the role(s) they might have to play in their society.16  
 
 Prior to any discussion of my chosen texts it will be useful to briefly engage with dystopian 
theory in general (insofar as it relevant to this thesis), and, more specifically, my claim that the 
dystopia is one of the main progenitors of the heterotopia. As I have already noted, the demarcation 
between dystopia and anti-utopia is not always clear; this is not only because they both display 
dissatisfaction with and suspicion towards (attempted) depictions of the wholly good place, but also 
because the dystopia is (perhaps by virtue of those aforementioned structural strategies) an “impure 
genre, with permeable borders which allow contamination from other genres, that represents 
                                                          
15 In his preface to Metamorphoses of Science Fiction Darko Suvin notes the long-standing estrangement of 
literary critics and scholars from “90 percent or more” of fiction on the grounds that it is not ‘good’ or 
“aesthetically significant” literature (vii). He comments on the distinction made between “literature” and what 
he terms “Para-literature,” and makes a convincing argument for a critical engagement with the latter (vii).  
16 I find it intriguing that Wegner identifies NEF, but not We, as anti-utopian, despite noting the links and 
similarities between the two. His is an argument I find compelling, despite my own preference for thinking of 
NEF as a misanthropic dystopia, rather than anti-utopian. However, as will become clear, I do not agree with 
his view of We as utopian, either.  
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resistance to a hegemonic ideology that reduces everything to global monoculture” (Baccolini and 
Moylan, 8, my emphasis). That is, far more so than it’s Other, the utopia, the dystopia is a genre that 
borrows from the forms and conventions of others; by virtue of that borrowing, the dystopia 
encourages hybridity and dynamism. As I have already noted, hybridity and resistance to uniformity 
is also a hallmark of the heterotopia. Whilst Moylan, Baccolini and Mohr see these features as 
belonging exclusively to later dystopian writing (what they, and Lyman Tower Sargent before them 
see as the ‘critical (feminist) dystopias’ of the 1980s and 1990s), I believe they can also be found in 
two examples of what are popularly thought of as the progenitors of the dystopian genre: Nineteen 
Eighty-Four and We. What these texts accomplish, almost by accident, is to lay the foundations for the 
depiction and our understanding of the role of (later) heterotopian fictions and their place in the 




 Whether one chooses to approach it as anti-utopian or dystopian – and there are valid reasons 
for approaching it as either, and, indeed, both – there can be little doubt that Evgenii Zamiatin’s We 
was a watershed moment in the greater utopian tradition. That it is so amenable to widely varying 
interpretations is, I suspect, at least partly the source of its continuing academic charm, but it also 
remains a singularly compelling novel because of its seemingly timeless relevance. In his introduction 
to a collection of critical essays on Zamiatin and We, Gary Kern describes it as “the ultimate anti-
utopia” (9), noting that “its basic plot…has been repeated by Aldous Huxley…George Orwell…and 
dozens of writers and film-makers…in the fifties, sixties and seventies; yet its artistry, prophetic power 
and underlying philosophy remains unsurpassed. Although it makes a statement against the 
permanence of any human achievement, We has established itself as the most significant anti-utopian 
novel of the century” (9). Although I respectfully disagree with the designation of We as solely anti-
utopian, Kern here distils the essence of its continuing popularity. Whilst We is a novel that responds 
to issues of its own time, it also – more importantly – anticipates many of the concerns of modern 
Western society: the issue of balancing freedom against happiness; of the balance, or the lack thereof, 
between the individual and society (or to put it another way, between the private and the public); 
and, most crucially, the contest between energy and entropy. Stated thus, particularly when there is 
an emphasis on an overtly contextual reading, these issues seem hopelessly universal and simplistic, 
and yet Zamiatin’s treatment of them is anything but. These issues are a hallmark of the dystopian or 
anti-utopian novel – indeed, We functions as one or the other, and sometimes both – but I will contend 
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instead that We displays instances of a prototypically heterotopian blend of dystopian prognostication 
and utopian hope. 
As Kern notes, We has the dubious distinction of being the first novel banned by the Glavlit 
(9); this fact, alongside Zamiatin’s self-imposed exile and the reviews and literary criticism of We that 
came out of Russia in the 1920s, and again in the 1980s and 1990s, has helped generate the 
assumption that Zamiatin’s novel is first and foremost a scathing indictment of the Soviet Union in 
general, and of Stalinism in particular.17 An early and enduringly influential example of the political, 
contextual critical interpretation of We is Aleksandr Voronskii’s 1922 essay ‘Evgeny Zamyatin,’ in 
which he describes everything in the novel as “untrue” (44), a “lampoon” (45) and “saturated with a 
genuine fear of socialism” (43); it is perhaps worthwhile to note here the irony of Voronskii’s own 
arrest and expulsion from the Party in the late 1920s (Stacy, 198). Voronskii was the first of many to 
take this stance against the novel; Robert Russell notes that “in the second half of the 1920s, 
Voronskii’s opinion that We represented nothing more than a lampoon on communism became the 
only one to be heard in the Soviet press” (Robert Russell, 6). This ‘critical’ focus on the novel endured, 
with O. Mikhailov’s entry on Zamiatin in The Short Literary Encyclopedia describing it as a “vicious 
pamphlet against the [Soviet] State” (56). This insistence on reading We in light of Stalinism and post-
Revolutionary Russia is not limited to Soviet writers and critics; M. Keith Booker (1994), with his 
chapter entitled ‘Zamyatin’s We: Anticipating Stalin’ is but one example of the continuation of that 
tradition in ‘Western’ critical circles, whilst Barbara Goodwin and Keith Taylor’s treatment of the novel 
in The Politics of Utopia (2009) is another. Although Zamiatin’s own non-fiction writing indicates a 
certain preoccupation with some of the cultural and political implications of the Russian Revolution 
and its aftermath, I believe it is a mistake to focus too exhaustively on them; in particular, it is an 
oversight to attribute such a narrow focus to the novel as a mere prediction of Stalinism. George 
Orwell comes to a similar conclusion; reviewing the novel in January 1946, he observes that 
  
It may well be…that Zamyatin did not intend the Soviet regime to be the special target of his 
satire. Writing at about the time of Lenin's death, he cannot have had the Stalin dictatorship 
in mind, and conditions in Russia in 1923 were not such that anyone would revolt against them 
on the ground that life was becoming too safe and comfortable. What Zamyatin seems to be 
aiming at is not any particular country but the implied aims of industrial civilisation. 
                                    para. 8 
                                                          
17 Glavlit is the Soviet censorship organisation, more formally known as the Main Administration for Literary 
and Publishing Affairs. Instituted in 1922, it replaced the old Gosizdat, and aimed, amongst other things, to 
“prevent publication and distribution of works which…contained propaganda against the Soviet regime” 
(Ermolaev, Censorship, 3).  
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In other words, We concerns itself with broadly general issues, as well as those that were specific to 
the emerging Soviet Union. (Those general issues, or ‘implied aims’ were also cause for disquiet for 
Orwell himself, although his approach to and treatment of them would be slightly different). It must 
also be noted that Zamiatin was explicitly engaging with not only the utopian literary tradition in 
general – especially H. G. Wells and Jack London – but also within a specifically Russian literary 
context.18 In particular, We engages in a dialogue with such works as Alexander Bogdanov’s Red Star 
(1908), Nikolai Chernyshevskii’s What Is To Be Done? (1863), and Fiodor Dostoevskii’s The Brothers 
Karamazov (1880) and Notes From Underground (1864); the latter itself being a reaction against What 
Is To Be Done? (Robert Russell, 28-36; 53-54; Edwards, 45-46).19  
 So whilst it is both tempting and easy to read We as a reflection of a single set of circumstances 
and monolithic purpose, to do so not only diminishes the myriad other achievements of the novel but 
also risks missing the point. Phillip Wegner is similarly cautious, stating that in doing so “we run an 
additional risk, one that is especially pressing in the case of We, of reducing the complex heterogeneity 
of the narrative into a univocal, positive or negative, representation” (149). Much of the heterogeneity 
that Wegner mentions is created by the multifaceted and, I would suggest, interactive approach 
Zamiatin takes to these issues that I will now discuss. It should be noted that whilst I approach these 
three sets of antinomies as separate entities, I believe that they are all interconnected with each 
forming one part of an ongoing overall dialogue within the novel, which argues for the abandonment 
of the dualistic mode of thought that sees these themes as mutually incompatible, rather than 
fundamentally and practically related. Exemplified, embodied, and enabled by the marginal figure of 
the Ancient House, the three themes that I believe to be central to a reading of We as a dystopia – or 
anti-utopia – that displays distinctly heterotopian characteristics can be summarised thus; as the 
never-ending search for the middle ground between the dualisms of individual and society, happiness 
and freedom, and revolution (energy) and perceived perfection (entropy). 
 
 In his 1923 essay ‘On Literature, Revolution, Entropy, and Other Matters,’ Zamiatin writes 
that: 
 
Revolution is everywhere, in everything. It is infinite. There is no final revolution, no final 
number. The social revolution is only one of an infinite number of numbers: the law of 
                                                          
18 See Christopher Collins (1973), E. J. Brown (1976), Robert Russell (2000), and Alex M. Shane (1968). 
Additionally, in 1927 a contemporary critic of We, Victor Shklovskii, notes that We “recalls a certain parody of 
utopia by Jerome [K.] Jerome” (‘Evgeny Zamyatin’s Ceiling,’ reprinted in Kern (1998), p49). 
19 T. R. N. Edwards’ Three Russian Writers and the Irrational (1982) is a particularly useful study for 
understanding Zamiatin in a specifically Russian literary context. Although it is somewhat older, D. Richards’ 
‘Four Utopias’ (1961) also explores some of the links between Zamiatin and Dostoevskii (and Orwell).  
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revolution is not a social law, but an immeasurably greater one. It is a cosmic, universal law—
like the laws of the conservation of energy and of the dissipation of energy (entropy)... The 
law of revolution is red, fiery, deadly: but this death means the birth of new life, a new star. 
And the law of entropy is cold…The flame turns from red to an even, warm pink, no longer 
deadly, but comfortable…Heretics are the only (bitter) remedy against the entropy of human 
thought. Where the flaming, seething sphere (in science, religion, social life, art) cools, the 
fiery magma becomes coated with dogma—a rigid, ossified, motionless crust. Dogmatization 
in science, religion, social life, or art is the entropy of thought. What has become dogma no 
longer burns: it only gives off warmth—it is tepid, it is cool.      
                                  (107) 
 
That the epigraph he chose for this essay was taken from We is neither a surprise nor a coincidence; 
both pieces of writing are intimately concerned with the effects of stasis, and the harmful emphasis 
on the quest for (static) perfection that is implicit in the pursuit of (scientific) ‘progress’ which can lead 
as easily to entropy as it can to energy and evolution. And whilst this might seem to lend itself to an 
interpretation of the novel as primarily an anti-utopia, rather than a dystopia, I believe the opposite 
is true. Wegner has noted that the dystopia “presents a critique of the limitations of a specific form of 
imagining place, [whilst the anti-utopia presents] a rejection of this cognitive act altogether” (152-
153). As a whole, Zamiatin’s novel does not reject the possibilities and potential of utopia, as it would 
if it were simply an anti-utopian satire; what it rejects instead are, as the above quote from his essay 
hints at, the dystopian tendencies inherent in the dogmatization and stagnation of thought and the 
goals of utopian dreaming, which can only be countered by the actions of those revolutionaries who 
were willing to speak out against the dominant ideology – those he calls heretics.20 This is borne out 
in the novel through his exploration and complication of those issues that I have already identified as 
characteristic not only of the dystopia, but also of the heterotopia. The first of these can be described 
as the entropy of thought (and action). The ostensible goal of the OneState is perfection, and when 
he is his lucid, reasonable “number” self D-503 (Zamiatin, 56), the narrator of the novel, celebrates 
that goal, which is to “unbend the wild curve, to straighten it tangentially, asymptotically, to flatten it 
to an undeviating line. Because the line of OneState is a straight line. The great, divine, precise, wise 
straight line – the wisest of all lines” (4). That desire for order, in the imagery of the straight line, also 
                                                          
20 This is the role which Zamiatin perceived himself as occupying, as the title of Mirra Ginsburg’s excellent 
collection of Zamiatin’s writings, A Soviet Heretic: Essays by Yevgeny Zamyatin (1970) indicates. 
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manifests itself in the Taylorism of the OneState, whereby its members are reduced quite literally to 
mere numbers, and metaphorically to small cogs in a great machine: 21 
 
Every morning, with six-wheeled precision, at the very same hour and the very same minute, 
we get up, millions of us, as though we were one. At the very same hour, millions of us, as 
though we were one, we start work. At the very same hour, millions as one, we stop. And 
then, like one body with a million hands, at one and the same second according to the Table, 
we lift the spoon to our lips. And at one and the same second we leave for a stroll and go to 
the auditorium, to the hall for the Taylor exercises, and then to bed.    
           (13) 
 
The price of perfection, the price of “mathematically infallible happiness” (3) and a stable society, it 
would seem, is freedom and a sense of oneself as an individual. And although this vision of the perfect 
OneState as a single organism is revisited several times by a D-503 increasingly frantic to regain his 
place “on the hand” (100) or in the machine, he is also forced to acknowledge, however grudgingly, 
that the OneState is not yet completely perfect: “Twice a day – from 16:00 to 17:00 and again from 
21:00 to 22:00 – the single mighty organism breaks down into its individual cells. These are the 
Personal Hours” (13). As D-503‘s ‘ode’ to the OneState continues, however, it becomes rapidly obvious 
that its shortcomings extend far beyond the horror of two hours of time only nebulously accounted 
for. The OneState is in fact riddled with imperfections. The “Green Wall” (12), which is designed to 
encapsulate and isolate the OneState from the outside world cannot keep out pollen from the forest 
beyond it, nor can it contain its citizens – the Mephi (led, presumably, by I-330) regularly rupture the 
boundary represented by the Wall to converse with the ‘creatures’ that survived the war waged upon 
them by the city. The encapsulation of the OneState – and it’s eugenics program –  is further 
undermined by the “women…from the city, who have come to love those others over [the Wall]” 
(157), and who breed with them, injecting into the genetic stream of the OneState “a drop or two of 
that sunny forest blood” (157) which is likely to be the cause of the hairy hands that D-503 so despises, 
and the “gorilla” like agility of R-13 (139). That there is a need for the Guardians (the spies and secret 
                                                          
21 After Frederic Winslow Taylor, who pioneered the concept of ‘scientific management’ during the Industrial 
Revolution, which emphasised standardisation of (best) practise and work-place efficiency. Although less 
obviously mocked than the Fordism (which displayed similar characteristics to Taylorism) of Huxley’s Brave 
New World, it is still clearly a satirical target. See Michael Berman’s ‘Deception of the Self in Zamyatin’s We’ 
(2009); Gormon Beauchamp’s ‘Man as Robot: The Taylor System in We’ (1983a) and ‘Technology in the 
Dystopian Novel’ (1986); and Julia Vaingart’s ‘Human Machines and the Pains of Penmanship in Yevgeny 
Zamyatin’s We’ (2012). Robert Russell also offers a succinct summation of Taylorism in We in Zamiatin’s We 
(2000) on pages 39-42. 
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police of the OneState) suggests that life behind the Wall is not as perfect as D-503 would prefer to 
believe.  
One of the most significant imperfections of the OneState is the Ancient House. Introduced in 
‘Record 6,’ the Ancient House has been retained as a kind of a museum: a reminder of the “chaos” 
(27) of the past. The “entire strange, rickety, godforsaken structure is clad all about in a glass shell” 
(26), yet it remains opaque and impenetrable, unlike the glass buildings of the OneState. This would 
seem to mean, as Robert Russell notes, that it is “the only area in the One State free from prying eyes” 
(Zamiatin, 60). This is not quite true, of course, and in the company of I-330 in one of the bedrooms 
of the house D-503 comes to the realisation that “the way the human body is built, it’s just as stupid 
as [these] ‘apartments’ – human heads are opaque and there’s no way to see inside except through 
those tiny little windows, the eyes” (28). The association that D-503 here creates between I-330 and 
the house is crucial, and not just for the fact that they both represent in their own ways “a secret and 
illicit world of sexual passion” (Robert Russell, 60), with I-330 as the object and instigator, and the 
house as the facilitator of that passion. This association is emphasized continually throughout the 
novel by D-503’s repeated references to the ways in which I-330 can, like the house, shutter her eyes 
– her windows – and so herself, against him. 
This connection helps establish the Ancient House as an ostensibly utopian space within what 
I see as a profoundly dystopian world, a space in which ‘natural’ human urges and desires can express 
themselves. It is, however, an ambiguous kind of utopian space; it allows D-503 to have illicit sex with 
I-330, and enables the escape of O-90 and her unauthorised child from the OneState, but it also causes 
D-503 existential pain, unhappiness, and significant anxiety. I would suggest instead, and at least 
partially by virtue of that ambiguity, that the Ancient House is one of the fundamentally heterotopian 
spaces in the novel, one that performs both transgressive and liminal functions. Although it is not the 
only heterotopian site – the closet it contains, which in turn opens into the tunnels that lead beyond 
the Wall and thus enable the rupture of the boundaries of the OneState, is another, as are the 
aforementioned tunnels – it is certainly the most pivotal. The Ancient House is a site of both deviance 
and crisis, as it encompasses and enables secret passions and a ‘freedom’ of sorts that is at odds with 
the accepted norms of the OneState, and is also the bridging point between several different capsules 
or spaces. As a site of deviance, and by virtue of the tunnels that it provides access to (and 
concealment for), it allows movement between the Mephi, the OneState and the forest beyond it both 
physically and genetically, thus allowing challenges to the encapsulation, homogeneity and entropy of 
the OneState to arise on several different levels.  
The most important of these is the concept of revolution, both personal and societal. In a 
broadly general sense, this is embodied by I-330 (Wegner, 155) and, in a more specifically social sense, 
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is indicated by the revolution of the Mephi, which may or may not be successful. The success or failure 
of the rebellion is, in many ways, irrelevant in the greater context of the novel; it is the act of revolution 
and the desire and ability to rebel that is considered to be important, not the attainment of any specific 
goals; at no point does I-330 reveal to D-503 any tangible objectives – what we might in more relevant 
parlance call a manifesto – beyond the act of rebellion itself.22 This neutrality and seeming disinterest 
towards both the (social) circumstances within the novel, and other members of her society (could 
she not at least overtly fight to free her fellow numbers?) conflicts with much of the rest of the utopian 
literary tradition, which invariably demands that its characters (and readers) embrace and defend very 
specific and unambiguously detailed sets of values and palpable goals, whether they do so in 
obedience or in resistance to the status quo. Think here of Winston Smith in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-
Four, and the ways in which O’Brien demands both absolute obedience and adherence to certain goals 
and beliefs, first for the (ostensibly righteous) cause of Goldstein and the Brotherhood:  
 
‘You are prepared to commit murder?’ 
‘Yes.’ 
…‘You are prepared to cheat, to forge, to blackmail, to corrupt the minds of children, to 
distribute habit-forming drugs, to encourage prostitution, to disseminate venereal diseases – 
to do anything which is likely to cause demoralisation and weaken the power of the Party?’ 
‘Yes.’                 
                      (Orwell, 199) 
 
And then again during the course of his torture and (re)education of Winston in the beliefs of the Party 
and Big Brother: 
 
 ‘How many fingers, Winston?’ 
 ‘Four. I suppose there are four. I would see five if I could. I am trying to see five.’ 
 ‘Which do you wish: to persuade me that you see five, or really to see them? 
 ‘Really to see them.’ 
 ‘Again,’ said O’Brien. 
…Winston could only intermittently remember why the pain was happening. Behind his 
screwed-up eyelids, a forest of fingers seemed to be moving in a sort of dance…He was trying 
                                                          
22 In this instance, we can perhaps see I-330 as an anti-utopian figure (as per Wegner’s aforementioned 
definition); I would suggest however that this is qualified by that fact that she is not so anti-utopian, per se, 




to count them, he could not remember why. He knew only that it was impossible to count 
them, and that this was somehow due to the mysterious identity between four and five. 
…‘How many fingers am I holding up, Winston?’ 
‘I don’t know. I don’t know…Four, five, six – in all honesty I don’t know.’ 
‘Better,’ said O’Brien.              
                      (288) 
 
Although in both of these instances the goals and ideals articulated and dictated by O’Brien are rather 
dystopian in nature – particularly those Winston is told to pursue in the name of Goldstein and the 
Brotherhood, which are supposed to be two of the beacons of utopian hope in NEF – they are still 
specifically articulated, and have a set of values – positive or negative – ascribed to them. This stands 
in stark contrast to I-330’s pursuit of revolution for its own sake – that it has been undertaken, even if 
only briefly, is a victory of sorts – and serves as another indicator of the underlying heterotopian 
nuances of Zamiatin’s novel, particularly if we begin to consider revolution, or, more accurately 
perhaps, action undertaken against the status quo, as a kind of heterotopian space in its own right. 
Fittingly, the revolutionary energy in We – both personal and social – is only made possible by 
the concealment and separation from the OneState and its millions of watchful eyes that the Ancient 
House offers; where else could the members and recruits of the Mephi congregate unobserved in a 
literally transparent society? Without the Ancient House, there could be no revolution, or even an 
attempt at revolution. It is appropriate then that it is I-330, who is inextricably linked to the Ancient 
House with her eyes like “lowered blinds” (Zamiatin, 52), and who in many ways can be considered its 
agent in the novel, who leads D-503 along the path to the “disease” (124) of self-consciousness, who 
is one of the “thousand hands [that] shoot up – ‘opposed’” (138) to the continued rule of the 
Benefactor in the farcical ‘elections’ of the OneState, and who, most importantly, raises the battle cry 
of the revolution, of all revolutions (part of which, interestingly enough, comprised the 
aforementioned epigraph to Zamiatin’s essay): 
 
And how can there be a final revolution? There is no final one. The number of revolutions is 
infinite. The last one – that’s for children. Infinity frightens children, but it’s essential that 
children get a good night’s sleep…Their mistake was the mistake of Galileo. He was right that 
the earth revolves around the sun, but he didn’t know that the entire solar system revolves 
around yet another center; he didn’t know that the real orbit of the earth, as opposed to the 
relative orbit, is by no means some naïve circle…        




The implication of this statement is that the search for perfection – if indeed perfection can even exist 
– must be ongoing, that it can never end. Nowhere in the novel is there a stronger statement for the 
energy of continual revolution, as opposed to the entropy (born of perceived perfection and the 
resultant stasis) that is worshipped by the OneState “as [their Christian ancestors] worshipped God” 
(159). I-330’s expression of desire for vitality, for multiplicity and dynamism, is, then, in many ways an 
expression of desire for a heterotopia, rather than the static and unchanging utopia – or dystopia, 
depending upon your point of view – of the OneState. This profession of the need for dynamism and 
continual change is not typically a feature of either the dystopia or anti-utopia – or, indeed, the 
utopia.23 For all that the Ancient House (if not I-330) is in many and varied ways a marginal ‘character’ 
in the novel, its (understated) centrality to much of the action and development that takes place is 
just one more indication of the heterotopian undercurrents in this influential novel that can be 
considered both anti-utopian and dystopian.24 
  
As well as sheltering the rebellion of both I-330 and the Mephi, and other transgressive 
behaviours, the Ancient House is also, profoundly, a site of personal crisis, as it facilitates what we 
might choose to call D-503’s awakening: “I became glass. I saw into myself, inside. There were two 
me’s [sic]. One me was the old one, D-503. Number D-503, and the other…The other used to just stick 
his hairy paws out of his shell, but now all of him came out, the shell burst open, and the pieces were 
just about to fly in all directions…and then what?” (56). This is the beginning of the individuation of D-
503, the birth of his conscious and, conversely, irrational self. Before he reaches this breaking point, 
he begins to dream – after, it should be noted, his first visit to the Ancient House with I-330 in Record 
6 – and notice what he calls “some kind of foreign body” (33) in his brain, likening it to “having a very 
thin little eyelash in your eye. You feel generally okay, but that eye with the lash in it – you can’t get it 
off your mind for a second” (33). He returns time and again to this imagery, this metaphor of the 
inflamed eye with the eyelash in it, and in doing so provides not only an effective link to the window-
like quality of the eyes of I-330 (and so, by association, the Ancient House), but one of the great 
sources of amusement value and irony in the novel. The metaphorical ‘eye’ that is bothering D-503 is, 
of course, the ‘I’ that OneState tries to suppress, the notion of a self that is distinct from the ‘we’ of 
its society. It is fitting, too, that D-503 conceives of his burgeoning identity in terms of an eye; in both 
                                                          
23 It could be argued that Ursula Le Guin’s The Dispossessed (1974) takes up and explores this particular issue 
(amongst others) at length, although I believe her depiction of the supposedly anarchic-utopia Anarres is 
problematic, at best. Other authors who (attempt to, with varying degrees of success) explore this notion of a 
dynamic utopia include Kim Stanley Robinson, and Samuel R. Delany. See also Tom Moylan’s discussion of 
dystopia in Scraps of the Untainted Sky (2000). 
24 That it defies attempts to assign a definition to it is also, I think, an indicator of its heterotopian nature. 
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his role as obedient, unconscious number, and as a conscious and distinct individual, he is preoccupied 
with the notion of seeing, and of the role and power of surveillance and the gaze in the OneState.  
Much has been made of the Panopticon-like quality of “the glass walls” (35) of the OneState 
that leave its citizens “always on view” (19) – as well as its successor, the ubiquitous telescreens of 
NEF – with the exception of those (sex) nights where numbers have permission to modestly lower the 
blinds around their bedrooms.25 In the beginning, the dutiful number D-503 lauds this, saying “we 
have nothing to hide from one another. Besides, this makes it easier for the Guardians to carry out 
their burdensome, noble task. No telling what might go on otherwise. Maybe it was the strange 
opaque dwellings of the ancients that gave rise to their pitiful cellular psychology” (19). It is telling, I 
think, that the main object of a literally transparent society, whether D-503 realises this or not, is to 
deter potentially criminal activity; this is a strange consideration in a society that is supposed to have 
“the most perfect form of life” (11-12).26 For all the apparent transparency in the OneState, however, 
it is questionable whether D-503 – or any truly dutiful number – really sees much of anything; his 
separation from the society of OneState and his awakening as an individual is entwined with the 
emergence of his ability to see. Following his meeting with I-330, and his encounter with his ‘other’ 
self, D-503 finds himself standing in front of a mirror: 
 
For the first time in my life, I get a clear, distinct, conscious look at myself; I see myself and I’m 
astonished, like I’m looking at some ‘him.’ There I am – or rather, there he is: He’s got straight 
black eyebrows, drawn with a ruler, and between them, like a scar, is a vertical crease (I don’t 
know if it was there before). Gray, steel eyes…and behind that steel – it turns out I never knew 
what was there. And from that ‘there’ (a ‘there’ that is here and at the same time infinitely far 
away) – I am looking at myself, at him, and I am absolutely certain that he…is a stranger, 
somebody else, I just met him for the first time in my life. And I’m the real one. I AM NOT HIM.
                               (59) 
 
                                                          
25 See Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, pp195-228 in the first instance; see also Michael D. Amey’s 
‘Living Under the Bell Jar: Surveillance and Resistance in Evgeny Zamyatin’s We,’ (2005), James Tyner’s ‘Self 
and Space, Resistance and Discipline: a Foucauldian Reading of George Orwell's 1984’ (2007), or Theo Finigan’s 
‘Into the Memory Hole’: Totalitarianism and Mal d’Archive in Nineteen Eighty-Four and The Handmaid’s Tale’ 
(2004). Although Booker does not use the term ‘Panopticon,’ he does explicitly link the use of glass in the 
OneState to the desire to keep citizens under “constant surveillance” (1994, 28). 
26 Part of this tendency towards surveillance and the gaze is expressed in the use of ceremonial public 
executions in the OneState; presumably, OneState considers that it has the Numbers under sufficient control 
that the condemned does not become the object of pity (see Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1995), especially 
pp 8-31).  
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It is telling that D-503 uses the word ‘conscious’ when describing the way in which he is viewing 
himself; the act of seeing requires conscious direction, something that he has only just acquired. It is 
equally important to note the fact that it is behind his eyes that he discovers something – or rather, 
someone – new; the ‘I’ that is his self, that he tries to disassociate himself from. Having now seen 
himself – however much he tries to disassociate from that self – he begins to fear and avoid the gaze 
of others. Back at his workplace, fantasizing about rejoining the ranks of the other, unconscious 
numbers, he encounters a concerned associate who enquires after his health. D-503 panics, as he 
“[cannot] lie to those eyes” (81). As he flees, it is not his physical self he considers or seeks to hide, 
but his eyes: “I was dazzled by the flashing glass steps beneath my feet, and each step made me feel 
more hopeless: I had no business being here, a criminal…my fate was to burn forever, to rush hither 
and yon, searching for some corner to hide my eyes” (82). On the surface, it would seem that D-503 
is wrestling with his ‘crime,’ trying to hide both his newfound stature as ‘I’ and the means by which he 
fears it will be revealed. Having seen himself through his eyes, D-503 fears others might do the same; 
he describes the eyes of the Guardian (and Mephi agent) S as “two steel-gray drills…boring into me” 
(85). However, if we recall Zamiatin’s description of the infinite revolution, and the “fiery” (1970, 1) 
nature of rebellion and revolution, this feeling that D-503 has, that it is his “fate to burn forever” 
(Zamiatin, 82) takes on added significance. By recognising himself as ‘I,’ rather than ‘We,’ D-503 has 
taken on the role – however unwittingly – of the revolutionary by virtue of discovering that 
individuality in a society that tries to suppress it.27 At first, D-503, obedient to his conditioning and the 
governing ideology of the OneState, is both afraid of and loathes the individual – the sense of self – 
that he fears those eye ‘drills’ might penetrate, but he gradually becomes reconciled to it, and to 
himself. Although he is never exactly happy with this new-found sense of himself as ‘I,’ he begins to 
value it; faced with a search of his premises and nowhere to hide the incriminating pages of the journal 
that has recorded (and probably facilitated) his journey to conscious individuality, he comes to the 
realisation that he “no longer [has] the strength to destroy this painful piece of [himself], which might 
turn out to be the piece [he] value[s] most” (160).28 Similarly, when the Guardians introduce the 
Operation – the fantasectomy, if you will – that will ‘cure’ his illness, he muses to himself that “I was 
all alone. I could see it clearly: All were saved, but there was no saving me, not any longer. I did not 
want to be saved…” (179, emphasis in original). Although he vacillates from this position once more – 
he would not be D-503 if he did not – this acceptance of himself as a solitary ‘I’ makes the final record 
                                                          
27 Zamiatin, as you will recall, wrote that it took ‘heretics’ to counter the entropy of human thought. 
28 Patrick Parrinder writes that “superficially D-503 develops a soul as a result of falling in love with the 
fascinating I-330, but really it is constituted by the act of writing” (para 15). I am of the view that both actions 
are equally important for the development of D-503’s individuality. 
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of We, written by the newly-rational and socially-oriented D-503 after the Operation has been 
imposed upon him, all the more poignant and grim.  
 
 Whilst the awakening or (re)education of an individual is a prevalent theme in the utopian 
tradition the use of glass and, especially, mirrors to facilitate this process is not; it is, however, if we 
refer back to Michel Foucault and what we might call the ‘classical’ or original heterotopia, yet another 
indicator of the underlying heterotopian elements of We.29 Although I contended in the introduction 
that Foucault’s belief in the every-day mirror as a fundamentally heterotopian device signified the 
basically static nature of his concept of the heterotopia, it works in the case of We if we consider that 
the mirror that D-503 gazes into reveals an “incurable soul” (95) that has always been there, waiting 
to be awakened so that it may reveal itself; the challenge to established norms and transgression that 
is an essential part of the heterotopia that I advance is supplied by the inherently heretical nature of 
an individual consciousness and subjectivity in the society of the OneState. We is not, however, a 
simplistic denunciation of the evils of a collective society and the virtues of the individual as, for 
instance, Ayn Rand’s Anthem is, and this is demonstrated by the role of the Mephi in the novel. The 
organisation that is behind I-330 and her revolution, the Mephi are those numbers who periodically 
rupture the boundaries of the OneState and retreat beyond the Green Wall to commune with nature 
and the people and animals that survived the war with the city. For all that they encourage a certain 
level of heterogeneity, and promise “the possibility of individual self-realization unavailable within the 
(en)closure of the One State” (Wegner, 156), the Mephi is still merely a society within a society. It may 
be dedicated to challenging the static society of the OneState, and the long-neglected cultivation of 
the individual within the dominant society, but it is still a society itself. And although critics have long 
been predisposed to view it as the agreeably utopian alternative to the OneState, there are hints in 
the novel that it may in fact merely be the other side of the same coin.30 When I-330 takes him to visit 
with the Mephi on the other side of the Wall, their reception of him bears a remarkable similarity to 
the words of D-503 in his first journal entry; “Long live OneState! Long live the Numbers! Long live the 
Benefactor!” (Zamiatin, 4) is merely substituted for “Down with the INTEGRAL!…Long live the Builder!” 
(151), the Builder being D-503. Likewise, while the world beyond the wall may, in the beginning, seem 
a little more appealing than the overly-regulated OneState, it is, as Wegner notes, merely the 
                                                          
29 Think of Hythloday’s ‘awakening’ after encountering the ‘original’ Utopians in Utopia, Gulliver’s rather comic 
adoption of the anti-human stance and trotting gait of his horse-like masters in Gulliver’s Travels, or of Avis 
Everhard’s wholehearted embrace of Ernest Everhard’s particular brand of socialism in The Iron Heel. 
30 See Alexandra Aldridge’s ‘Myths of Origin and Destiny in Utopian Literature: Zamiatin’s We’ (1977) and 
‘Origins of Dystopia: When the Sleeper Awakes and We’ (1983) especially, as well as Gormon Beauchamp’s 




“dialectical negation” of it (162). The City-based ‘utopia’ that is the OneState has long since been 
revealed as a dystopia; it takes but a small leap of the imagination to follow the Country-based ‘utopia’ 
of the Mephi to a similarly desolate end-point – think here of the “horrors” of Malpais (Huxley, 96), 
the squalid and disease-ridden (but all-natural) Reservation that produces (the defiantly unhappy) 
John the Savage in Huxley’s Brave New World. That I-330 rejects D-503’s plea that they should “go 
together, over there, beyond the Wall” (Zamiatin, 157) suggests that although the presence of the 
natural (pastorally idyllic) world is both desirable and necessary, it should no more be the (utopian) 
end goal than the mechanized city state. The implication is that the ideal society combines and accepts 
both the urban and the bucolic realms, and so, by extension, the people they represent (the Numbers, 
and the Mephi and the people who survive beyond the Wall). In one of his few truly insightful 
moments, D-503 seems to grasp at least the edges of this idea: “Are [the Mephi] the half we’ve lost – 
the H2 to our O, that have to be joined as H2O to make streams, seas, waterfalls, waves, storms?” (157). 
What he is articulating here is the possibility that the Mephi, the forest people, their natural world, 
and their emphasis on the individual are as necessary as the Numbers and their collectively-focused 
OneState: that the two are halves of a whole. This is in stark contrast to Winston Smith’s belief that 
“if there is hope…it lies in the proles” (Orwell, 80, emphasis in original) and the Arcadian past that they 
represent, which Orwell offers as the only acceptable alternative to the “dinginess [and]…listlessness” 
(85) of modern life in Oceania. If we consider the ways in which heterotopian spaces are able to not 
only juxtapose, but reconcile multiple and diverse spaces within themselves, this rejection of the 
simplistic dualism of the wholly natural and individualistic (the Mephi) and the wholly mechanized and 
collective (OneState), in conjunction with the idea of the infinite revolution, is yet another example of 
the distinctly heterotopian undertows in We.  
 
With this dismissal of utopian and individual / collective dualism in mind, it is also important 
to note that neither the OneState nor the ‘natural’ world of the Mephi enable D-503 to be happy as a 
conscious individual. As much as he comes to value his individuality, D-503 cannot rid himself of his 
distaste for his “hairy, shaggy…throwback” (Zamiatin, 7) – and implicitly forest – self; in esteeming 
that individuality – “Everything used to revolve around the sun; now I knew it all revolved around me” 
(72) – he cannot be happy as a mere Number in the OneState. Crucially, whilst the OneState affords 
the unconscious Number D-503 (a kind of) happiness, it cannot offer him freedom; the Mephi can 
offer the conscious D-503 the freedom he comes to crave, but it cannot afford him the happiness he 
had as just another Number. This conundrum, and the deliberation on the relative merits of happiness 
and freedom and the need for a balance between them is a prominent theme throughout the novel, 
and one that D-503 frequently returns to, especially once he has begun to awaken. Here Zamiatin is 
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engaging with the discussions on the subject that had been raised by the likes of Dostoevskii and 
Chernevskii (as I have already noted). It is also possible to view the conflict between freedom and 
happiness in the light of Soviet rhetoric around happiness that began emerging in the early 1920s.31 
More generally, however, Zamiatin is engaging with a topic that is fundamental to the utopian 
tradition, and in such a way that many who followed him would try to emulate.32 As Marina Balina and 
Evgeny Dobrenko note in the introduction to Petrified Utopia (2009), “the yearning for happiness is 
one of mankind’s fundamental needs, and its fulfilment is the basis for a person’s creative activity” 
(xv), whilst the “social Utopia is always aimed towards the pursuit of happiness; but contrary to 
individualistic bourgeois ideals, socialist Utopia (much like a nationalist or religious Utopia) is rooted 
in the impossibility of achieving individual happiness without first embracing collective happiness” 
(xvi). This is true of even the earliest ‘socialist’ utopias; consider the collective emphasis on happiness 
in More’s Utopia, for instance. It became (and remained) a compelling theme of the dystopia and anti-
utopia; as I will cover shortly, Orwell – writing in Zamiatin’s wake – took a largely negative view of the 
drive for collective happiness over individual freedom, as did Huxley before him. Who can forget John 
the Savage, “claiming the right to be unhappy” (Huxley, 212)?33 Conversely, there is also a great deal 
of fear around the individual that pays no heed to society (and its other members); consider the 
critique of Urras in Le Guin’s The Dispossessed, and the wilful recklessness and violence of Alex in 
Anthony Burgess’ A Clockwork Orange. The question of whether we emphasise freedom or happiness 
is a question that is linked indelibly to the utopian / dystopian binary. What we begin to see in We, 
however, and what Orwell, for instance, either overlooks or chooses to interpret in a particularly 
pessimistic light is the simple but inherently transgressive acknowledgement that in order to achieve 
one, you must also have the other. 
In the opening pages of Zamiatin’s novel, freedom is likened to a “primitive state” (Zamiatin, 
3), and is “indissolubly linked” with “criminality” and unhappiness (36); this inversion of the concept 
of freedom that Zamiatin here depicts is undoubtedly what Orwell had in mind when he created 
doublethink and the second of the three slogans of the Party – “Freedom is slavery” (Orwell, 6). During 
the extended period of Winston’s stay in the Ministry of Love, O’Brien asks him if it has “ever occurred 
to [him] that [the slogan] is reversible? Slavery is freedom” (303). The utter negation of individual 
identity, the surrender to the social whole that O’Brien poses as the ultimate freedom (and 
immortality) of man is, in a sense, exactly what the OneState demands of its Numbers, the price they 
                                                          
31 See Balina and Dobrenko (2009); more specifically, see Helena Goscilo’s chapter entitled ‘Luxuriating in Lack’ 
(pp53-78), and Maria Balina’s ‘”It’s Grand to Be an Orphan!”’ (pp99-114). 
32 See Ernest Bloch’s Natural Law and Human Dignity (1986), especially pp 204-208. See also my discussion on 
the (Russian ‘utopian’) antecedents of We on page 5 of this chapter. 
33 Admittedly John takes his stand for the rights of the (unhappy) individual to the antithetical pole of the 
collective ‘happiness’ depicted in BNW, but at least he has a choice. 
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pay for their ‘happiness.’ The simple formulation of happiness over freedom is stated explicitly in the 
speech given by R-13, the male number with whom D-503 shares O-19: 
 
The old legend about Paradise – that was about us, about right now. Yes! Just think about it. 
Those two in Paradise, they were offered a choice: happiness without freedom, or freedom 
without happiness, nothing else. Those idiots chose freedom. And then what? Then for 
centuries they were homesick for the chains. That’s why the world was so miserable, see? 
They missed the chains…. And we were the first to hit on the way to get back to happiness…. 
Paradise was back. And we’re simple and innocent again, like Adam and Eve. None of those 
complications about good and evil: Everything is very simple, childishly simple – Paradise! The 
Benefactor, the Machine, the Cube, the Gas Bell, the Guardians: All those things represent 
good…. Because that is what protects our nonfreedom, which is to say, our happiness. 
                     (Zamiatin, 61) 
 
Freedom and happiness are here presented as a mutually exclusive binary that Wegner, after 
Jameson, describes as one of the antinomies that “lies at the very foundation of human civilization” 
(158). In R-13’s view – the view promulgated and endorsed by the OneState, and, initially at least, 
subscribed to by D-503 – there is no compatibility between the two; the choice is between either 
freedom or happiness. The citizens of OneState have chosen – or, rather, have had chosen for them – 
a “mathematically infallible happiness” (3) that removes the need and even the desire for freedom; 
this state of ‘happiness’ is also intrinsically interwoven with their embrace of the collective, and 
rejection of themselves as individuals. But as D-503 begins to emerge as a conscious individual, his 
perceptions on the relative merits of freedom and happiness similarly start to shift. In the wake of 
being ‘diagnosed’ with a soul, D-503 takes a long and solitary stroll. His path takes him along a road 
that “runs along the base of the Green Wall” (90) and it is there that he first encounters one of the 
people that live in the “boundless green ocean” (90) that is the forest beyond the borders of the 
OneState: 
 
Through the glass, dim and foggy, the blunt muzzle of some beast looked at me, its yellow 
eyes insistently repeating one and the same thought, incomprehensible to me. We looked 
each other in the eye for a long time – through those shafts connecting the surface world to 
that other beneath the surface. And then a little thought wormed its way into my head: ‘And 
what if yellow-eyes, in his stupid, dirty pile of leaves, in his uncalculated life, is happier than 
us?’             
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             (91, my emphasis) 
 
This is an important moment for both D-503 and for the action of the novel; it is where he first realises 
– once again through the acts of seeing (through glass) and looking (into another’s eyes) – that not 
only is there happiness of a kind other than that imposed by the OneState, but that these other kinds 
of happiness might, in fact, be superior. And although D-503, as is his wont, immediately brushes off 
his insight and consoles himself with the idea that he is merely “sick” (91), the implication is that the 
“creature” beyond the Wall is happier because s/he has a far greater degree of freedom than D-503 
has. This is underscored by the different paths they take after their encounter; the creature vanishes 
into the foliage – presumably to follow what path it will – whilst D-503 rushes along his prescribed 
path to the Ancient House, his misery, and his dual – and conflicting – servitudes (to the OneState, 
and I-330).  
For all that he tries to brush it off, the encounter with the creature sparks something in D-503. 
Having reached the Ancient House, which once again acts as the enabler of transgressive behaviours 
and experiences, he is faced with a moment in which he realises that “I, the sun, the old woman, the 
wormwood, the yellow eyes – we all blended into one, were all bound forever by veins through which 
flowed one common, stormy, magnificent blood” (92). If we return momentarily to a consideration of 
the (related) argument for the balancing of the needs of the individual and society, this may seem at 
first glance as though D-503 is merely substituting one collective for another; the collective of the 
Mephi in place of the OneState, for example.34 If we recall I-330’s rejection of the Mephi’s as the only 
way of life, however, this embryonic realisation of D-503 can be read as yet another heterotopian 
moment in the text, one which hints at the necessity of balancing freedom and happiness, as well as 
the individual and society, rather than treating them as mutually incompatible. Ernst Bloch came to a 
similar conclusion, although he used the term “human dignity” (1986, 207) rather than ‘freedom,’ 
writing that “there can be no human dignity without the end of misery and need, but also no human 
happiness without the end of old and new forms of servitude” (208, my emphasis). The last is 
particularly relevant to D-503’s situation; he has in many ways, as I have already noted, merely 
exchanged one kind of servitude for another, and goes so far as to acknowledge that he is in fact “a 
slave” to I-330 (Zamiatin, 71), much as he was to the OneState. And although he comes to recognise 
the need for freedom, D-503, in fact, completes a full circle in his servitude, returning in the end to 
the OneState via the fantasectomy.  
                                                          
34 It is no accident, I think, that D-503 uses blood as the substance that binds them all – himself (as a 
representative of the Numbers), the old woman, the natural world and the creatures beyond the Wall; it 
prefigures I-330’s revelation of his probable “sunny forest blood” (157), and also calls to mind the quote from 
Zamiatin’s essay that I quoted earlier in this chapter. 
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Once again, it is I-330 who embodies the synthesis of freedom and happiness in the novel, the 
formulation of which starts with the opposition to the OneState that she is a part of on the Day of 
Unanimity: “And tomorrow…what? Nobody knows. You understand? Neither I nor anyone else knows. 
It’s unknown. You understand it’s come to an end, everything that was known? Now it’ll be new, never 
before seen, or imagined” (141, my emphasis). I-330 here echoes the sentiments of Bloch, whilst the 
freedom that she desires, the freedom that will bring a more honest kind of happiness – for who can 
know true happiness without first having experienced unhappiness? – is linked to the concept of the 
infinite revolution, and the rejection of the static, perfect ‘happiness’ that OneState forces upon its 
members. The protest on the Day of Unanimity may also have the effect of enabling the individual, as 
D-503 notes when he writes at the end of the day “what will happen tomorrow? What will I turn into 
tomorrow?” (142). The most powerful statement about freedom and happiness, however, comes 
when I-330 is telling D-503 the history of the Mephi, and of the people beyond the Wall: “You had it 
worse. You grew numbers all over your body…. You all have to be stripped naked and driven into the 
forest. You should learn to tremble with fear, with joy, insane rage, cold – you should learn to pray to 
the fire” (158, my emphasis). It is important to note that, once again, I-330 does not present freedom 
as the opposite of the blissfully ignorant ‘happiness’ of the OneState, just as she rejects the wholly 
natural as a utopian alternative to the OneState; instead, she acknowledges that with freedom comes 
as much negative as positive. It is not a perfect world that I-330 advocates, but a heterotopian one 
that is peculiarly human; a world that encompasses contradictions and multitudes, and boundless 




Written at least partially in response to We, George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four is 
considerably less hopeful about the enduring presence of the good.35 There are many similarities 
between the two and, indeed, the novels deal with similar themes: whether we should choose 
freedom or happiness, the individual against society, and progress in opposition to stasis. But whilst 
Zamiatin’s novel implies that in the end there may be, if not a middle way, then at least some way to 
reconcile these supposedly contradictory needs and goals, Orwell’s vision is grim and despairing. As 
                                                          
35 Gormon Beauchamp calls the influence of We on NEF “pronounced and pervasive” (‘Of Man’s Last 
Disobedience,’ 293) and cites the review of We that Orwell published in 1946 that I have already touched 
upon; he also provides a useful, if slightly dated, list of comparative essays on Orwell and Zamiatin (n20, p300). 
To his list I would also add E. J. Brown’s An Essay on Anti-Utopia (1976), and Patrick Parrinder’s ‘Imagining the 
Future’ (1973). Isaac Deutscher’s 1955 essay ‘1984 – The Mysticism of Cruelty’ was one of the earliest critical 
pieces to note the connection between the two. James Connors (1975) is one of the few dissenting voices to 
this interpretation, arguing that “Orwell’s vision of the totalitarian state was fully worked out before he read 
Zamyatin’s We” (‘The Genesis of 1984,’ 124). 
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Wegner notes, “every road ‘forward’ in Orwell’s texts seems to end in [a] final point of closure. The 
play of utopian Possible Worlds elaborated in Zamyatin’s narrative is reduced in Nineteen Eighty-Four 
to a single, homogeneous, monolithic enclosure, the ‘World’ of Oceania” (188, emphasis in original). 
Although I have already posited that the ‘Possible Worlds’ in We are heterotopian in nature, rather 
than utopian, Wegner’s observation is pertinent; the differences between the two texts are stark. 
Although Oceania is, ostensibly, not as heavily regulated as the OneState – Winston notes that 
technically “nothing [is] illegal, since there [are] no longer any laws” (Orwell, 9) – the members of the 
Party are subject to all manner of (unwritten) rules and to the pervasive surveillance of the 
telescreens, which are located in all spheres, public and private. Thus, they have even less freedom 
and privacy than the Numbers of the OneState: 
 
The instrument (the telescreen, it was called) could be dimmed, but there was no way of 
shutting it off completely…The telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously. Any 
sound that Winston made, above the level of a very low whisper, would be picked up by it; 
moreover, so long as he remained within the field of vision which the metal plaque 
commanded, he could be seen as well as heard. There was of course no way of knowing 
whether you were being watched at any given moment…You had to live – did live, from habit 
that became instinct – in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, 
except in darkness, every movement scrutinised.              
                       (4-5)
                            
There are no personal hours in Oceania, no time in which blinds can be modestly lowered and the  
surveilling gaze averted. Party members in Oceania are forever on display – “always the eyes watching 
you” (31) – or, at least, have to assume that they are, and act accordingly; Raj Shah aptly describes it 
as the “internalization of the subjugating gaze” (702).36 Additionally, there are no hours in Oceania 
that are not accounted for. Party members have no spare time in principle, whilst the Newspeak term 
“Ownlife” (Orwell, 94, emphasis in original) is synonymous with “individualism and eccentricity” (94). 
In these ways, you might say, the niggling imperfections that so vexed D-503 have been solved. Even 
though Winston, much like D-503 before him goes on to muse that “nothing [is] your own except the 
few cubic centimetres inside your skull” (32), later events prove him wrong; O’Brien’s ‘re-education’ 
of Winston shows that Big Brother and the Party can, in fact, get inside a person’s head. In his diary, 
Winston writes that “freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four. If that is granted, all 
                                                          
36 See also Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, 175-177, and 195-228.  
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else follows” (93). By the time O’Brien is through with him, however, Winston does not even have that 
small freedom; he writes (and believes) that “two and two make five” (318).  
Unlike D-503, the reduction of his freedom has not lead to a corresponding increase in 
Winston’s happiness. Rather, he is left to 
 
[meditate] resentfully on the physical texture of life. Had it always been like this? Had food 
always tasted like this?... Always in your stomach and in your skin there was a sort of protest, 
a feeling that you had been cheated of something that you had a right to…was it not a sign 
that this was not the natural order of things, if one’s heart sickened at the discomfort and dirt 
and scarcity, the interminable winters…Why should one feel it to be intolerable unless one 
had some kind of ancestral memory that things had once been different?  
                      (68-69, emphasis in original) 
 
What he has been cheated of is the chance to be free or happy. And Winston, unlike D-503, does not 
have even the freedom to choose to be unhappy. That unhappiness is not accidental; during Winston’s 
sojourn in the Ministry of Love, O’Brien tells him that the world that the Party intends to create is one 
of “fear and treachery and torment, a world of trampling and being trampled upon, a world which will 
grow not less but more merciless as it refines itself…. [Our world] is founded upon hatred. In our world 
there will be no emotions except fear, rage, triumph and self-abasement” (306, emphasis in original). 
Winston’s unhappiness, which is manufactured by the same people who curtail his freedom, is both 
spiritual – almost primeval in nature – and physical; he feels his unhappiness in his bones, in his 
stomach and in his skin, and it manifests itself in his persistent varicose ulcer – which, tellingly, recedes 
during the ‘idyllic’ period of his clandestine affair with Julia. He is, moreover, depicted as a fairly 
miserable-looking creature, a “smallish, frail figure” (4) with a “meagreness” (4) to his body. With his 
“naturally sanguine” (4) face and fair hair, however, he is also portrayed as (physically) significantly 
different to the “small, dark and ill-favoured…beetle-like” (69) people who appear to make up the 
“majority” (69) of the population; even Julia is first described as the “dark-haired girl” (18). Ironically 
enough, given his deviation from Party orthodoxy, it would seem that Winston, more than most, 
resembles the Party’s “ideal” (69).  
What his palpable unhappiness and physical difference from those around him cements is a 
sense of Winston as an individual in a society that not only has no place for the individual, but also 
seems to offer little (positive) incentive to “make the act of submission which is the price of sanity” in 
that society (285). That surrendering is the complete sublimation of the individual to the needs of the 




The first thing you must realise is that power is collective. The individual only has power in so 
far [sic] as he ceases to be an individual…Alone – free – the human being is always defeated. 
It must be so, because every human being is doomed to die, which is the greatest of all failures. 
But if he can make complete, utter submission, if he can escape from his identity, if he can 
merge himself in the Party so that he is the Party, then he is all-powerful and immortal.  
                                            (303) 
 
This is a powerful statement about the privileging of the collective over the individual in the novel, as 
well as an appeal to the human instinct to survive at any cost. The logic is both twisted and persuasive; 
become one with the Party, and you will live forever as a part of the Party. It is doubtful whether D-
503 and his fellow numbers are required to so completely surrender their sense of their selves. At the 
end of the novel, when the news of the “greatest victory in human history” (341) coincides with 
Winston’s complete submission, his “final, indispensable, healing change” (342), there is a sense that 
he is not so much happy as he is gin-soaked and vanquished.  
Even more so than in We, the coupled concerns of freedom and happiness, and society and 
the individual, are intertwined and interdependent, whilst the struggle between the stasis of 
(perceived) perfection and energy seems to have already been decided. The Party, by way of the 
“continual alteration of the past” and the (enforced) practise of doublethink – “the power to hold two 
contradictory beliefs…simultaneously” – has managed to arrest the progress of history amongst its 
members (242, 244). This stasis is a central tenet of the Party’s ideology: “Who controls the past 
controls the future: who controls the present controls the past” (284). The records of the Party are 
continually updated to reflect the present ‘truth.’ Because of this control, time is both frozen and 
irrelevant in the world of the novel – Winston cannot even say “with any certainty that [it is] 1984” 
(9). Similarly, he is unable to refute anything O’Brien says during the course of his torture and ‘re-
education,’ losing every kind of freedom and trace of individuality in the process; O’Brien even hints 
that he has been playing with Winston for “seven years” (307), that he has always been under 
observation and so had no chance at ever succeeding in his rebellion, such as it was. NEF closes with 
Winston’s impromptu profession of love for Big Brother, and so seems to bear out Wegner’s 
suggestion, as noted earlier, that there is no way forward in Orwell’s novel. 
 
NEF seems to be a novel at the extremes of both anti-utopia and dystopia. O’Brien, in one of 
the more darkly humorous moments in the novel, rejects on behalf of the Party the “stupid hedonistic 
Utopias that the old reformers imagined” (306). Nonetheless, I would suggest that there are a few 
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spaces in the novel that can be seen as heterotopian and thus, perhaps, offer a glimmer of relief.  The 
most obvious of these – and arguably another indication of Orwell’s literary debt to Zamiatin – is the 
“shabby little room above Mr. Charrington’s shop” (158). Raj Shah also notes the heterotopian 
potentials of this space, although he uses the term in a more traditionally Foucauldian sense. Unlike 
Shah, I also distinguish between the antique shop and the apartment above it (716-717). The 
apartment, much like the Ancient House, is representative of a previous era, and “still arranged as 
though [it] were meant to be lived in” (Orwell, 110), whilst the antiques store is merely a “rubbish-
heap” (105) of worthless and largely irrelevant items, run by what Winston takes to be a harmlessly 
nostalgic member of the proletarian masses (‘Charrington’ is, in fact, an agent of the Thought Police). 
Awakening in him a “sort of ancestral memory” (111), and rented by Winston for the purposes of 
conducting his criminal “love affair” (159) with Julia, the apartment above Charrington’s “frowzy little 
junk-shop” (8) is, whilst still being nestled in the heart of Oceania’s city, a space apart. This is most 
palpably demonstrated by the “absurd” (167) and “old fashioned clock with the twelve-hour face” 
(158) on the mantelpiece. Oceania runs on twenty-four hour time; there is no “seven-twenty” (158) 
in the evening, only “nineteen-twenty” (158), just as the “clocks [strike] thirteen” (3) instead of one in 
the afternoon. The apartment, quite literally, runs to a time that is different to the rest of Oceania. 
This further estranges the apartment from the rest of the city – it is already different by virtue of its 
old-fashioned furniture and (supposed) lack of a telescreen – and helps create an atmosphere of 
perceived “comfort and safety” (214). For all that it is a space of what modern readers – or even 
readers in the early 1950s – might recognise as normalcy, for Winston and Julia it is a transgressive 
capsule which facilitates their love affair (in much the same way the Ancient House facilitates the illicit 
aspects of D-503 and I-330’s relationship) and their taste for “ownlife” (93, emphasis in original) and 
privacy. It is also a “paradise” (173), one in which they can wander naked, make love – or not, as they 
desire – and consume their equivalent of forbidden fruit: “real sugar…proper white bread…a little pot 
of jam…a tin of milk” and “real coffee…[and] real tea” (162-163). The apartment becomes a refuge of 
the utmost importance to Winston, who regards it as a “secure hiding-place, almost a home” and has 
consequently “grown fatter” and “dropped his habit of drinking gin at all hours”, having “lost the need 
for it” (173). For all that they value it – and perhaps this is one of the reasons why they value it so 
much – Winston and Julia can only spend snatches of time in the apartment; however, for Winston at 
least, this matters less than the fact that “the room over the junk-shop should exist. To know that it 
was there, inviolate, was almost the same as being in it. The room was a world, a pocket of the past” 




It is not, however, a utopian space, but rather a deeply ambiguous, heterotopian one: “Far 
from providing stability and security… [the] alternative temporality…proves to be dangerous” (Shah, 
716). Although he is talking about Charrington’s shop, rather than the apartment above it, Shah’s 
observation is nonetheless pertinent. The apartment is not a stable and secure place, which is perhaps 
foreshadowed by the presence of a rat (what Winston fears more than anything) during his and Julia’s 
first liaison there. In its role as heterotopian space, the apartment is not only the site of Winston and 
Julia’s arrest by the Thought Police, but actively endangers them and in all likelihood hastens their 
downfall, a fact that Winston is plainly aware of long before his arrest:  
 
Folly, folly, his heart kept saying: conscious, gratuitous, suicidal folly. Of all the crimes that a 
Party member could commit, this one was the least possible to conceal…. Folly, folly, folly! he 
thought again. It was inconceivable that they could frequent this place for more than a few 
weeks without being caught. But the temptation of having a hiding-place that was truly their 
own, indoors and near at hand, had been too much for both of them.      
                 (Orwell, 157-159, my emphasis) 
 
Winston is well aware of the danger represented by the apartment – it is a conscious and fully 
intentional folly that he and Julia are engaged in. Yet continue to engage in it they do, unable to resist 
the allure of the semblance of privacy, freedom and happiness. It is possible that because he believes 
he understands the nature of the danger represented by the apartment, Winston imagines that he 
can circumvent it, that he can negate the ambiguous nature of their refuge. This is demonstrated by 
the nature of his and Julia’s feeling that “so long as they were actually in [the] room…no harm could 
come to them. Getting there was difficult and dangerous, but the room itself was sanctuary” (174). 
Given that it is the site of his and Julia’s eventual arrest, this is grimly ironic, and a misplaced trust at 
best. The true danger is in fact represented by the room itself, and “the illusion not only of safety but 
of permanence” that it creates (174). The revelation that a telescreen has always been in place 
“behind the picture” (253) on the wall brings that illusion crashing down; the apartment where they 
believed themselves safe, unseen and unheard, is as much the instrument of their downfall as it is 
their happiness. It is also, presumably, the means (via the hidden telescreen) that O’Brien learns that 
what Winston fears above all else are rats; it is this information which is used to break him, to finally 
persuade him to betray Julia.  
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The apartment may be a space apart from Oceania and the eyes of the Party, but it is 
simultaneously enclosed within and an extension of them.37 The apartment also has the effect of 
confusing time for Winston; during his arrest, he is unable to say with any certainty what time – or 
day – it actually is: “He noticed that the clock on the mantelpiece said nine, meaning twenty-one. But 
the light seemed too strong. Would not the light be fading at twenty-one hours on an August evening? 
He wondered whether he and Julia had mistaken the time – had slept the clock round and thought it 
was twenty-thirty when really it was nought eight-thirty on the following morning” (255). 
Consequently, Winston is estranged (even further) from both the apartment and from Oceania in 
general, an effect which is compounded when he is taken to the cells under the Ministry of Love and 
incarcerated and tortured for an indeterminate (and indeterminable) amount of time; in a process 
that begins in the apartment he is firmly removed from any recognisable time. The heterotopian 
nature of the apartment, and the ways in which it contains seemingly irreconcilable spaces within 
itself – spaces of freedom and safety, and of danger and control – are cemented when it is revealed 
that “the book” (230, emphasis in original) that Winston reads in the (imagined) “bliss… [and] eternity” 
(214) of the apartment, which sets forth the aims and values of both the Party and the resistance to it 
was, in fact, authored by O’Brien and other Party members. Entitled “The Theory and Practice of 
Oligarchical Collectivism” (213, emphasis in original), the book is, in some respects, a heterotopian 
space in its own right. Ostensibly authored by Emmanuel Goldstein, the official enemy of the Party 
and of Big Brother, it offers a brief history of the rise of the Party to power in Oceania, and insight into 
its means and motives, thus appearing to transgress the Party’s domination of information. Reading 
it as part of his ‘initiation’ into “the Brotherhood” (203), Winston finds that “the book fascinated him, 
or more exactly it reassured him. In a sense it told him nothing that was new, but that was part of the 
attraction” (229). When Winston finishes reading he believes that although “he understood how; he 
did not understand why. Chapter I, like Chapter III, had not actually told him anything that he did not 
know” (247). In fact, the book offers plenty of information that Winston fails to realise the importance 
of. Foremost amongst this is the answer to the question ‘why?’ which he puts later to O’Brien, who 
tells him that “the Party seeks power entirely for its own sake” (301). This answer, in fact, has already 
been implied at several points in the pages that Winston has read. In a manner similar to the way in 
which he underestimates and misrepresents the danger of the apartment, Winston, however 
mistakenly, feels that he has understood the book in its entirety, and thus takes a certain amount of 
comfort from it. That comfort, as I have indicated, is an illusion: O’Brien and other Inner Party 
members are revealed to have authored the book. That being said, it must be noted that O’Brien 
                                                          
37 In the context of Panopticism, Shah makes a similar statement when he notes that the heterotopia of the 
apartment is not in opposition to the Panopticism of the Party but is, in fact an extension of it (717). 
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could, in fact, be simply lying; the Party has already been shown to claim various inventions for itself, 
such as the helicopter and aeroplane (177). This possibility amplifies the ambiguity of the book. It is 
impossible to determine whether it tells Winston the truth, or whether it is another example of the 
Party’s control over information. 
The book, then, is heartening and offers, as O’Brien admits, a certain amount of truth in its 
description of the history, goals and methods of the Party. But it also contains not only the seeds of 
Winston’s downfall, but what O’Brien declaims as “nonsense” (300); specifically, “the programme it 
sets forth…the secret accumulation of knowledge – a gradual spread of enlightenment – ultimately a 
proletarian rebellion – the overthrow of the Party” (300). This is the articulation of the utopian hope 
that Winston has harboured for the entirety of the novel; he writes early on in his diary that “if there 
[is] hope, it must lie in the proles” (80, emphasis in original). It is a faint hope, as Winston himself 
acknowledges – “until [the proles] become conscious they will never rebel, and until after they have 
rebelled they cannot become conscious” (81) – but one he entertains nonetheless, and which is 
reinforced by its presence in Goldstein’s book. That hope is rejected by O’Brien as ‘nonsense,’ and, by 
implication, so is the image of an idealised, natural, utopian past that is linked (in Winston’s mind, at 
least) to the proles, and the countryside where Winston and Julia first have sex. When watching the 
singing prole woman from the apartment moments before their arrest, Winston realises that “the 
mystical reverence that he felt for her was somehow mixed up with the aspect of the pale, cloudless 
sky” (251). The future, as Winston imagines it, belongs to the proles and a more natural, Mephi-like 
world, one that is firmly anchored in an (imagined) agrarian past and is the opposite of the grimly 
mechanised city-states of Oceania. O’Brien’s mockery, and Winston’s own inability to comprehend 
important details further undermines the viability of this utopian possibility, which appears to be a 
tenuous and impossible dream.38  
Despite the presence of heterotopian spaces in NEF, the potential for dynamism and change 
that was an important undercurrent in We, due largely to I-330’s revolution for its own sake, is 
seemingly nowhere to be found in NEF thanks to the ambiguous nature of heterotopia itself, the 
pervasive technologies employed by the Party and the image of the downtrodden society that O’Brien 
offers (307). Equally to blame are Winston’s own failures; he continually underestimates the 
heterotopian spaces he could perhaps make use of (Shah, 718), and invests his hopes and energies in 
utopian dreams of a proletarian revolution and a rural utopia that will never be achieved. The novel 
ends with his opposition to Big Brother turned into adoration, his affair with Julia a distant (and 
horrible) memory, and Winston himself a gin-soaked, “bloated” parody of his former self (336). That 
                                                          
38 See Wegner pp192ff for a more precise and detailed explanation of the ways in which Orwell uses NEF to 
attempt to locate a more conservative utopian project in the past.  
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being said, the novel does perhaps offer, if not hope, then a breathing space and the barest possibility 
for change with the final potentially heterotopian element that I will now address. The appendix – and 
single footnote on page six of the text that refers to it – in NEF that outlines “The Principles of 
Newspeak” (343) is easy to overlook, but it bears a remarkable similarity in tone and purpose to the 
foreword and footnotes that the historian, Anthony Meredith, inserts into the “Everhard Manuscript” 
(London, 5) – that is, Jack London’s The Iron Heel; Wegner notes that in some ways Winston Smith is 
“a kind of heir to London’s Ernest Everhard” (203).39 TIH itself is, as Wegner mentions, a largely 
(critical) utopian text, but even though that utopia is relegated, literally, to “the margins of the text” 
(100) in the form of Meredith’s footnotes, his commentary also opens up a nascent heterotopian 
space in the text. In some places it reaffirms or elaborates on Avis Everhard’s account, whilst in others 
it ridicules and undermines it in a gently patronising way:  
 
Looking back across the seven centuries that have lapsed since Avis Everhard completed her 
manuscript, events, and the bearings of events, that were confused and veiled to her, are clear 
to us. She lacked perspective. She was too close to the events she writes about. Nay, she was 
merged in the events she has described. Nevertheless, as a personal document, the Everhard 
Manuscript is of inestimable value. But here again enter error of perspective, and vitiation 
due to the bias of love.             
           (London, 5) 
 
What the above quotation reveals, apart from Meredith’s somewhat condescending attitude, is the 
fact that he is living and writing some seven hundred years after the events that are described in the 
novel take place. In another footnote, he divulges that the Oligarchy and its rule endured for “three 
centuries” (157) before being overthrown and replaced by “the Brotherhood of Man” (157). This 
directly contradicts the hopes of the Everhards and their fellow revolutionaries, who do not attribute 
any permanence to the Oligarchy but expect it to be overthrown in a “few short years” (7). Meredith’s 
annotations thus undermine whatever optimism runs through Avis Everhard’s account – which 
                                                          
39 Orwell, whilst not necessarily enjoying London’s writings, was certainly influenced by them; although he 
writes in 1940 that The Iron Heel was “clumsily written…shows no grasp of scientific possibilities, and the hero 
is the kind of human gramophone who is now disappearing even from Socialist tracts” (‘Prophecies of 
Fascism’), he also acknowledges in 1941 that “A crude book like The Iron Heel, written nearly thirty years ago, 
is a truer prophecy of the future than either Brave New World or The Shape of Things to Come” (‘Wells, Hitler 
and the World State’). That influence manifests itself in NEF as well; if Winston is Everhard’s literary heir, then 
O’Brien, with his declaration of the maintenance of power for its own sake, is the heir of Mr. Wickson, one of 
the founding Oligarchs of the Iron Heel, who states that “we are in power. Nobody will deny it. By virtue of 
that power we shall remain in power” (London, TIH, 72). See also William Steinhoff’s George Orwell and the 
Origins of 1984 (1975), especially chapter I (‘Utopias and Other Fiction’) pp 3-29. 
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comprises the majority of the novel – whilst simultaneously offering a different kind of hope. Thus 
there are at least two separate and seemingly irreconcilable times contained within the novel: the 
early years of the twentieth century, and what is referred to as the year “419 B.O.M.” (8) – the year 
2618 A.D., or thereabouts, which is the time Meredith writes from. There are also two vastly different 
societies. One is profoundly dystopian, crushed beneath “the iron heel of a despotism as relentless 
and terrible as any despotism that has blackened the pages of the history of man” (112) and the other 
is, as far as any reader can discern, a utopia of global peace and harmony.  
  It is overly optimistic to suggest, as Howard Fink and Richard. K. Voorhees have, that the 
appendix which refers to the Party and Newspeak in the past tense holds out any certain hope of a 
gloriously peaceful and happy future. Conversely, Harold Bloom’s suggestion that the appendix 
indicates “the impassive continuance of the Party and its ability to survive any resistance” (41) seems 
unduly pessimistic. I am inclined instead to believe that the appendix functions in a manner similar to 
Meredith’s footnotes and foreword. It questions the completeness of the closure that Wegner sees in 
the novel, opening up alternate spaces and possibilities within (and beyond) the novel, and emboldens 
us as readers to question certain assumptions that the novel itself seems to encourage – such as the 
permanence of the Party’s rule – without ever offering any assurances as to its own veracity. If we 
succumb for a moment to the temptation of a meta (and troublingly postmodern) interpretive 
approach to the novel, it is even possible to consider the possibility that Nineteen Eighty Four and the 
appendix both function for readers as Goldstein – or O’Brien’s – book does for Winston – they both 
grant and crush hope. Without ever approaching the term ‘heterotopia,’ Richard K. Sanderson quite 
neatly sums up at least part of the heterotopian function of the appendix (and the footnote which 
references it):  
 
The footnote's implied promise of verification is hollow, and the reader's attempts to 
determine the "objective truth" about Oceania – its social and political structure, its language, 
its fate – are frustrated. By trying to reconcile the novel and the Appendix, we experience for 
ourselves what it might be like to inhabit a world in which the authenticity (never mind the 
accuracy or objectivity) of all documents is in doubt, in which documents are almost 
dreamlike, unfixed in time, infused with self-contradiction, at once recognizable and cryptic.
                 (593-594) 
 
  As the above quotation implies, whilst Meredith’s commentary is recognisably from the perspective 
of a future far removed from the “terrible times” (London, 5) described by Avis Everhard, it is far more 
difficult to ascertain whether or not the “second narrator” (Sanderson, 587) in NEF, the supposed 
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author of the appendix, is a representative of a time when the Party has fallen from power. As a 
heterotopian space, the appendix both tantalises with the promise of unexpected hope and augments 
the feeling of hopelessness that the rest of the novel creates about Oceania. The effect of these 
competing potentials resonates even today conjuring images of a culture dominated by telescreens, 
the centralisation of the Party, and the terrors of Thought Police that our civilisation seems to be 
























Chapter Two: Towards Heterotopia – Snow Crash  
The contemporary transformation of the city displays a profound redrawing of the contours of public 
and private space, bringing to the fore an equally treacherous and fertile ground of conditions that 
are not merely hybrid, but rather defy an easy description in these terms. 
   ‘Heterotopia in a postcivil society’ – Michiel Dehaene and Lieven De Cauter 
 
 As Judith Shklar notes, one of the main reasons for the enduring popularity of Nineteen Eighty 
Four is because the novel is “a prophecy to which everyone could attach any fear whether that be 
technology, government surveillance, mind-control, consumerism, perpetual war, totalitarianism or 
the decline of English, to name only the most common” (5-6). That is, despite the “urgent 
contemporaneity, the flaunted topicality” (Rai, 5) of Orwell’s novel, it retains its appeal because many 
of the themes with which it engages and the fears that it invokes are as equally applicable to the early 
twenty-first century as they were to the mid-twentieth. The same, I believe, is true of Zamiatin’s We; 
the spectre of a totalitarian government that lies to, spies on and disregards the individual desires and 
subjectivity of its citizens is a theme that haunts many recent novels (and mediocre film adaptations). 
Whilst many of these recent texts that can be seen as fitting into the broader utopian tradition explore 
these issues through the reactive and, I would argue, increasingly redundant binary of utopia and 
dystopia, there are a growing number of novels that follow the heterotopian precedents set by We 
and NEF, and whose treatment of these themes reflect the equivocations, tensions and contradictions 
that are progressively dominant traits of our global, post-modern society. Rather than simply 
disavowing dystopias and utopias alike and thus perpetuating the binary, these ‘new’ texts instead 
incorporate aspects of both, creating unsettled spaces with fluid boundaries and definitions – 
heterotopias – that allow room for the subject within these spaces to explore their subjectivity and 
sense of self, both in conjunction with and in opposition to the society in which it resides. It could be 
said that we have already witnessed the latter in We and NEF; both Winston and D-503 explored their 
subjectivity in direct opposition to the dictates of the society in which they lived. The difference might 
be, however, that Winston in particular did so knowing his efforts – and self – were doomed to 
discovery and destruction. The sense of futility and resignation that thus pervades his attempts at self-
definition and awareness is not present in the experiences and narratives of the characters who live 
in societies that are, if not fully accepting of all difference, then at least accustomed to the presence 
of it. This is true of the three texts I will examine shortly; Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash (1992), 
Michael Marshall Smith’s Only Forward (1994) and Nick Harkaway’s The Gone-Away World (2008).  
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Once again, before I begin to analyse my texts, it may prove useful to discuss the concept of 
the individual, the self and subjectivity as it is relevant to this thesis, and the ways in which my model 
of the heterotopia constitutes – and, in turn, is constituted by – these individuals. Theoretical coverage 
of the self and the nature of subjectivity is, much like utopian studies itself, a vast and fascinating field 
and my coverage of it will be of necessity brief; it would be all too easy to devolve into a minute 
discussion of the politics and competing theories of the individual, subjectivity and self. While it may 
not be strictly accurate according to current dictionary, theoretical and literary definitions, I will use 
the terms ‘subject,’ ‘self’ and ‘individual’ somewhat interchangeably – although ‘self’ will denote the 
ways in which a character might view themselves, and ‘subject’ will tend towards indicating how a 
character is perceived by others, whilst ‘individual’ can be read as indicating a character as a single, 
discreet and distinct unit with a sense of its self and subjectivity, that may or may not be a part of (or 
apart from) the society that it resides in. When using the terms ‘subject’ and ‘subjectivity,’ I take my 
cue from Nick Mansfield, who states that:  
 
[s]ubjectivity refers…to an abstract or general principle that defies our separation into distinct 
selves and that encourages us to imagine that, or simply helps us to understand why, our 
interior lives inevitably seem to involve other people, either as objects of need, desire and 
interest or as necessary sharers of common experience. In this way, the subject is always 
linked to something outside of it – an idea or principle or the society of other subjects…One is 
always subject to or of something. The word subject, therefore, proposes that the self is not 
a separate and isolated entity, but one that operates at the intersection of general truths and 
shared principles.    
                (3, emphasis in original) 
 
This definition of the subject and subjectivity moves away from certain elements of Enlightenment 
and Modernist discourse that theorised a (predominantly white / straight / male) wholly self-
contained and self-constituted subject that was postulated by the likes of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in 
his Confessions (1782). What is particularly important about the definition of the subject that is offered 
here by Mansfield is the emphasis it places on the growth of the subject at the intersection of the 
various cultures, truths, and principles in which it is immersed. What it lacks, however, is an 
acknowledgement that one of the key ways in which the subject itself tries to make sense of and 
incorporate these experiences and principles is through the narrative(s) it constructs and (re)tells 
about itself and its experience(s); that is, it is a definition that fails to take into account the importance 
and centrality of a self that is continually being (self) rendered and (re)constituted. In the opening 
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pages of her Situating the Self, Seyla Benhabib depicts as standard a model in which the subject, self 
and individual are points on a (lineal) continuum of development. Whilst I agree wholeheartedly with 
her recognition of the subject as “embodied and fragile” (5), I would move away from the idea that it 
is finite (and, by extension, wholly knowable), and suggest instead that a human infant, by way of 
socialisation, develops into an individual whose subjectivity and sense of self continually develops and 
evolves in response to changing circumstances, perceptions and exposure to different cultures, 
environments and social groups, and, most importantly, in response to the narratives – and counter 
narratives – that individuals construct and (re)tell about themselves, and the competing or 
complementary narratives that are told about and to them. This is not to say that I am placing an 
emphasis on “an arbitrary and ad-hoc formation of a pastiche identity” (Yancy and Hadley, 10); nor 
am I suggesting that subjectivity is entirely self-constituted. I am postulating instead a middle ground, 
a subjectivity in which a multiplicity of mini-narratives of our selves “provides the ongoing context in 
which the figures of discourse are embedded and achieve their determinations of sense and 
reference” (Schrag, 19). This acknowledges on the one hand the constructed nature of the self – the 
subject – as it emerges “in a world in which language is always already established” (Mansfield, 39), 
but also the influences of the societal “mechanisms” by which not only are “human beings…made 
subject” (Foucault, 1982, 779, 777), but are encouraged (rightly or wrongly) to recognise themselves 
as knowable and wholly (whole) individual(s).40  
As a basis for my exploration of a narratively-based subjectivity and the ways in which it 
interacts with and is enabled by heterotopia, I will focus – briefly – here on the work of two somewhat 
disparate theorists; Paul John Eakin and Lisa Swanstrom. My coverage of their work will be by no 
means comprehensive; it is meant instead to be read alongside and in conjunction with my discussion 
of heterotopia. From Eakin I will draw the starting point for a theoretical examination of narrative 
identity, whilst I will use Swanstrom to illustrate the ways in which a heterotopian society can work in 
conjunction with the construction of a narrative-based subjectivity. Following the example set by 
psychologist John Shotter, Eakin has located one of the primary sources of our narrative-based identity 
as being “other people, usually parents and caregivers” (Eakin, 2001, 115); that is, the people who first 
narrate our lives and who in turn are the first to encourage us to tell our own stories about our selves. 
Although he never goes so far as to unequivocally equate the two, Eakin has drawn parallels between 
the theory and practices of written autobiography and a narrative-based identity, stating that “the 
rules for identity narrative function simultaneously as rules for identity, and the key to this hypothesis 
is the concept of narrative identity, which assumes that narrative is not merely a literary form but a 
                                                          
40 Nick Mansfield provides an excellent summation of some of the more important competing (and, in some 
cases, complementary) theories of subjectivity and the self in his Subjectivity (2000). 
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mode of phenomenological and cognitive self-experience” (114-115). Or, to put it another way, 
narrative is the means by which we not only relate our experiences (orally or via the printed text), but 
the means by which we make sense of those events and the ways in which they influence us and the 
way we view – and then depict – ourselves. Eakin identifies and explores what he believes to be the 
“primary transgressions for which self-narrators have been called to account” (113). These are, 
respectively: misrepresentations of ‘truths,’ both biographical and historical; privacy violations; and 
failures of normative representation (113-114). I believe that the first and third of these 
‘transgressions’ are particularly pertinent when it comes to a consideration of the individual in 
heterotopia, particularly when we consider the ways in which the heterotopia undermines attempts 
to establish and enforce “normative models of personhood” (114) whilst simultaneously enabling and 
encouraging the belief that there are always only what we might call ‘degrees of truth,’ whether those 
truths be historical or, more pertinently, biographical. 
 
I have already made brief reference to the ways in which the largely dystopian societies of We 
and NEF seek to supress, and even eradicate Winston and D-503’s conception of themselves as 
individual, independent selves, and the ways in which the heterotopian elements of those societies 
act as counter sites, allowing them an ostensibly safe space in which to explore their burgeoning 
subjectivities.  What I have only alluded to briefly, however, are the ways in which both Winston and 
D-503 begin the (re)constitution of their selves by means of narrative. As I noted in the previous 
chapter, Patrick Parrinder believes that D-503’s soul is “constituted by the act of writing” (para. 15) in 
his journal; although it begins as an ostensibly sanctioned ode to the OneState, the transgressive 
possibilities of D-503‘s diary, and the ways in which it is central to the awakening of his self are 
apparent from the very beginning:41  
 
I feel my cheeks burning as I write this. This is probably like what a woman feels when she first 
senses in her the pulse of a new little person, still tiny and blind. It’s me, and at the same time 
it’s not me. And for long months to come she will have to nourish it with her own juice, her 
own blood, and then – tear it painfully out of herself and lay it at the feet of OneState. But I 
am ready. Like all of us, or nearly all of us. I am ready.    
                         (Zamiatin, 4, my emphasis) 
 
                                                          
41 I have already explored at length the ways in which D-503’s sexual attraction to I-330 and their liaison also 
plays a central role in his awakening; my examination here of the role of his burgeoning narrative of self is not 
meant to detract from the importance of that, but instead to complement it. 
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I would suggest that D-503‘s cheeks burn here not so much from his passion for the OneState and the 
INTEGRAL, as he would have his readers – and himself – believe, but rather from his sense of nurturing 
and giving birth to a being unauthorised by the OneState: his self. It is, as yet, embryonic; he senses 
the pulse of his self, but – to continue the metaphor that D-503 begins – he will not be (re)born until 
after he meets I-330. The simple act of choosing to begin a daily record, to begin what amounts to the 
narrative of his self instead of “a poem in accordance with the approved public literary genres” 
(Parrinder, para. 15) of the OneState signals that D-503 is indeed ‘ready’ to begin an exploration of 
himself as an individual, rather than as just another cog in the giant machine that is the OneState. The 
opening of his diary takes on a similar significance for Winston Smith; although he has long been aware 
of his status as an individual in a society that demands conformity, the act of setting down his narrative 
“[is] the decisive act” that overtly signals his attempts to reclaim his subjectivity (Orwell, 9).  
By attempting to reclaim and relate the stories of their selves, both Winston and D-503 are 
guilty of the third of Eakin’s three transgressions: they fail to display what are, in the dystopian 
societies of Oceania and the OneState, normative models of personhood. In D-503‘s case “the normal 
state of a normal person” (Zamiatin, 224) is forced back onto him by means of the fantasectomy, and 
once this is carried out he is no longer perceived as a threat to himself or to the OneState; Winston is 
forced to undergo a similar – although far more painful and lengthy – journey at the hands of O’Brien 
in the Ministry of Love. However, it is not enough for either of these men to be ‘proven’ to be 
‘abnormal.’ Instead, the foundations of their fledgling selfhood are also challenged on the grounds of 
biographical and historical truth. There is no way around this binary in the dystopic societies of the 
OneState and Oceania; one is either telling the truth that has been pre-determined by the ruling 
powers, or one is simply peddling lies. In the fortieth and final Record, a newly dispassionate D-503 
questions the veracity of his journal: “Could it be that I, D-503, actually wrote these 225 pages? Could 
it be that I ever actually felt this – or imagined that I did? It’s my handwriting. And it goes on, in the 
same hand, but fortunately only the handwriting is the same. No delirium, no ridiculous metaphors, 
no feelings. Just the facts” (224, my emphasis). In just a few lines, whatever truth and sense of self 
that the newly soulful and imaginative D-503 felt he had (re)discovered, is dismissed as idle fancies, 
the work of his “former illness (soul)” (224). The attacks on the individual narrative on the grounds of 
a pre-determined truth are even more pronounced in Nineteen Eighty Four. In the dreaded Room 101, 
O’Brien tells Winston that he is “mentally deranged” (Orwell, 282) that he suffers from a “defective 
memory” (282), and that the individual “truth[s]” (282) that Winston clings to are merely 




Only the disciplined mind can see reality, Winston…. When you delude yourself into thinking 
that you see something, you assume that everyone else sees the same thing as you. But I tell 
you, Winston, that reality is not external. Reality exists in the human mind, and nowhere else. 
Not in the individual mind, which can make mistakes, and in any case soon perishes: only in 
the mind of the Party, which is collective and immortal. Whatever the Party holds to be truth, 
is truth. It is impossible to see reality except by looking through the eyes of the Party. That is 
the fact that you have got to re-learn, Winston.       
               (285, emphasis in original) 
 
There is no room in this recursive way of being that O’Brien articulates for individual narratives and 
truths, and even less room for any exploration of an individual subjectivity that might arise from those 
narratives and truths. It is their determination to nonetheless render their selves, to celebrate and 
explore their subjectivity and their identities as individuals that brings both D-503 and Winston into 
direct conflict with the societies in which they reside, and ultimately leads to their destruction. The 
rebellions of Winston and D-503 are fostered by heterotopian spaces, such as the apartment over 
Charrington’s shop and the Ancient House. These spaces, however, are isolated capsules in a hostile 
environment; this, along with the fact that both men – especially Winston – misapprehend the nature 
of the heterotopian spaces that they encounter, and because of the ultimately ambiguous nature of 
those spaces, means that there are limits as to far their rebellions can be taken once removed from 
the spaces that enabled them.  
 
 But what if heterotopian spaces, with all their ambiguities and transgressional properties 
were, if not the norm, then at least far more open and accepted? What if they were, rather than being 
isolated as they are in both Oceania and the OneState, part of a network? And what if individuals 
residing in these networked heterotopian spaces were not only free to represent and narrate their 
selves, but to do so in any way that they saw fit? This is the case in the next ‘cluster’ of texts I will 
examine. Although it would be quite easy to read each of these texts, like Nineteen Eighty Four and 
We before them as (futuristic) dystopias, I would suggest that the dynamic and unpredictable nature 
of the societies that they portray, and the relative freedom of action (if not always thought) and 
opportunities for self-determination that is granted to the individuals who dwell within and alongside 
them challenges that reading. The heterotopian elements of Only Forward, Snow Crash and The Gone-
Away World are, however, far more developed and pervasive than they were in NEF and We, by virtue 
of the multitude of different perspectives and beliefs that are accepted, encouraged and cultivated 
within the portrayed societies. The dominant (and domineering) world views of the Party and the 
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OneState have been replaced – quite literally, in the case of Only Forward and Snow Crash – by loosely 
connected enclaves of (conscious) difference. By the same token, however, it should be noted that 
these texts do not simply portray hedonistic utopias; the spaces and the societies within them are 
ambiguous, treacherous, and as much of a threat to the individual as they are a refuge. And as we 
shall see, although individuals in these three texts are free to constitute their subjectivities narratively, 
both in conjunction with and in opposition to the societies in which they reside, they are still subject 
to – although in new and different ways – some of the rules of autobiography. 
 
Lisa Swanstrom writes about the “persistent tensions between encapsulation and penetration 
in the network systems of Snow Crash,” (‘Circulating Subjectivity,’ 55) and the ways in which these 
“contribute to a networked sense of self” (55). Although Swanston’s reading of SC as it pertains to 
subjectivity privileges the near-Archetypal figure of ‘The Hacker,’ the sense of self that she sees as 
arising from the tensions that result from the (permeability of) boundaries in SC provides a useful way 
of thinking about the subject and subjectivity – and the ways in which these concepts relate to the 
society that shapes it, but can also be shaped by it:  
 
Neither completely tied to the Cartesian model (which describes identity as an indivisible soul 
or mind encapsulated within a physical body), nor an excessively open model that treats 
subjectivity as a mass of societal affiliations with no roots or grounding of any kind, a subject 
in circulation is instead a complex, distributed network of embodied systems that exists in a 
flux of encapsulations, enclosures, ruptures, and flows.      
           (55) 
 
‘Networked’ is a key term here, and builds upon the key element that I identified as lacking in the 
earlier definition of the subject and subjectivity that Mansfield offers; although Swanstrom (and de 
Cauter before her) use it in a strictly technological sense, I would also like to consider the expression 
in terms of a set or series of connections that may utilise and be facilitated by technology, but are not 
wholly dependent on them. Thus, in terms of narrative identity and the construction of subjectivity, 
we can consider the matrix of stories that we tell about ourselves and that are told concurrently about 
us as contributing to what we might label a networked sense of self. While technology can play a 
definitive role in this – consider the ways in which the ‘storytelling’ mechanisms of social media 
facilitate the construction of identities and subjectivities that are strikingly different from those 







This is not necessarily immediately obvious in Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash (1992). 
First described by David Porush in 1994 as a “second-generation cyberpunk novel” (‘Hacking the 
Brainstem, 540), there is a critical tendency to view Snow Crash as a technologically-oriented novel 
with a bleak prognosis for society and humanity. Wade Roush, writing a little over a decade after 
Porush, categorises it as “a classic of the dystopian ‘cyberpunk’ genre” (41), whilst N. Katherine Hayles 
states that the novel presents “a nightmare vision” (247). That SC is frequently associated with and 
viewed as a successor to William Gibson’s Sprawl Trilogy – particularly Neuromancer (1984) – merely 
helps to cement the idea that it is an entirely dystopian depiction of a society that has become 
fragmented and lawless.42 Despite the seeming bleakness of Stephenson’s vision, however, I would 
contend that the society portrayed in Snow Crash is not a dystopian one; it is most certainly not, 
despite the presence of the ostensibly benign Metaverse, a utopian one either. Rather, it is a 
heterotopian and wholly ambiguous one that contains both utopian and dystopian elements and 
demonstrates the tension at work between encapsulation, rupture and penetration that I have 
identified as central to my model of the heterotopia. This is equally true of both of the ‘worlds’ 
depicted in Snow Crash – Reality and the virtual reality that is the Metaverse. Whilst Reality, which is 
seemingly characterised by fragmentation and isolation, appears highly dystopic, the Metaverse 
appears to be an idyllic haven; as one of the central characters notes, “[the Metaverse] beats the shit 
out of the U-Stor-It” unit that he lives in (Stephenson, 22). As I have already suggested, however, this 
appearance is deceptive; both of these spaces contain utopian and dystopian elements, and are 
heterotopian in nature and in composition. Moreover, both of these spaces – the virtual and the real 
– are equally important when considering the impact of heterotopian spaces upon the individuals that 
inhabit them. 
However, much of the critical focus on SC, particularly when it comes to issues of subjectivity 
and identity, tends to focus on the Metaverse.43 This is perhaps understandable; Stephenson’s 
Metaverse is a compelling shared virtual space that, as Shane Shukis notes, “very closely predicted the 
actual expansion of the Internet as a space for virtual identity and interaction” (57) and continues to 
be used as the basis for discussions and visions of “the Metaverse that’s really on the way” (Roush, 
                                                          
42 See Tim Jordan’s Cyberpower: The Culture and Politics of Cyberspace and the Internet (1999) and, to a lesser 
extent, Daniel Grassian’s ‘Discovering the Machine in You’ (2001) for examples of this tendency to associate 
the writing of Gibson and Stephenson.  
43 See Michelle Kendrick (2002), Swanstrom (2004), Porush (1994) and Grassian (2001).  
55 
 
41). Michelle Kendrick describes it as “[the] one coherent space” found in the novel, and, in a break 
from Gibsonian representations of cyberspace, as “a simulacrum of the real world, not the 
representation of a data-driven imaginary space of capital” (62). But whilst it is designed to be similar 
in many ways to, and replicates many of the more problematic hierarchical aspects – particularly those 
related to wealth and ease of access – of the ‘real world,’ the Metaverse is not merely a facsimile of 
Reality. Different people are able to move between virtual boundaries; as I will demonstrate in my 
examination of SC, the rules of rupture and flow in the Metaverse are different to those in Reality and 
privilege the figure of the Hacker, embodied and exemplified by Hiro Protagonist. In the course of my 
analysis of these issues in relation to the Metaverse – hierarchy and access, encapsulation and the 
flow between different capsules – I will focus on the exclusive virtual club, The Black Sun. I will suggest 
that The Black Sun also performs as a continuation – with necessary differences, due to the prevalence 
of heterotopian spaces – of the position and function of the Ancient House in We. I will also 
demonstrate that The Black Sun and the Metaverse are dynamic heterotopian spaces which, through 
the medium of “avatars” (SC, 33), allow its users to construct and explore subjectivities and identities 
that are different to those that they maintain – or are forced to maintain – in Reality. In conjunction 
with my exploration of the roles of avatars, I will examine the construction of subjectivity and narrative 
in Reality, and the ways in which these might in fact be more fluid than those explored online. As I will 
demonstrate when I analyse the figure of the gargoyle, however, the heterotopianism at work in SC is 
not all-pervasive.  
 
Unlike many of its literary predecessors, such as the almost aggressively-bodiless cyberspace 
depicted by William Gibson, or the colourful data highways of Dan Simmon’s datumplane (Hyperion, 
1989), Stephenson’s Metaverse is in many ways designed to be a replica of Reality, with definitive 
rules and boundaries, and identifiable structures. One of the most absolute rules of the Metaverse, 
and the one that most ensures that it resembles Reality, is that people are unable to “just materialize 
anywhere…like Captain Kirk beaming down from on high…. It would break the metaphor” (34). You 
materialize in the House that you own in the Metaverse; if you are “some peon” who doesn’t own 
virtual real estate, you materialize in a Port (34). As an extension of this logic of sameness, to move 
about through the Metaverse, people – or, rather, their avatars – must walk or drive, or take the 
monorail, which is a “free piece of public utility software that enables users to change their location 
on the Street rapidly and smoothly” (25). The monorail is the virtual equivalent of the (franchised) 
mega-highways in Reality and fulfils the same function; it connects and aids movement between the 
different areas – capsules – of the Metaverse, just as the highways of Reality connect the ‘Burbclaves, 
FOQNEs and unaffiliated slum-lie areas of the rest of the city. And both the monorail and the highways 
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extend far beyond the easily accessible capsules in the Metaverse and in Reality; Hiro drives a 
motorbike from L.A. to Port Sherman, whilst Y.T. catches the train to a “black cube” (198) which is 
situated some “twenty thousand miles” (198) from the Street. Because they demonstrate the same 
rules of encapsulation, the similarities between the two spaces can be exploited by their users; Y.T., – 
“it stands for Yours Truly” (SC, 46) – whilst admitting that she’s “not that good at the Metaverse” (205), 
nevertheless understands that due to the many similarities between the two, “finding an address in 
the Metaverse shouldn’t be any more difficult than doing it in Reality, at least if you’re not a totally 
retarded ped” (205).44 Like the real world, the borders in the Metaverse are only semi-permeable; 
whilst there are universally accessible spaces there are also private spaces, and spaces where only 
some people can go.  
The Metaverse, however, privileges different people; those who can move with ease in Reality 
cannot necessarily do so in the virtual world. Whilst in Reality and carrying out her role as a Kourier, 
Y.T. has almost unlimited access to the different capsules of the fragmented city, and breaks the rules 
of encapsulation at will: “[she] has a visa to everywhere. It’s right there on her chest, a little bar code” 
(30). Crucially, Y.T. also understands the rules that govern encapsulation in Reality, and thus can 
undermine and transgress those rules; she can also predict the immediate consequences of those 
transgressions and use these to her advantage. This is illustrated early on in the novel, when, in the 
course of delivering a pizza on behalf of Hiro, she poons a bimbo box driven by a person whom she 
dubs “young Studley” (28). 45 Studley, like Hiro before him, views the Kourier pooned onto his vehicle 
as an unwanted parasite, and attempts to get rid of her: 
 
This fucking Kourier is about to die, knotted around one of those fire hydrants. Studley the  
Testosterone Boy will see to it… 
Y.T. does not know any of this for a fact, but she suspects it…. It is her reconstruction of the 
psychological environment inside of that bimbo box. She sees the hydrant coming a mile away, 
sees Studley reaching down to rest one hand on the parking brake. It is all so obvious. She 
feels sorry for Studley and his ilk. She reels out, gives herself lots of slack…. The minivan goes 
sideways…and doesn’t quite snap her around the way he wanted; she has to help it. As its ass 
is rotating around, she reels in hard, converting that gift of angular momentum into forward 
velocity, and ends up shooting right past the van going well over a mile a minute. 
                                                          
44 Ped = pedestrian. As a skateboard-toting Kourier, Y.T. appears to have almost as much contempt for those 
who travel on foot as she does for those who travel in bimbo boxes. 
45 A “MagnaPoon” (27), shortened to ‘poon’ throughout the novel, is the means by which Kouriers latch onto 
passing vehicles and are thus able to travel rapidly from one place to another. As the name implies, it is, to all 
extents and purposes, an electromagnetic harpoon.  
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           (29) 
 
Although Lisa Swanstrom notes that in the course of Y.T.’s role as a “skateboarding Kourier” she 
routinely breaches the perimeter of other capsules when she poons them (60-61), she does not 
explore what I think the above passage reveals: that Y.T. demonstrates not only an innate 
understanding of what can and will happen when she transgresses the rules of encapsulation in 
Reality, but also the ability to make that knowledge work to her advantage – abilities and knowledge 
that are comparable to Hiro’s abilities within the Metaverse. This ability is also demonstrated in the 
opening sequences of the novel when Y.T. poons Hiro during the course of his last, frantic pizza 
delivery: 
 
[Hiro] passes a slower car in the middle lane, then cuts right in front of him. The Kourier will 
have to unpoon or else be slammed sideways into the slower vehicle.  
Done. The Kourier isn’t ten feet behind him anymore – he is right there, peering in the rear 
window. Anticipating the maneuver [sic], the Kourier reeled in his cord, which is attached to 
a handle with a power reel in it, and is now right on top of the pizza mobile, the front wheel 
of his skateboard actually underneath the Deliverator’s rear bumper.      
         (Stephenson, 13-14) 
 
Hiro may be a master of the online world, but when it comes to the rules of rupture and flow in regards 
to Reality, he is outstripped and humbled by Y.T. the Kourier. By virtue of her understanding of the 
rules of movement between capsules and her ability to use that knowledge to transgress and 
penetrate boundaries, Y.T. has almost unlimited access in Reality; she can move between different 
‘Burbclaves and FOQNEs and can “easily [penetrate] airport security” at LAX (437). However, this 
almost universal access in Reality does not translate into access in the Metaverse: Y.T. is able to find 
her way around in the most basic of ways, and is granted access to some private property in the 
Metaverse by virtue of her association with Uncle Enzo, the head of Nova Sicilia (this franchise owns 
the pizza delivery company that Hiro works for at the beginning of the novel), yet she is still just “some 
skater come in done up in grainy black-and-white” (207) who is bound by the rules.46 Contrasted 
against Y.T. is Hiro Protagonist, who has limited abilities to move between capsules in Reality once his 
time as a pizza delivery man ends, but who, as a hacker, has almost unlimited access to the virtual 
capsules of the Metaverse, and is able to break the rules of encapsulation in this space at will. In stark 
                                                          




contrast to Reality, where he shares a “spacious 20-by-30” (18) storage unit with his roommate, Hiro 
owns a “nice big house” (24) in what appears to be an exclusive (online) neighbourhood populated by 
hackers; he is thus automatically distinguished from and placed above those ‘peons’ who must 
materialise in a Port. He also, by virtue of his status as one of the first computer programmers – 
hackers – to develop the Metaverse, has access to one of the most exclusive and impenetrable spaces 
within the Metaverse: The Black Sun.  
Like the Ancient House of We before it, The Black Sun is an architectural oddity that stands in 
stark contrast to its surroundings, a “large, low-slung black building… [that] is extraordinarily somber 
[sic] for the Street, like a parcel that someone forgot to develop…Above the door is a matte black 
hemisphere about a meter [sic] in diameter, set into the front wall of the building. It is the closest 
thing the place has to decoration” (37). I would suggest that this space, this capsule which “only a 
couple of thousand people” (38) in the world have access to, is in many ways a heterotopian successor 
to the Ancient House although it is, somewhat ironically, less accessible; whilst the Ancient House may 
have had few visitors, it was in theory open to all. Like the Ancient House, The Black Sun also functions 
as a site of personal crisis. It is in this space that Hiro re-encounters his former lover and fellow hacker, 
Juanita; this meeting and his desire to “figure out what’s on [her] mind” (215) precipitates his 
involvement in the quest to prevent L. Bob Rife – fittingly described as the “last of the nineteenth-
century monopolists” (105) – from infecting users of the Metaverse (especially the programmers and 
hackers) with the Snow Crash virus that would “burn their minds” and subject them to his (mind) 
control (410). Whilst The Black Sun might allow only a select few through its doors and is in its own 
way as “opaque” (Zamiatin, 28) as the Ancient House, it also has the effect of briefly making visible 
those who were previously unseen (and unseeable):   
 
When things get this jammed together, the computer simplifies things by drawing all of the 
avatars ghostly and translucent so you can see where you’re going. Hiro appears solid to  
himself, but everyone else looks like a ghost. He walks through the crowd as if it’s a fogbank, 
clearly seeing The Black Sun in front of him. He steps over the property line, and he’s in the 
doorway. And in that instant he becomes solid and visible to all the avatars milling outside…. 
Now that he’s all by himself in the entryway…he can see all of the people in the front row of 
the crowd with perfect clarity.          
         (Stephenson, 37-38) 
 
In the moments before Hiro disappears into the inaccessible space that is The Black Sun, he becomes 
visible to everyone “milling” (38) in front of it just as they become more visible to him; it is a moment 
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of individuation, a moment where Hiro becomes distinct from the crowd that has previously hidden 
him. The liminal zone that Hiro here occupies, between the property line and the interior of The Black 
Sun, is, I would suggest, both the first ‘sub-capsule’ of the larger capsule that is The Black Sun and one 
of the first virtual heterotopian spaces of the novel. It is a marginal zone, standing as it does between 
two distinctly different spaces – the Street and The Black Sun – and  one that upholds the rigid 
hierarchy at work in the Metaverse; only a special few, such as Hiro, can occupy it. Those who wish to 
join the exclusive clientele of The Black Sun mingle at the fringes of this zone with “run-of-the-mill 
psycho fans, devoted to the fantasy of stabbing some particular actress to death” (38). The existence 
of this zone, the dividing line between the privileged few of the Metaverse and other users allows Hiro 
to feel secure and anonymous. Because this is a heterotopian space, however, this sense of safety and 
anonymity is soon undermined and questioned: 
  
 Hiro realizes that the guy has noticed him and is staring back, looking him up and down… 
A grin spreads across the black-and-white guy’s face. It is a satisfied grin. A grin of recognition. 
The grin of a man who knows something that Hiro doesn’t…. He steps as close as he can and 
leans forward… 
‘Hey, Hiro,” the black-and-white guy says, ‘you want to try some Snow Crash?’” 
…Oddity the first: The guy knows Hiro’s name. 
           (39)  
            
Hiro, as is shown in the above passage, is not completely anonymous; neither is he completely 
invulnerable. The black-and-white avatar, later identified as Raven, may be unable to physically enter 
the capsule between The Black Sun and the Street that Hiro occupies and believes himself safe in, but 
he is still able to offer Hiro a “hypercard” (40) that contains the drug Snow Crash.47 Although Hiro does 
not take the hypercard from Raven he is, for a small amount of time and unbeknownst to him, in a 
considerable amount of danger; Da5id, Hiro’s friend and the founder of The Black Sun, has already 
accepted the “free sample” (40) that Raven also offers to him. This space between the Street and The 
Black Sun, which is supposed to represent the beginning of safety and segregation, is instead revealed 
to have deceptively penetrable boundaries. 
 This ambiguity does not stop at the doors of The Black Sun. Although Hiro might believe 
himself to be safe within this highly exclusive capsule it, like the buffer zone that precedes it, is still 
subject to the effects of rupture. This is not immediately obvious; at first glance The Black Sun appears 
                                                          
47 A hypercard is an online version of a business card, and represents a “chunk of data” (40) that can be passed 
from one user to another, and represents yet another layer of encapsulation within the Metaverse; it is a piece 
of data within a piece of data that contains yet more data.  
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highly encapsulated and self-contained. Inaccessible to the majority of Metaverse users, it also places 
further restrictions on those who can access it – “only so many people can be [in The Black Sun] at 
once” (51). Those who patronise The Black Sun are subdivided further, and inhabit one of the four 
areas; the “Nipponese Quadrant”, the “Rock Star Quadrant”, the “Movie Star Quadrant” and, of 
course, the “Hacker Quadrant” where Hiro belongs (52); within these quadrants there are also a series 
of closed off “private rooms” that avatars can meet in (185). There are also pieces of software in the 
club – known as daemons – that act as bouncers, removing “undesirables” from the bar (51); these 
might be users who are being disruptive or intrusive, or they might be “contagious” – someone whose 
personal computer is infected with viruses (51). That there is a need for security against virus-
spreading avatars suggests, in the first instance, that the boundaries of The Black Sun are not as 
impenetrable as they initially appear. This is confirmed when Da5id, Hiro’s friend, “supreme hacker 
overlord, founding father of the Metaverse protocol, creator and proprietor of the world-famous Black 
Sun” is exposed to and succumbs to the Snow Crash virus within this sanctum, and is summarily 
ejected by his own daemons, despite the presence of apparently overwhelming quantities of “antiviral 
medicine” in his operating system (71, 67). Or, to put it another way, the ease with which supposedly 
impermeable boundaries can be penetrated in the Metaverse in general, and in The Black Sun 
specifically, is evinced by the way in which Snow Crash penetrates the boundaries of multiple capsules: 
it moves from the Street into the liminal zone that divides The Black Sun from the rest of the 
Metaverse, and from there moves into The Black Sun proper, and into Da5id’s operating system. The 
‘secure’ boundaries of The Black Sun are ruptured again later in the novel, when an anonymous “Clint” 
gains access to the club and attempts to expose Hiro to the Snow Crash virus (189). That his attempt 
to do so is unsuccessful – thanks largely to Hiro’s finely-tuned sword-fighting reflexes – is beside the 
point; the fact that ‘he’ somehow gained access to what is supposed to be an exclusive zone – created 
and protected by hackers, no less – definitively demonstrates that the boundaries of The Black Sun 
are vulnerable to rupture and penetration. This final example of rupture in The Black Sun also, fittingly 
enough, begins to unfold some of the dynamic possibilities of The Black Sun – and, by extension, the 
Metaverse – by revealing the full (and hitherto undisclosed) potential and implications of the “tunnel 
system” that runs beneath The Black Sun, and, more importantly, Hiro’s relationship to those spaces 
(96).  
 Ostensibly “accessible only to the Graveyard Daemons” (96), it appears at first that this system 
of tunnels serves a vastly different purpose to those “endless corridors” that run beneath the Ancient 
House and out beyond the Green Wall (Zamiatin, 147); rather than allowing movement between 
(forbidden) spaces, it seems that they exist primarily to allow the aforementioned daemons to carry 
out their designated role – the removal and destruction of the “inert, dismembered avatars” that 
61 
 
result from combat in The Black Sun (Stephenson, 95). Although it is hinted that Hiro can access these 
tunnels, the implications of this are not explored until much later in the novel. In the aftermath of the 
unsuccessful attack on Hiro in The Black Sun by the Clint, however, it is revealed that not only did Hiro 
create the Graveyard Daemons, but that he is in fact “the one who coded those tunnels into The Black 
Sun to begin with” (190), and that he is the only person who can access them. Furthermore, it is 
revealed that the tunnels that the Graveyard Daemons inhabit extend beyond The Black Sun, and in 
fact allow movement beneath the surface of the Street, out into the hacker neighbourhood where 
Hiro’s virtual house is located, and up into the “basement – the room where Hiro does his hacking” 
(191). These tunnels, then, begin to display some of the same characteristics and perform similar 
functions to those found beneath the Ancient House; they allow for movement between different and 
seemingly unconnected capsules. And, as in We, the movement between The Black Sun and Hiro’s 
basement that the tunnels facilitates is transgressive; in We, the tunnels facilitate movement between 
acceptable and forbidden spaces – and, indirectly, for movement between the respective genetic 
pools of the members of The OneState and those who live beyond the Green Wall – whereas in SC, 
the tunnels allow Hiro – and only Hiro – to move in secrecy between two virtual spaces without 
traversing the Street. What these tunnels also do, however, is reveal Hiro’s role and function as a 
hacker in the Metaverse: he not only takes advantage of the tunnels and the movement between 
different capsules that they afford him, but actually creates and alters these spaces as he requires 
them. They, and the daemons that inhabit them, enable him to safely obtain a copy of the online 
version of Snow Crash, which in turn allows him hack into it and create an ‘antidote’ to it. This is a 
crucial difference between Hiro, D-503 and Winston, and also between The Black Sun, the Metaverse 
and their prototypically heterotopian predecessors in We and Nineteen Eighty-Four. The nature of the 
relationship between D-503 and the Ancient House, and between Winston and Charrington’s 
apartment is essentially one-sided; the heterotopian spaces that they come into contact with effect 
change, crisis and deviation in D-503 and Winston, but remain unchanged – and perhaps 
unchangeable – themselves. This is not the case in Snow Crash; as The Black Sun and the tunnels 
beneath it reveals, the relationship between space and user is much more dynamic and reciprocal, if 
no less ambiguous. As I have already noted, it is The Black Sun’s role as meeting point that brings Hiro 
back into contact with Juanita; this encounter, in combination with the infection of Da5id with Snow 
Crash, sends Hiro on the quest that, whilst propelling much of the action in the novel, also – and far 
more importantly – changes Hiro’s view of himself and the spaces around him at a fundamental level. 
In the case of Hiro, however, his occupation as a hacker means that he is able to alter these spaces 
and the rules that govern them and thus – unlike D-503 and Winston – is not completely at the mercy 
of them.  
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This is demonstrated initially by Hiro’s use of Bigboard to subvert the rules of encapsulation 
at work within The Black Sun, but is cemented by the depiction of the swordfight that occurs in the 
club between Hiro and a Nipponese businessman.48 Immediately after Da5id succumbs to Snow Crash 
and is ejected by his daemons from his own bar, Hiro is confronted by (the avatar of) a “neo-
traditional” (Stephenson, 79) Nipponese businessman who is, like Hiro’s avatar, depicted as wearing 
a kimono and “two swords – the long katana on his left hip and the one-handed wakizashi stuck 
diagonally in his waistband” (70). This businessman takes exception to a man of Hiro’s appearance 
and apparent ethnicity – Hiro’s mother is Korean, and his father was African-American – carrying 
“ancient” Nipponese swords (79), and challenges him to single combat: 
 
The businessman turns out to have a lot of zanshin. Translating this concept into English is like 
translating “fuckface” into Nipponese, but it might translate into “emotional intensity” in 
football lingo…. “Emotional intensity” doesn’t convey the half of it, of course…. The word 
“zanshin” is larded down with a lot of other folderol that you have to be Nipponese to 
understand. 
…Hiro doesn’t have any zanshin at all. He just wants this over with. The next time the 
businessman sets up his ear-splitting screech and shuffles toward Hiro, cutting and snapping 
his blade, Hiro parries the attack, turns around, and cuts both of his legs off just above the 
knees…  
“Well, land sakes!” Hiro says. “Lookee here!” He whips his blade sideways, cutting off both of 
the businessman’s forearms, causing the sword to clatter onto the floor. He whips his blade 
sideways, cutting off both of the businessman’s forearms, causing the sword to clatter onto 
the floor.  
“Better fire up the ol’ barbeque, Jemima!” Hiro continues, whipping the sword around 
sideways, cutting the businessman’s body in half just above the navel. Then he leans down so 
he’s looking right into the businessman’s face. “Didn’t anyone tell you,” he says, losing the 
dialect, “that I was a hacker?” 
Then he hacks the guy’s head off.                 
        (80-82, emphasis in original) 
 
That there are a great many undercurrents at play in, and multiple ways of interpreting this passage 
seems patently obvious. For now, however, I wish to examine this passage in terms of Hiro ‘hacking’ 
                                                          
48 Nippon (or more usually, Nihon), is the formal (Japanese) name for Japan, and is used instead of the more 
familiar term throughout the novel.   
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into the Nipponese businessman. At the conclusion of their duel, Hiro literally hacks the head of the 
businessman off, having first removed the arms and legs from his avatar. This ‘hacking’ means that 
the businessman is “disconnected” (82) from the Metaverse; his avatar has been killed, and he will 
not be able to return to the Metaverse or The Black Sun until his forcibly disassembled avatar has been 
collected and destroyed by the Graveyard Daemons. As has already been revealed, Hiro is the one 
who created the Graveyard Daemons, raising the possibility that he could stop the destruction of the 
businessman’s avatar, and thus prevent him from ever regaining access to the Metaverse. Hiro’s 
power over who can and cannot access the Metaverse, only hinted at with the ‘death’ of the 
Nipponese businessman, is made explicit during the final showdown with Raven. All Hiro has to do is 
“take his head off” because if he kills Raven, “‘[Raven] gets kicked out of the system. And he can’t sign 
back on until the Graveyard Daemons dispose of his avatar’” – Hiro is the one who “[controls] the 
Graveyard Daemons” (411). Thus, if Hiro kills Raven’s avatar, he can prevent him from ever logging 
back into the Metaverse.  
Hiro’s ability to control access to the Metaverse is also demonstrated by the two final ways in 
which he ‘hacks’ the businessman. One of these has implications for the (heterotopian) treatment of 
subjectivity and identity in the novel, and will be examined shortly; this is Hiro’s understanding the 
concept of zanshin and the ways in which he turns it against the Nipponese businessman. The other 
is perhaps the most important in terms of Hiro’s ability to influence the spaces around him. Hiro wins 
his fight against the Nipponese businessman – and, quite probably, most of the other online duels he 
engages in – less because he is “the greatest sword fighter in the world” (97) and more because he 
“wrote the software” (97); that is, Hiro is in fact the person who originally wrote the code that allows 
avatars to engage in sword-fights in the Metaverse. This means that he not only has an understanding 
of virtual sword-fighting on a fundamental level, but that he will know of any – and perhaps have 
written in – coding ‘loopholes’ that allow him to get the better of an opponent in a virtual sword-fight; 
this is all but confirmed somewhat later in the novel when it is revealed that his avatar’s katana has 
been coded in such a way as to make it “all-penetrating” (407). To put it another way, it is Hiro’s ability 
to hack into and (re) programme the spaces that surround him online that grants him the proficiency 
to physically hack into the avatars of those who challenge him. As the sword-fight in The Black Sun 
reveals, “it takes a lot of practise to make your avatar move through the Metaverse like a real person” 
(82). And although Hiro demonstrates some sword-wielding abilities in Reality, he is clearly not a 
master swordsman as he acknowledges in the wake of his first encounter with Raven: “He knows he 
was totally unprepared. The spear [that Raven threw] just came at him. He slapped at it with the blade. 
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He happened to slap it at the right time, and it missed him” (172).49  Hiro may be good with a blade, 
but he’s probably not good enough to be ranked “Number One” out of “890 people who have ever 
participated in a sword fight in The Black Sun” (83). In short, Hiro, in his capacity as programmer and 
hacker, quite literally hacks the Nipponese businessman and their online sword-fight.   
 Hiro’s abilities and occupation as a hacker mean that he occupies a pole position not only 
within the ranks of virtual sword-fighters, but also within the Metaverse itself. Those few who have 
the ability to access it in the first instance – it has not, Daniel Grassian’s statement to the contrary, “all 
but” (253) replaced Reality as the most utilised and highly populated space in the novel – are then 
sorted into a rigid hierarchy which is dependent on the appearance of their avatars. Much like The 
Black Sun, which replicates its structures in miniature, the Metaverse is not even remotely a utopian 
space. Although it seems to be in many ways an idyllic retreat from the grim fragmentation, it is, as 
Grassian notes, still as “polarised by wealth and power” as Reality is (253), and as such is a highly 
ambiguous and exclusive capsule that is accessible only to a privileged few: 
 
In the real world – planet Earth, Reality – there are somewhere between six and ten billion 
people. At any given time, most of them are making mud bricks of field-stripping their AK-47s. 
Perhaps a billion of them have enough money to own a computer; these people have more 
money than all of the others put together. Of these billion potential computer owners, maybe 
a quarter of them actually bother to own computers, and a quarter of these have machines 
that are powerful enough to handle the Street protocol. That makes for about sixty million 
people who can be on the Street at any given time. Add in another sixty million or so who 
can’t really afford it but go there anyway, by using public machines, or machines owned by 
their school or their employer, and at any given time the Street is occupied by twice the 
population of New York City. 
That’s why the damn place is so overdeveloped. Put in a sign or a building on the Street and 
the hundred million richest, hippest, best-connected people will see it every day of their lives.
          (Stephenson, 24-25) 
 
In other words, approximately one point five percent of people have access to the Street. Whilst the 
differentiation between the Street, the areas that surround the Street (such as the online 
neighbourhoods where the houses of the likes of Hiro and Ng can be found), “Downtown” (24) and 
the Metaverse in general is not always clear, if we calculate Metaverse access in general based on the 
                                                          
49 This is in fact Hiro’s second encounter with Raven, but the first in Reality; their first ‘meeting’ takes place 
outside The Black Sun. 
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numbers that are provided in the above passage, it is still only around three percent of people living 
within the world of the novel who have access to this online space. This encapsulation and exclusivity 
undermines the idea that the Metaverse is a utopian space; Hiro views it as such – at least throughout 
the early stages of the novel – because he has access to it. Despite the fact that he actually falls into 
the category of those people who “can’t really afford the computer” (20) that he uses to access the 
Metaverse, Hiro bypasses this by virtue of being a part of the “little neighbourhood of hackers” (24). 
Hiro is, in effect, a part of what we might call the ‘old aristocracy’ – elsewhere they are referred to as 
the “technological priesthood” (380) – of the Metaverse; even though he has no wealth in Reality to 
speak of, he is able to take advantage of his connections and his occupation and not only penetrate 
the boundaries that keep most people out of the Metaverse, but continue to associate and be 
associated with the highest echelons of its society.   
Hiro’s position at the top of the Metaverse’s hierarchy  is revealed not only by his access to 
such exclusive spaces such as The Black Sun, but by the avatar that he uses to represent himself when 
he is online and the ways in which this avatar sets him apart from – and above – other users. Although 
it is not immediately apparent, a hierarchy that is intimately connected with wealth and / or power 
and is enacted by the appearance of avatars underpins much of the interaction within the Metaverse. 
Whilst online, users can conceivably present themselves in any way that they see fit: “If you’re ugly, 
you can make your avatar beautiful…. You can look like a gorilla or a dragon or a giant talking penis…. 
Spend five minutes walking down the Street and you will see all of these” (33-34). The idea that there 
are boundless possibilities for the (re)presentation of users via the appearance of their avatar is, of 
course, a fundamentally utopian one, and has positive connotations for the exploration of alternate 
subjectivities and identities. As I will illustrate, whilst the Metaverse does allow its users a certain 
freedom from the constraints of their real life identities and subjectivity, it also imposes a new 
hierarchy and thus creates new restraints on its users based on those very same avatars that seemingly 
allow them freedom of expression and exploration. Users can indeed look like walking phalluses or 
dragons if they so desire, but this ability to represent themselves is dependent on the limitations of 
either their equipment – if they have the knowledge that allows them to code their own avatar – or 
their buying power. In this way avatars function in a way that is reminiscent of branded clothing, high 
fashion and ‘normal’ clothing in Reality (in a way that will likely be instantly recognisable to many 
readers); just as certain assumptions are made about a person because of the way in which they dress 
and the ‘labels’ that they wear, so too are assumptions made about a person because of the 
appearance of their avatar. This connection between clothing and avatars is made explicit and 




As soon as [Y.T.] steps out into the Street, people start giving her these looks. The same kind 
of looks that people give her when she walks through the worsted-wool desolation of the 
Westlake Corporate Park in her dynamic blue-and-orange Kourier gear. She knows that the 
people in the Street are giving her dirty looks because she’s just coming in from a shitty public 
terminal. She’s a trashy black-and-white-person.         
              (205-206) 
 
Y.T’s Kourier uniform, which is viewed with hostility and scorn by those wearing worsted-wool suits 
(which are traditionally tailor-made) in Reality, is unequivocally equated here with the “jerky, grainy 
black and white” (38) avatar which occupies the lowest rung on the Metaverse hierarchy; just as Y.T.’s 
Kourier gear indicates that she is a “parasite” (13), a messenger and quite probably a “thrasher” (13), 
her black-and-white avatar indicates that she is unable to afford her own equipment or avatar.50 If it 
were to be put into clothing terms, the black-and-white avatar is the equivalent of something 
purchased from Walmart – it is cheap, low-quality, and usually associated with people of ‘lower class.’ 
The description and experience of Hiro and his avatar is considerably different to that of Y.T.: 
 
Hiro’s avatar just looks like Hiro, with the difference that no matter what Hiro is wearing in 
Reality, his avatar always wears a black leather kimono. Most hacker types don’t go in for 
garish avatars, because they know that it takes a lot more sophistication to render a realistic 
human face than a talking penis. Kind of the way people who really know clothing can 
appreciate the fine details that separate a cheap gray wool suit from an expensive hand-
tailored gray wool suit.          
           (34) 
 
Quite clearly, Hiro’s avatar is the equivalent of an expensive hand-tailored wool suit. As this second 
passage shows, a categorical connection is drawn between tailor-made (whether it be woollen suits 
or avatars) and a high position in the hierarchy of the Metaverse. It is of interest to note that whilst 
Hiro could easily create a wide range of avatars for himself, he chooses – or, perhaps more accurately, 
is forced by expectation – to merely depict himself online; he is a hacker, and thus is required to appear 
sophisticated, realistic – and quite likely slightly boring – whilst online.  
                                                          
50 In the novel, as in current parlance, a thrasher is a term that usually indicates either a skateboarder or a fan 
of metal; in the context of Snow Crash, it tends to indicate both. Kouriers, by and large, utilise skateboards to 
make their deliveries. The Thrasher magazine referenced by Y.T. (pp25-26) is an actual magazine written by 
and for skateboarders.   
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A further, finer and more subtle distinction is drawn between those who can code their own 
avatars, and those who have the money to pay for one to be made for them. I have previously likened 
Hiro to a member of an old aristocracy, but it might be more fitting for him to be likened to online 
royalty which is comprised of hackers and programmers. As two prominent figures in the community 
of hackers, it is no mistake, I think, that Hiro is described as a “warrior prince” in the Metaverse (58), 
and Da5id as an “overlord” (71). If the royalty of the virtual world are those who can create their own 
avatars, then the aristocracy of the Metaverse consists of those who can afford to have an avatar 
custom-made for them, but lack the ability to create or code on for themselves; these are people like 
the Nipponese rapper Sushi-K, who has access to The Black Sun but employs Hiro to create his avatar 
for him. The online hierarchy of the Metaverse is further enforced by the descriptions of what we 
might think of as the virtual ‘middle classes’ or, in the terminology of the novel, “peons” (34). These 
are the users who “can’t afford to have custom avatars made and don’t know how to write their own” 
(34) and who have to buy an avatar off the shelf – or, if we’re still thinking in terms of clothing, off the 
rack. These users can purchase an “Avatar Construction Set™” (35) and put a semi-customised avatar 
together out of miscellaneous parts (this of course takes extra money), or they can purchase a 
“Brandy” if they wish to appear female, or a “Clint” if they wish to appear male (35). Highly 
stereotypical in appearance – Brandys have “three breast sizes: improbable, impossible, and 
ludicrous” whilst Clints are “craggy and handsome” (35), and both have a narrow range of facial 
expressions – these avatars appear to make up a large proportion of Metaverse users; Hiro notes idly 
that “there are enough Clints and Brandys to found a new ethnic group” (35). There are also degrees 
of Brandy (and presumably Clint); there is a clear difference in quality – and therefore status – 
between a “standard” Brandy and “the cheap Taiwanese Brandy knockoffs” (67). The lowest class of 
avatar is, of course, the aforementioned “black-and-white” (38), who are regarded almost universally 
with disdain.  
The hierarchy that becomes evident through an examination of the avatars used to represent 
users of the Metaverse, then, undermines some of the more utopian potentials of the Metaverse; 
whilst it is theoretically possible for users to represent themselves in any way they desire, the reality 
is that most cannot. The space that appears to promise freedom of representation and the ability to 
explore different identities is instead highly ambiguous and heterotopian in nature; the majority of 
Metaverse users who are unable to buy or code avatars that are “like Playboy pinups turned three-
dimensional…[or] tornadoes of gyrating light” (38, emphasis in original) are instead forced to assume 
one of a few arbitrary online identities – they can either be a Clint or a Brandy, or they can be a black-
and-white. And whilst there may be an element of freedom in being either anonymous as just another 
Clint, Brandy or black-and-white, or by appearing as male when you are in fact female or vice versa, 
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all of these kinds of avatar come with pre-determined narratives and subjectivities attached to them. 
In particular, Clint and Brandy, forming as they do their own ‘new’ ethnic group – that is to say an 
ethnic group that is highly stereotypical in appearance and most likely, given the people that they are 
by and large marketed to, white – do not challenge or undermine issues of identity and (self) 
representation. Rather, they merely allow for the transposition and replication of elements of the 
hierarchical elements of the real world in the Metaverse. They – and by extension their users – 
participate in what Lisa Nakamura labels “cybertyping” (5); that is, they help to produce “stable 
images” (6) of (white) self and identity that can act as a counter to the (potential) fluidity of self that 
the Metaverse could – or should – enable. The cybertyping of the Metaverse is not just limited to the 
masses of Brandys, Clints and black-and-whites; there are also the stereotypically performed 
Nipponese businessmen, who are “exquisitely rendered by their fancy equipment, but utterly 
reserved and boring in their suits” (Stephenson, 38). And it is not just the middle and lower classes of 
the Metaverse who are forced, by the appearance of their avatars, into specific narratives whilst they 
are online. There is no indication given to the contrary that Da5id’s avatar is anything other than a 
straightforward portrayal of how he appears in Reality. As I have already mentioned, as another of the 
established hacker elite Hiro is also bound by the unwritten rules of hierarchy that govern self-
representation in the Metaverse; the avatar that he customarily uses is a refined and deceptively 
simplistic depiction of his image in Reality.  
 
The Metaverse, however, is not a dystopian space; it is a heterotopian space and Hiroaki 
Protagonist is first and foremost a hacker. As such he is able, even as he appears to cleave to them, to 
undermine the hierarchical rules of self-representation and portrayal that in their turn appear to 
challenge the ability of Metaverse users to depict and explore their selves as they see fit. Hiro is not 
alone in this undertaking – another hacker, Juanita, also challenges the rules of representation within 
the Metaverse. Although Juanita is the programmer who “was the one who figured out a way to make 
avatars show something close to real emotion” (59), creating the code that allows high-quality avatars 
to have realistic facial features, she herself eschews the unwritten rule that as a hacker she must have 
an avatar that is a faithful representation and appears in The Black Sun as a black-and-white “fax-of-
life” (62) instead. The reactions to her grainy appearance in this most refined and exclusive of places 
are telling: “the movie stars give her drop-dead looks, and the hackers purse their lips and stare 
reverently” (65). Those with the deeper understanding of the rules of the Metaverse – the hackers – 
can appreciate not only the irony of Juanita’s appearance as a black-and-white, but also the enormity 
of her contravention of the unwritten rules. Juanita’s transgression of expectations surrounding 
avatars and self-representation is far more overt than Hiro’s, and, coupled with her general eschewal 
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of the Metaverse in general, constitutes an almost outright rebellion. In this way she is somewhat 
reminiscent of I-330, although the resistance that she leads against the homogenising forces of L. Bob 
Rife and the remnants of the United States (both of whom seek to make hackers and programmers 
into “assembly-line workers” [36]) has a definite agenda and timeline, unlike I-330’s revolution for 
revolution’s sake. The ways in which Hiro challenges the rules of representation online are far more 
subtle than Juanita’s, and are implicitly tied to his knowledge of himself as a Hacker. This is 
demonstrated by the form and compilation of both of his avatars; one is his standard avatar, and the 
other is his invisible avatar. Coded later in the novel in response to the possibilities of the “new and 
more dangerous Metaverse” (329-330), Hiro’s invisible avatar is “illegal” in many of the different 
capsules of the Metaverse, and is comprised of “bits and pieces” of various avatars that Hiro has 
written over the years (330); it is in no way meant to represent Hiro himself and as such appears to 
undermine the rules of representation that govern the use of avatars within the Metaverse. Perhaps 
more intriguingly, Hiro’s invisible avatar transgresses the expectations of show and spectacle that 
appear to govern appearance within the Metaverse; from Sushi K’s hair-do that radiates a “fan of 
orange beams…[that] keeps moving, turning around, shaking from side to side” (69) to the “stunningly 
beautiful” avatars of aspiring actresses (38), the majority of custom-made avatars within the 
Metaverse are designed to be seen. Hiro, who regards the virtual realm as a place of work as well as 
recreation, creates his invisible avatar so that he can continue his work as a hacker. At the same time 
as it transgresses the rules of realistic representation, however, the invisible avatar can actually be 
seen as upholding them; whilst it may not constitute a literal representation of Hiro, it is a composite 
and as such is – despite being invisible – perhaps an even more realistic representation of Hiro than 
his regular avatar is. No matter what Hiro is wearing whilst in Reality, his every day avatar “always 
wears a black leather kimono” (34) and the antique swords that he inherited from his father. Hiro is 
not Nipponese. He views their attitudes towards their programmers with barely disguised horror – 
they “have to wear white shirts and show up at eight in the morning and sit in cubicles and go to 
meetings” (36) – and his only tangible social connections with Nipponese culture are oppressive; his 
father was held as a POW in a Nipponese prison camp whilst “his mother was a Korean woman whose 
people had been mine slaves” there (57). Not only is Hiro not Nipponese, he looks distinctly non-
Nipponese; despite the fact that his eyes “look Asian” courtesy of his mother, “the rest of him looks 
more like his father, who was African by way of Texas” with “cappuccino skin and spiky, truncated 
dreadlocks” (19-20). His (avatar’s) donning of a kimono, then, represents a challenge not only to the 
rules of realistic representation that govern the avatars of the elite, but also to – once again largely 
unwritten – rules of ethnic and racial (self)representation online. It is with this context in mind that I 
wish now to return to Hiro’s sword-fight with the Nipponese businessman in The Black Sun.  
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It is the appearance of Hiro’s avatar – distinctly non-Nipponese but wearing a kimono and, 
more importantly, a set of samurai swords – and the challenge that it poses to the rigid rules of self-
representation that leads to his fight in The Black Sun in the first instance. I have already briefly 
touched on the concept of cybertyping, and one of the ways in which it can be seen at work in the 
Metaverse, depicting Nipponese users as stereotypically ‘Asian businessmen.’ By having his avatar 
wear a kimono and samurai swords, Hiro, with his defiantly non-white and non-Nipponese 
appearance, poses a challenge to not one but two (competing) cultural norms: 
 
‘These –’ the businessman says. ‘Very nice.’ 
‘Thank you, sir. Please feel free to converse in Nipponese if you prefer.’ 
‘This is what your avatar wears. You do not carry such weapons in Reality,’ the businessman 
says. In English. 
‘I’m sorry to be difficult, but in fact, I do carry such weapons in Reality,’ Hiro says. 
… ‘These are ancient weapons, then,’ the businessman says. 
‘Yes, I believe they are.’ 
‘How did you come to be in possession of such important family heirlooms from Nippon?’ the 
businessman says. 
Hiro knows the subtext here: What do you use those swords for, boy, slicing watermelon? 
              (79, emphasis in original) 
 
Not only does the businessman here challenge the truthfulness of Hiro’s depiction of self by declaring 
that Hiro only wears his Nipponese swords for show in the Metaverse, but he rejects Hiro’s offer to 
converse with him in his own language and goes on to question whether or not Hiro’s father gained 
the swords honourably, suggesting that they were won “gambling” (79) rather than in single combat 
as is traditional. Or, to put it another way, the businessman challenges Hiro on the basis of what he 
perceives to be biographical and historical (un)truths behind Hiro’s (narrative) representation of his 
self. As Swanstrom notes, the basis for the Nipponese businessman’s challenge appears to be, in the 
first instance, “racially motivated” (64); this is supported by Hiro’s own understanding of the subtext 
of the businessman’s questioning of him – watermelons, of course, having a long and problematic 
history of association with African-Americans.51 When viewed in this light, then, the sword-fight 
between Hiro and the Nipponese businessman can be construed as a fight over differing beliefs about 
                                                          
51 The title of Melvin van Preebles ground-breaking film Watermelon Man (1970) references this stereotype, as 
does Cheryl Dunye’s Watermelon Woman (1996). In December 2014 The Atlantic published an article (‘How 
Watermelons Became a Racist Trope’) tracing the origins of the association; this article can be found online 
and is a useful introduction to this topic.   
71 
 
(self) representation and the limitations of cultural and ethnic boundaries. Hiro, as one who 
continually tests and penetrates such boundaries, takes up the challenge, ‘hacking’ the businessman 
not only with a sword and his programming abilities but also on a cultural level as he defends his 
representation of his online self. In the early stages of the sword-fight, Hiro, analysing the 
businessman’s display of zanshin and sword-fighting techniques, recognises that “like most Nipponese 
sword fighters, all he knows is kendo. Kendo is to real samurai sword fighting what fencing is to real 
swashbuckling: an attempt to take a highly disorganized [sic], chaotic, violent, and brutal conflict and 
turn it into a cute game. As in fencing, you’re only supposed to attack certain parts of the body” 
(Stephenson, 81, emphasis in original). By understanding the implications this has for the ways in 
which the fight is supposed to be carried out, Hiro is able to undermine and anticipate the 
businessman; he parries an attack and, knowing that the businessman will still be following the 
formulas of kendo, turns around and cuts off his legs. By the rules of the ‘game’ that the businessman 
is playing, Hiro cheats; I would suggest instead that he, having displayed an understanding of it, simply 
hacks the businessman’s fighting style and culture. This in turn allows him to literally hack into his 
opponent’s avatar. This is not the extent of his culture-hacking activities, however. Having disarmed – 
or perhaps more accurately de-legged – his opponent, Hiro then systematically hacks him to pieces. 
Swanstrom suggests that by doing this whilst wearing a kimono and a set of samurai swords, Hiro is 
not only performing a kind of “vengeance” (65) upon a culture he finds oppressive, but he is also 
moving “beyond his real-world ethnic identity and [becoming] something else entirely” (65). I disagree 
with this assertion. As he hacks the businessman to pieces, Hiro keeps up a stream of dialogue that he 
delivers in what we can imagine is a stereotypically Southern African-American “dialect” (Stephenson, 
82). By parodying the kind of speech that the Nipponese businessman might have expected – given 
Hiro’s appearance – to hear when he began the confrontation, Hiro is not moving beyond his real-
world ethnic identity so much as he is instead reaffirming it by way of a performed stereotype; his 
father, after all, originally came from Texas. At the same time as he reaffirms the ethnic identity that 
he displays quite openly in the Metaverse, however, he also asserts the right of a half-Korean, half-
African-American hacker to wear online the symbols of Nipponese culture and to carry the swords 
that his father won in single combat, according to the dictates of Nipponese culture. Thus Hiro, aided 
by the technologies and heterotopian spaces of the Metaverse begins to display a subjectivity that 
owes its origins to multiple ethnic and cultural sources; he displays, in other words, what we can begin 
to think of as a hybrid identity. This online confrontation, and the implications it has for Hiro’s identity 
as multiple and evolving, is analogous to another altercation that takes place later in the novel, this 
time in Reality. Whilst in the “Towne Hall” (276) of a “Snooze ‘n’ Cruise” (282), Hiro is asked by a “New 
South African” with the words “RACIALLY INSENSITIVE” tattooed across his forehead to clarify whether 
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he is “a lazy shiftless watermelon-eating black-ass nigger, or a sneaky little v.d.-infected gook?” 
(281).52 Having ascertained that the New South African and the “dozen or so other men” with him 
intend to – at the very least – “beat the shit out of” him (281-282), Hiro uses his katana to cut off the 
head of his assailant. The explicitly racist discourse aside – the racism that fuelled the Nipponese 
businessman’s confrontation was implicit, if still obvious – what is most striking about this conflict is 
that not only is Hiro’s appearance again the basis for it, but that the New South African’s question only 
allows for Hiro to be one or the other; it presupposes that his (ethnic) identity is dualistic, fixed and 
(pre)determined by biology. Like the Nipponese businessman before him, the New South African 
seems unable to comprehend that Hiro is both, and neither; I would suggest that Hiro’s deft 
decapitation of the “porky white man” (281) is as much a refutation of the binary state of being that 
he – the white man (who is in turn subjected to and reduced by the narrative to a stereotypically 
‘white-trash’ appearance and outlook) – advocates as it is of the racist discourse that fuels it.  
 
 The multiplicity of Hiro’s subjectivity and the hybrid nature of his identity is not only aided and 
fostered by the online spaces of the Metaverse. Although his (online) identity as a hacker is of great 
importance to Hiro’s conception of himself and his place in the world, he also embodies and explores 
a multitude of differing – and sometimes complementary – narratives and subjectivities whilst 
inhabiting the different capsules of Reality. Like D-503 and Winston before him, Hiro is on a quest to 
figure out who he really is; unlike them, he has the ability – thanks to the preponderance of 
heterotopian spaces around him – to explore different narrative arcs of his self. At the beginning of 
the novel, he is “The Deliverator” (1); he is not actually introduced as ‘Hiro’ until seventeen pages into 
the novel and after the destruction of his “black chariot of pepperoni fire” (7) – the purpose-built pizza 
delivery car that functions as the central symbol of his Deliverator role. Dressed in a uniform that is as 
“black as activated charcoal” he belongs to “an elite order, a hallowed subcategory” (1). Or, rather, he 
is a pizza delivery driver for “CosaNostra Pizza, Incorporated” (4). CosaNostra Pizza is the pizza chain 
run and owned by Nova Sicilia, the franchised incarnation of the Mafia, which is one of the most 
powerful franchulates within the fragmented spaces of the novel. Headed by the “avuncular” Uncle 
Enzo (8), the Mafia represents itself as a family, and encourages its employees to buy into this 
particular narrative. As part of this ‘family’, Hiro takes great pride in his Deliverator identity, never 
delivering a pizza “in more than twenty-one minutes” (3) and building a narrative of power, speed and 
                                                          
52 The Snooze ‘n’ Cruise in question is a representative of a series of franchised road-side motor camps; the 
Towne Hall is another franchise, a large inflatable building located within the Snooze ‘n’ Cruise, which in turn 
houses “a few franchises-within franchises” (276) – pubs, convenience stores, laundromats etc. Both of these 
franchulates demonstrate the encapsulation at work within Reality to the nth degree. New South Africa is a 




mystery around it. After he crashes and destroys his pizza delivery car, however, he is no longer a part 
of the family; his tenure as the Deliverator comes to an end and he slides effortlessly back into his 
“auxiliary emergency backup job” as an information gatherer, or a “freelance stringer for the CIC, the 
Central Intelligence Corporation of Langley, Virginia” (20). It should be noted here that the role that 
Hiro assumes as a CIC stringer is also associated with another, rather undesirable subjectivity that he 
comes dangerously close to assuming during the course of the novel – that of a “gargoyle” (115). In 
addition to the identities and subjectivities that spring from his various jobs, Hiro is also subject to his 
peculiar cultural and ethnic background, which has already been referenced earlier in this chapter: 
“his father was a sergeant major, his mother was a Korean woman whose people had been mine slaves 
in Nippon, and Hiro didn’t know whether he was black or Asian or just plain Army, whether he was 
rich or poor, educated or ignorant, talented or lucky. He didn’t even have a part of the country to call 
home until he moved to California, which is about as specific as saying that you live in the Northern 
Hemisphere” (57). There are a welter of possible identities at play in Hiro’s background, and all of 
them are true in different ways, at different times. Living as he does in a U-Stor-It in the fragmented 
remnants of the inner city, Hiro is implicitly associated with the (supposed) detritus of society that 
gathers there, “street people” (179) and the immigrants who have been “thrown out like shrapnel” 
(179); that is, the poor. At the same time, however, that same U-Stor-It is described as “spacious” and 
as possessing marks of “distinction and luxury” (18) in comparison to its near neighbours, whilst the 
other inhabitants of the inner city are “the technomedia priesthood…young smart people like Da5id 
and Hiro, who take the risk of living in the city because they like stimulation and they know they can 
handle it” (179). Add into consideration Hiro’s wealth in the Metaverse – which begins to cross-over 
into Reality towards the end of the novel – and it starts to become apparent that Hiro is not rich or 
poor, talented or lucky; he is all of these things – and more – at once, depending upon which space he 
is inhabiting, and which narrative he is giving precedence to. The hybridity of Hiro’s subjectivity and 
identity is demonstrated and enabled initially by his Army background, which, by virtue of its semi-
nomadic lifestyle, exposes him to a variety of different people and places whilst he is growing up, and 
compounded by his association with the Mafia, and his status as a citizen of Mr. Lee’s Greater Hong 
Kong.53 The Mafia under Uncle Enzo is what Swanstrom terms “an ethnically diverse workforce” 
(Swanstrom, 62) that actively recruits from a variety of different backgrounds; one of the Mafia’s 
recruitment billboards depicts “Uncle Enzo holding up one hand to stop an Uzi-toting Hispanic 
scumbag; behind him stands a pan-ethnic phalanx of kids and grannies, resolutely gripping baseball 
bats and frying pans” (Stephenson, 136). Mr. Lee’s Greater Hong Kong is similarly heterogeneous, 
                                                          
53 By the time Hiro reaches an age to attend college, he is described as having lived in cities in New Jersey, 
Washington, North Carolina, Georgia, Texas, Kansas and New York, as well as in Germany and Korea.  
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advertising itself as a “quasi-national entity” (92) that believes in “the potentials of all ethnic races and 
anthropologies to merge” (92) under one banner. The military is in fact described as its own ethnic 
group with its own peculiarities: “Black kids didn’t talk like black kids. Asian kids didn’t bust their asses 
to excel in school. White kids, by and large, didn’t have any problem getting along with the black and 
Asian kids” (54). As is suggest here, the Army here can be seen as a kind of a melting-pot, a breeding-
ground for multiplicity and cultural amalgamation; the swords that Hiro carries, which add another 
layer to his subjectivity and which seem to be incorporated into any narrative he enacts – he carries 
them as the Deliverator, uses them (and loses his job for using them) as a security guard, and always 
wears them whilst in the Metaverse – come to him by way of his (father’s) involvement with the Army. 
Hiro’s ethnic and cultural background, then, is not just Asian-African-American, it is Army-Korean-
African-American, complemented by aspects of Nipponese culture that is represented in the first 
instance by the swords that he carries.  
Hiro’s identities in both the Metaverse and Reality are multiple and shifting, and are enabled 
in the first instance by the space(s) that surround him; in the Metaverse he is able, through the 
appearance of his avatar, to express the multitude of different cultures that make up his world-view, 
whilst in Reality he is able to experiment with different roles and the narratives that accompany them. 
And whilst that grants him a level of freedom of self-expression that D-503 and Winston can only 
dream about, it also creates ambiguity and confusion for Hiro, who, despite the welter of different 
identities and different narratives available to him for exploration, nonetheless spends much of the 
novel trying to understand himself; just as we saw in We and Nineteen Eighty-Four, even as the 
heterotopian spaces of the novel enable Hiro’s exploration of his self they also subvert it, ultimately 
leaving him vulnerable to – if not the actual drug – then to the repercussions of Snow Crash and the 
implications it has for the destabilisation of identity and boundaries, and the nature of the 
heterotopian spaces within the novel. Although Hiro doesn’t sample Snow Crash, and thus is not 
subjected – literally – to or “brainwashed” (304) by it, he does begin to exhibit at least one behaviour 
that is similar to the drug during his exploration of different identities; that is, he begins to transcend, 
rather than simply rupture, the boundaries that are not meant to be breached. Snow Crash is able to 
penetrate and infect the brain, the body, and the computer of those who use it simultaneously. This, 
along with the fact that it enables the “hypnotization and control” (Grassian, 264) of those who are 
exposed to it, is what makes it so dangerous; it penetrates boundaries that are supposed to be 
impenetrable, creating flow between capsules that are meant to be discrete, and, crucially, enables 
humans and computers to be treated as one and the same thing. When he begins to take on the 
subjectivity of a “gargoyle” (Stephenson, 248), Hiro does something similar; he begins to occupy both 
Reality and the Metaverse simultaneously, and breaks down the barriers between himself and his 
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computer, displaying what we might think of as a cyborg-hybrid subjectivity. Although they are 
stringers – information gatherers and programmers – and thus should occupy a rank that is not that 
far below the hackers, because of the collapse of these boundaries that gargoyles represent they are 
instead viewed with a certain amount of derision, scorn and pity: 
 
Gargoyles represent the embarrassing side of the Central Intelligence Corporation. Instead of 
using laptops, they wear their computers on their bodies, broken up into separate modules 
that hang on the waist, so the back, on the headset. They serve as human surveillance 
devices…nothing looks stupider; these getups are the modern-day equivalent of the slide-rule 
scabbard or the calculator pouch on the belt, marking the user as belonging to a class that is 
at once above and far below human society…The payoff for this self-imposed ostracism is that 
you can be in the Metaverse all the time, and gather intelligence all the time.  
                                        (115) 
 
Here gargoyles are represented as not only embarrassing and stupid looking, but – more significantly 
– as belonging to a ‘class’ that is somewhat less than human and equated implicitly, by virtue of their 
association with the slide-ruler and calculator, with the figure of ‘the geek.’54 Lagos, the first gargoyle 
that appears in the novel, is described as “rude” and “no fun to talk to” (116); he may be physically 
present in Reality, ostensibly making conversation with Hiro, but he is also “adrift in a laser-drawn 
world, scanning retinas in all directions…seeing everything in visual light, infrared, millimetre-wave 
[sic] radar, and ultrasound all at once” (116). Gargoyles are inseparable from their computers – and 
thus the Metaverse – and their subjectivity is unequivocally equated with and dependent upon the 
technology that they utilise, right down to the way they literally see the world around them.  
Unlike the figure of the hacker, however, whose identity is also synonymous with the  
technology that it employs, and who is portrayed and viewed with positivity throughout the course of 
the novel, the attitude towards gargoyles is more ambivalent. Not only is Lagos, the only gargoyle 
(apart from Hiro) that the novel acknowledges, killed by Raven shortly after his initial appearance, but 
the gargoyle subjectivity that Hiro begins to explore is the only one that is met with outright 
disapproval and hostility, in this instance by Y.T.: 
 
“How can you be goggled in if you’re walking down a street?” Then the terrible reality sinks 
in: “Oh, my God, you didn’t turn into a gargoyle, did you?” 
                                                          
54 In modern parlance, ‘geek’ is frequently used as a pejorative term to describe a person who is a (digital) 
technology enthusiast, and is often perceived to be eccentric and / or socially awkward.  
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“Well,” Hiro says. He is hesitant, embarrassed, like it hadn’t occurred to him yet that this was 
what he was doing. “It’s not exactly like being a gargoyle. Remember when you gave me shit 
about spending all my money on computer stuff?... I decided I wasn’t spending enough. So I 
got a beltpack machine. Smallest ever made. I’m walking down the street with this thing 
strapped to my belly. It’s really cool.”  
“You’re a gargoyle.”                     
“Yeah, but it’s not like having all this clunky shit strapped all over your body –” 
“You’re a gargoyle.”                     
                      (248) 
 
The language used in this passage is telling. Y.T. is facing the ‘terrible reality’ of her partner being a 
gargoyle, whilst Hiro is ‘embarrassed’ and ‘hesitant’ to accept that this is what he has become / is 
becoming. Interestingly, it appears that Hiro equates gargoyle identity with appearance, rather than 
action; because his portable computer is discreet he doesn’t look exactly like a gargoyle, and therefore 
he can’t really be one. For Y.T., the distinction is far clearer and of a moral, rather than aesthetic, 
nature. Hiro is walking down a street in Reality whilst he is goggled into the Metaverse (and possibly 
walking down the Street); he is, by definition, a gargoyle, inhabiting what are supposed to be two 
mutually exclusive spaces at once. This is, I would suggest, the main difference between the hacker 
and the gargoyle; although they both deal in (digital) information, the hacker only ever inhabits either 
Reality or the virtual world whilst the gargoyle, like Snow Crash, is almost always in both at once. This 
ability to occupy two worlds simultaneously is also, I believe, why the attitudes of the novel and the 
characters within it are so ambivalent towards gargoyles, and why Snow Crash – with its ability to 
create a single, (peaceful) mind that both Big Brother and the OneState would undoubtedly admire – 
is regarded with abhorrence; despite the largely heterotopian nature of the spaces within Snow Crash, 
and the ability of multiple characters to move with relative ease between different spaces, there is 
still an overall logic of dualistic encapsulation at work – on both a societal and individual level – within 
the novel that requires them to inhabit one space at a time. Transgression of this logic is encouraged 
only up to a point; as we have seen, those who demonstrate the capacity of Snow Crash to inhabit 
both the real and virtual worlds simultaneously are marginalised, dehumanised and – if they continue 
to transgress like Lagos – killed. Swanstrom points out that Juanita is an exception to this (74), 
becoming, by the novel’s end, a “neurolinguistic hacker” (Stephenson, 404). That is, thanks to her 
exposure to the Snow Crash virus, she can hack both computers and the language centres of the brain. 
I would suggest, however, that there are limits to Juanita’s transgression of this logic of encapsulation; 
her subjectivity (or one of them, at least) is that of a hacker, and never that of a gargoyle.  
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Chapter Three: The Heterotopia Proper – The Gone-Away World and Only 
Forward 
 
The dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they may act their dreams with open eyes, to make 
it possible. 
      Seven Pillars of Wisdom – T. E. Lawrence. 
 
Do I contradict myself? / Very well then I contradict myself, / (I am large, I contain multitudes.)  
    ‘Leaves of Grass’ – Walt Whitman. 
 
The Gone-Away World 
 
Although there is a largely heterotopian sensibility in Snow Crash that sees the proliferation 
of contrasting spaces that allow characters such as Hiro and Y.T. far greater freedom of self-expression 
and self-exploration than was ever available to D-503 or Winston, the binary logic of utopia / dystopia 
is still at times discernible, limiting the potential of the heterotopian spaces and figures within the 
novel. This is not the case with Nick Harkaway’s The Gone-Away World, although it would be easy, by 
virtue of its having been categorised as a “post-apocalyptic” (Poole, para. 1) novel, to dismiss it as just 
another example of dystopian science fiction. Initially at least, The Gone-Away World certainly appears 
to retain the same dualisms of Snow Crash, and We and Nineteen Eighty-Four before it; there is a Hiro-
like protagonist – the un-named narrator and hero, who is able to penetrate the boundaries of a 
variety of capsules, particularly Jorgmund’s, with ease – and a Big Brother-like nemesis, Humbert 
Pestle. Like Hiro before him, the unnamed narrator embarks upon a quest to discover – although 
rather more literally – himself, and to defeat the homogenising forces represented by Pestle. The 
company that Pestle heads, Jorgmund, is almost stereotypically similar to the OneState and the Party 
of Oceania with its inclination towards the mechanical and entropic, both in terms of its insistence 
upon and utilisation of technology in order to (re)establish a homogenous “unity” (Harkaway, 473, 
emphasis in original) in the wake of the chaos created by the event known as the “Go Away War” (22), 
and in the actions and mind-set of the individuals that constitute and perpetuate it, amusingly 
described throughout the novel as “pencilnecks” (17). As I shall demonstrate, however, the 
heterotopianism of TGAW is pervasive; despite its perceived status as bulwark of the utopia / dystopia 
binary, the rigid hierarchy and encapsulation of Jorgmund, as evinced by the strict ranking of 
employees is in fact undermined by the structure and hybrid nature of Jorgmund itself, which not only 
“evolved out of other companies from back before the Go Away War” (13) but also encompasses the 
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“Clockwork Hand Society” (469), a secret society comprised of ninja assassins that requires its 
members to “set aside one’s own desires and become the instrument of destiny” (472) in a (voluntary) 
abrogation of self that is reminiscent of that demanded of Winston Smith by O’Brien. Moreover, the 
final level of encapsulation, the boundary between heterotopian spaces and the body that was upheld 
in SC is ruptured in TGAW when our narrator is “reified” (269) and made ‘real’ when Gonzo Lubitsch 
– whose alter ego / imaginary friend he has been – is exposed to a large quantity of “Stuff” (261). The 
resilience of this final boundary, which becomes the focal point of Hiro’s quest in SC, is undermined 
not only when people come into contact with Stuff but – as the relationship between the unnamed 
narrator and Gonzo Lubitsch eventually reveals – from the moment that narratives about identity are 
constructed and enacted. And where the narrative arc in SC sees the eventual suppression of the 
boundary defying substance Snow Crash and the resultant reaffirmation of an arbitrary distinction 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ the events of TGAW invert this; the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ is 
destabilised, and the heterotopian substance which challenges the encapsulation and homogeneity 
that Jorgmund attempts to perpetuate – Stuff – is instead released from its containment. Jorgmund’s 
eventual failure to suppress Stuff allows individual freedom and difference, as represented by the 
unnamed narrator and the members of “the Found Thousand” (27) – new beings created by exposure 
to Stuff – to flourish in ways which were eventually denied in SC. And whilst there are heterotopian 
spaces within the novel that fulfil similar functions to those I have identified in other texts, such as 
Cricklewood Cove, and the sandpit that it contains, Stuff also allows for the exploration of alternative 
spaces that are created in conjunction with the individuals who inhabit them, precipitating tangible 
changes in those individuals in unpredictable ways in direct response to the narratives that they tell 
about themselves. By virtue of its ability to effect change and prompt the rupture of boundaries on 
both an institutional and individual level, Stuff poses a direct challenge to and constantly undermines 
the static dualism characteristic of the utopia / dystopia binary that Jorgmund strives to perpetuate.   
 
The Jorgmund Company, headed by the sinister Humbert Pestle and ostensibly central to the 
survival of the world inhabited by our nameless narrator and his best friend Gonzo Lubitsch, functions 
in many ways as a kind of operational relic; in a similar, although far less beneficial manner to the 
Ancient House in We, Jorgmund acts as a bastion of ‘the way things used to be’ before the Go Away 
War destroyed much of the world and Stuff made the remainder of it changeable and dangerous. As 
our narrator wryly notes, the purpose of the Jorgmund Company – or, perhaps more accurately, of 
Humbert Pestle in his role as the Master of the Clockwork Hand – is to “usher out the new and restore 
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the old” (473).55 Unlike the Ancient House, however, Jorgmund does not offer a respite from or help 
to counter the “universalizing forces” (Wegner, 185) that seek to wipe out individual difference and 
change; rather, Jorgmund is the universalising force at work in TGAW. During the course of his analysis 
of Nineteen Eighty-Four, Phillip Wegner writes that “every effort to effect a total change of the 
present, to institute a utopia…invariably gives rise to total systems of domination, systems wherein, 
ultimately, even the potential for change might be eliminated” (191). Although he is here introducing 
what he perceives to be the total closure and the elimination of “every other possible utopian horizon” 
(191) in Orwell’s narrative, I believe that this is also – however inadvertently – a fitting introduction to 
the Jorgmund Company and the ways in which it attempts to eradicate “discordant” (Harkaway, 473) 
differences and possibilities, and uphold and re-establish the equilibrium and worldview perpetuated 
by the utopia / dystopia binary that Stuff undermines and challenges. Jorgmund’s control of the new 
world, which is based upon its production of FOX – “the magic potion” (9) that can counter the effects 
of Stuff – appears to be absolute; the “circle-snake logo [of Jorgmund]” (13) can be found everywhere. 
This logo is instantly recognisable as an ouroboros, the ancient Greek symbol of a snake consuming its 
own tail that Carl Jung, amongst others, associates with the “idea of a self-generating and self-
devouring being” (Jung, 307), and that Susan Squier calls “a vital image of circularity” (131). The 
recursive nature and enclosure that is symbolised by the ouroboros of Jorgmund is indicative not only 
of the viewpoint espoused by Jorgmund but is also a reminder of the shadowy presence of the 
Clockwork Hand within Jorgmund. It is no mistake, I think, that both Jorgmund and the Clockwork 
Hand can be recognised by their association with representations of a closed circle, and that those 
images are ones that are indicative of their function; the image of a snake – a frequently venomous 
creature that many view with repulsion and fear – endlessly consuming itself to create a continuous 
loop is an appropriate metaphor for the ways in which the Jorgmund Company poisons and devours 
the individuals that it employs. The Clockwork Hand Society, is, by virtue of its name and its members 
belief in “the perfect progress of the universe as if steered by a mechanical armature” (Harkaway, 
472), associated with the flawless circle of a clock and the endless repetitious movement of those 
mechanisms. The circle-snake logo of the former can also be viewed as a representative-in-miniature 
of the way in which the Pipe that Jorgmund builds to distribute FOX and create the “Liveable Zone” 
that makes “a sort of rough circle girdling the earth” (10). The Liveable Zone is just one of the capsules 
                                                          
55 It should be noted in passing that whilst Jorgmund and the Clockwork Hand are technically different 
organisations, there are significant areas of overlap. They are headed by the same person – Pestle – and it is 
fairly safe to assume that the mysterious “Core” (446) which is “the final authority” (446) in Jorgmund is 
comprised almost entirely of members of the Clockwork Hand. There are, however, structural and functional 
differences between the two organisations and, where necessary for the purposes of this thesis, I will explicitly 
elaborate upon these. Nonetheless, for the most part when I refer to Jorgmund, I am of necessity also 
referring – however indirectly – to the Clockwork Hand as well.  
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that Jorgmund creates and perpetuates; produced by proximity to the Pipe and the distribution of FOX 
into the surrounding atmosphere, the Liveable Zone is characterised by a series of isolated – and thus 
further contained – settlements of varying size and sophistication that are populated by those who 
believe that the Pipe is “the thing [they can’t] do without” (13). As the main distribution system for 
FOX and in its ensuing role as the “despised spine” (10) of the post-Reification world, the Pipe is a 
tangible illustration of the control that Jorgmund exerts, and of the ways in which it attempts to create 
an enclosed world with no options other than the ones they offer. By proffering a means by which 
Stuff and the different possibilities that it offers can be banished, the Pipe allows Jorgmund to restore 
the old at the expense of the new, endlessly replicating itself and the rigidly organised, highly 
encapsulated world(view) it deems acceptable.  
Like the OneState and the Party of Oceania before it, Jorgmund (and the Clockwork Hand) 
attempts to perpetuate the system that first creates, and then sustains it by turning the people 
associated with it into anonymous, pre-programmed “gears” (302). Those employed by Jorgmund are 
described by our narrator as pencilnecks; this is a description which, whilst humorous, also lends itself 
to a somewhat troubling image of uniform, faceless and interchangeable people whose humanity and 
individuality is gradually being whittled away. Unlike the OneState, however, where all Numbers are 
considered equal, there are differing degrees of “pencilneckhood” (22):   
 
Dick Washburn, known forevermore as Dickwash, is a type D pencilneck: a sassy wannabe 
paymaster with vestigial humanity. This makes him vastly less evil than a type B pencilneck 
(heartless bureaucratic machine, pro-class tennis) and somewhat less evil than a type C 
pencilneck (chortling lackey of the dehumanising system, ambient golf), but unquestionably 
more evil than pencilneck types M through E (real human screaming to escape a soul-
devouring professional persona, varying degrees of desperation). No one I know has ever met 
the type A pencilneck, in much the same way that no one ever reports their own fatal accident; 
a type A pencilneck would be a person so entirely consumed by the mechanism in which he 
or she is employed that they had ceased to exist as a separate entity. They would be odourless, 
faceless and undetectable, without ambition or restraint, and would take decisions entirely 
unfettered by human concerns, make choices for the company, of the company.  
                        (15-16) 
 
The first of several such descriptions of the sliding scale of the (in)humanity of Jorgmund employees, 
there is a clear sense from the above passage that the closer a person gets to the top of the hierarchy 
the less human and more machine-like they become. The type A pencilneck described above sounds 
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like an ideal and obedient Number of the OneState or a member of the Party who has made the final 
“act of submission” that O’Brien demands of Winston (Orwell, 285). Indeed, the act of moving up the 
ranks of the pencilnecks, to becoming a type A is in fact a voluntary one:  
  
The pencilneck smiled at Sally Culpepper…and his pencilneckhood rolled back as he found that 
part of himself which was indifferent, and he slipped gently into the warm water of not giving 
a damn. 
Look at him again: this is not Dick Washburn you’re seeing, not exactly…This is Jorgmund itself, 
staring through Dick’s eyes and measuring things as numbers and profit margins. Of course 
Jorgmund is nothing more than a shared hallucination, a set of rules which make up Richard 
Washburn’s job, and every time he does this – slips away from a human situation and lets the 
pattern use his mind and his mouth because he’d rather not make the decision himself – he 
edges a little closer to being a type C pencilneck. He loses a bit of his soul. There’s a flicker of 
pain and anger in him as the animal he is feels the machine he is becoming take another bite, 
and snarls in its cage…But it’s really a very small animal, and not one of the fiercer ones. 
                   (22-23) 
 
In other words, by lending himself completely to the rules by which Jorgmund views and interacts with 
the world, Dick Washburn gives up his humanity voluntarily, one decision at a time. In many ways, he 
and the other pencilnecks become akin to the “Falabalas” (Stephenson, 301), the subjects of L. Bob 
Rife that are created by exposure to Snow Crash. Like the falabalas, the pencilnecks are part of a kind 
of overarching and highly encapsulated group mind that governs their behaviour and action. Each of 
these groups – falabalas and pencilnecks – have their own language by which they communicate with 
each other, replicate (and perpetuate) the systems that they are subject to, and which distinguishes 
them from those who have not been ‘initiated’; falabalas communicate with each other by speaking 
in tongues, or – as Y.T. so scathingly puts it – by “babbling” to each other (301), whilst pencilnecks 
speak a kind of “reasonable” yet chilling bureaucratese (Harkaway, 314). Unlike L. Bob Rife, however, 
Jorgmund requires no antennas to be grafted onto the skull of its employees to continuously broadcast 
instructions; the pencilnecks, in a manner similar to O’Brien and to the falabalas infected with the 
Snow Crash virus, carry the pattern of Jorgmund with them wherever they go. And whilst the language 
used in the above passages emphasise the ways in which Jorgmund is a dehumanising machine that 
enforces a set of rules and patterns that remakes and takes over people to fulfil its purpose, they also 
reveal the encapsulation and hierarchy that is at work not only in Jorgmund the company, but also the 
system that it presides over.   
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 The hierarchy that is ascribed to and exhibited by the pencilnecks of Jorgmund is in many ways 
comparable to the hierarchy discernible amongst users of the Metaverse; it is primarily predicated 
upon the same principles of occupation and outward appearance – especially clothing – that I 
identified during my analysis of SC. Much like the Metaverse, Jorgmund and the system that it is both 
representative of and central to is itself a series of semi-exclusive capsules that are structured in such 
a way that a majority of people are unable to penetrate their boundaries. I have already touched upon 
the issue of hierarchy as it pertains to various strata of pencilnecks; depending upon their level of 
commitment to the Company and the level of self-negation that they have undertaken, a pencilneck 
will occupy a rank classified by our narrator as anything from ‘M’ (the lowest level of pencilneckhood) 
to ‘A.’ This is the most basic and overarching form of encapsulation demonstrated by the Jorgmund 
Company, encompassing all those who work for it. As a pencilneck advances up the ranks, however, 
they might begin to move into different and more exclusive capsules within the overall capsule that is 
the system that Jorgmund is both a part of and integral to. The structure of Jorgmund can be likened 
to a series of concentric circles spreading outwards – the importance of self-contained circles to the 
structure and attitudes of Jorgmund cannot be overstated. The Core, of which Humbert Pestle is a 
part, is the most exclusive capsule within Jorgmund – it is so exclusive that “no one knows who else is 
in it” (446) – and resides at both the metaphorical and literal centre of the Company. The capsule 
beyond that is comprised of the Senior Board which is slightly less exclusive, and is “composed of 
people who would very much like to be in the Core” (446). The Senior Board has oversight of a series 
of lesser capsules, such as the Planning Horizons Committee; this is the capsule that our narrator gains 
access to in the course of his infiltration of Jorgmund and uses as a means of further rupturing the 
boundaries and hierarchies by which Jorgmund contains and maintains itself.  
The hierarchies of pencilnecks are not, however, only maintained by occupation. The 
importance of apparel as a means of identification and stratification is established early in the novel. 
When Dick Washburn is first described by our narrator, among the first of his “coiffured” features that 
are described are his “brogues” and “silk socks”, along with his “come-fuck-me cologne” and the 
“hand-tooled leather briefcase” that he carries (12-13). Washburn himself is not described; what are 
described are items by which he can be identified. The implication is that Dick Washburn the 
pencilneck is his clothing, and that what he wears is a more than sufficient means by which to identify 
him. The quality of Dick’s tailor-made attire is perhaps even more important when it comes to 
identifying who – and what – he is. When one considers that Dick Washburn is an on-the-rise 
pencilneck (with vestigial humanity) this begins to make sense; with Jorgmund as with avatars in the 
Metaverse, there is an explicit connection between those who wear bespoke items and those who 
occupy a high rank within the organisation. Thus, Dick Washburn wears “year’s-salary shoes” (22) 
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whilst Humbert Pestle wears “two-tone leather” (329) brogues by Daniel Prang with a unique, 
personalised crest on the heel. These links between clothing and rank are re-emphasised when the 
unnamed narrator attempts to infiltrate the Jorgmund Company by impersonating a “new executive” 
in Haviland City (438):56 
 
 ‘The plain white,’ Libby Lloyd says definitively… 
 ‘I like the stripes.’ 
 ‘The stripes are very popular among the senior executives.’ Subtext: surely you aren’t one. 
 ‘Ideal,’ I tell her briskly. Subtext: then why on Earth are you showing me this other crap? 
Libby Lloyd reassesses. She does not know me, so she has assumed that I am not important. 
On the other hand, I’m in her insane little shop in Haviland Square buying unpleasantly tight 
sports gear. More, I’m buying top of the line…. A new customer. A new executive.  
           (438, my emphasis) 
 
Simply by virtue of the fact that our narrator is buying top of the line sportswear which is differentiated 
from other, (relatively) lower lines within Libby’s shop by its outward appearance – that is, the striped 
sportswear that is probably intended to be reminiscent of the pinstriped suits worn by the business 
elite the world over – he is assumed to be of high rank in the Jorgmund Company. Like Dick Washburn 
before him, our narrator becomes (or at least gives the appearance of being) what the clothing makes 
him out to be.  
On the basis of his choice of clothing and the supposed status that this implies, our narrator 
is then propositioned by Libby Lloyd, who wishes to entering the hierarchy herself: “Libby Lloyd makes 
more money in a week than I have ever seen in one place. Money is not the issue. The issue is access. 
Running the most exclusive sports boutique in Haviland is still being a shopkeeper. It’s not being part 
of the System, and Libby Lloyd wants In. I know this because in Haviland everybody who isn’t In wants 
In, and everybody who is In wants to keep them Out. Pencilneck Heaven” (439, emphasis in original). 
In other words, Libby, believing him to be a member of a more exclusive capsule than she currently 
has access to, attempts to charm our narrator into helping her advance up the hierarchy. The irony of 
this is, of course, that “the bag from [her store] is a passport to greatness” (439) that he uses to great 
effect. The bag full of over-priced sports-gear is the means by which he begins to rupture the various 
capsules of Jorgmund: “with [the bag from Libby Lloyd’s] under my arm scruffy clothes are simply not 
an issue. I have already bought. I am spending. I have money. Respectable clothing is what I will come 
                                                          
56 The word-play at work in the name of Jorgmund’s ‘capital city’ is worthy of note; characterised by excessive 
consumption and conspicuous expenditure in a world with limited resources, it really is the land of the ‘haves,’ 
as opposed to the ‘have-nots.’  
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out of Royce Allen’s with, not what I need going in” (439-440, emphasis in original). By establishing 
himself as a person of prominence – courtesy of his striped, rather than plain white sportswear – in 
Libby Lloyd’s shop, our narrator is able to penetrate the first of the boundaries that Jorgmund 
maintains and progress deeper into system. His behaviour and choice of suits made of fabric “which 
empty banks and consume the wealth of nations” in the store of the tailor Royce Allen corroborates 
his status as a “powerful man” (441-442), and eventually facilitates his entry into the exclusive capsule 
that is “the Brandon Club” (442), where the fact that he is wearing clothing made by Royce Allen is “as 
much a passport as Libby Lloyd’s whites” (443); the “murmur” (443) that his striped sportswear causes 
when revealed is indicative not only of the quality of the clothing, but also of the hierarchical standing 
that it implies. Having taken to heart the advice that, when it comes to navigating Jorgmund’s system, 
“the more ludicrously you behave, the more they will assume you have the right to” (439), it is in the 
Brandon Club that our narrator truly demonstrates that he, like Hiro and Y.T. before him, understands 
the rules of encapsulation at work around him. This understanding, coupled with his detailed 
“taxonomy” (300) of pencilnecks enables him to calculate, in a manner reminiscent of the way in which 
Y.T. predicts the actions of young Studley once she poons his bimbo box, the probable actions and 
reactions of the pencilneck – Buddy Keene – that he meets at the Club. In turn, the advantage that 
this understanding offers allows him to undermine the rules of encapsulation and penetrate the 
hitherto intransigent boundaries of Jorgmund proper: 
 
I wait. Sooner or later, they have to ask me to join the game. And they do…I give Buddy a bit 
of polite surprise. Oh no. No, I’m waiting for Someone. Buddy catches hold of the capital S. 
His eyes light up….  
This is easy. No one here is telling the truth. Every single one of them is living for every other. 
They do things because they must be seen to do them. These are type D or even type E 
pencilnecks vying for an upgrade. They’re here to lose a bit of identity, to become more the 
Right Kind of Guy. The rules they know are their own rules, and someone who breaks them 
without fear must be playing on the next level up. 
…‘So where’s Richard going to be?’ 
And of course they tell me. Anything to help a fellow out. Particularly if you suspect he may 
be your next boss. Buddy Keene is looking at me, little wheels turning in his head. Think, 
Buddy. Take a risk. Grift…. I step out into the corridor, and I walk away. He might not come. 
He might not have anything to offer. And then, heavy footsteps… 
‘Hey,’ says Buddy Keene. ‘Wait up.’ 
Goodness me, whatever can it be? 
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…Buddy Keene smiles an ingratiating smile. ‘There’s a meeting of the Planning Horizons 
Committee in an hour. Would you like to sit in, unofficially?’ 
Yes, Buddy. That would be just ideal.           
              (444-445) 
 
By understanding the rules of hierarchy that govern the lives and actions of pencilnecks, our narrator 
is able to give the appearance of eliding those rules completely, thus reinforcing the perception 
created initially by his clothing that he is “a bigwig from back along the Silver” (446).57 By playing upon 
the desire of pencilnecks to advance themselves in the hierarchy, by allowing Buddy Keene to believe 
that he too is breaking rules – and thus demonstrating that he is, in fact, the ‘Right Kind of Guy,’ – our 
narrator is able to enter the capsules that the hierarchy of Jorgmund is supposed to keep 
impermeable.  
 
 Given the rigid hierarchies and high levels of encapsulation at work in the Jorgmund Company, 
it seems almost redundant to draw attention to the fact that it appears to be a dystopic organisation 
that strives to perpetuate a binary-based world-view that is antediluvian at best. And yet, I would 
suggest that heterotopianism at work within The Gone-Away World is so pervasive that even the 
seemingly oppressive homogeneity of Jorgmund and its pencilnecks is continuously undermined, not 
only by our narrator and his ability to move between capsules, but by the very structure of the 
organisation itself. Brought into the offices of Jorgmund to attend a meeting of the Planning Horizons 
Committee – located, appropriately enough, on “one of the middle floors” (446) of the building – our 
narrator encounters Robert Crabtree, the man who “[moves] the paper” (448). Although he appears 
to be – and, in some ways is – just another “cog in the machine” (449), Robert Crabtree is also able to 
transcend rather than simply penetrate the boundaries of various capsules in place in Jorgmund:  
 
I watch him walk the halls of Jorgmund with his cart…No one speaks to him. No one even really 
looks at him. He’s just there, cog in the machine. Finally he walks into a big round room with 
an expensive table in it… 
‘Senior Board room,’ says Mr Crabtree… Waiting for him is a smaller stack of yellow envelopes 
stamped ‘Forward to Core.’ He takes them, and moves off down the corridor again…. Know 
your enemy. Follow the paper. I follow. Mr Crabtree is my guide in a strange land… 
                                                          
57 The Silver is another term for the Jorgmund Pipe; although Haviland City is the centre of operations for 
Jorgmund, the head office itself remains along the Pipe at the original site of FOX manufacture.  
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We are coming to the edge of the building…Robert Crabtree pushes his cart into a small service 
lift and turns to face me. There is only room for him. 
‘Core,’ says Robert Crabtree flatly. The doors close.                  
                      (449) 
 
As the above passage begins to reveal, Robert Crabtree is perhaps the only person who can walk 
unremarked into any single capsule – or, to use the appropriate jargon, office, boardroom, or meeting 
place – within Jorgmund; even Humbert Pestle, as is demonstrated slightly later on in the novel when 
he finally comes face-to-face with our narrator at Dick’s party, creates waves in his wake.58 In this 
manner, he truly is the “secret master” (448) of Jorgmund. Additionally, while it seems that he is 
merely fulfilling his function, acting as a (vital) cog in the machine, Robert Crabtree also reveals the 
fragility of the boundaries with which Jorgmund insulates itself. Or, to put it another way, the man 
who makes the deliveries of paper on which every bureaucracy depends is also the one who provides 
proof that the capsules of Jorgmund are far more vulnerable to rupture and flow than they originally 
appear. Alerted to this possibility by the stray comment of a pencilneck our narrator attaches himself 
to Crabtree; it is only by doing this that he is able to move more or less effortlessly through Jorgmund’s 
offices once the meeting and the (un)official reason for his presence has ended: “I stand at the end of 
the corridor…hoping no one sees me and thinks to ask why I am here…. [Robert Crabtree] takes my 
hand…and settles it painfully hard on the front of the trolley…we make his round. We deliver thirty 
executive decisions. We are messengers of God, invisible, inevitable, ignored” (449-450). Although our 
narrator – unlike Crabtree – is barred from entering the Core, it is only by traversing the corridors with 
him that he gains enough of an understanding (of the layout) of Jorgmund that he is able to return 
later, penetrate the final boundaries and reach the secrets at the Core of the company.  
 As I have already briefly noted, our narrator is alerted to the significance of Robert Crabtree 
and the possibilities he offers by the passing comments of one of the pencilnecks at the meeting of 
the Planning Horizons Committee. Although this comment – and the passage it is a part of – provides 
him with the information that he needs to rupture the boundaries of Jorgmund, it also alerts us as 
readers to the possibility that Jorgmund is less impenetrable that it initially appears. It also, however, 
begins to destabilise and subvert the taxonomy of pencilnecks that our narrator clings to, and by which 
he – and thus we – understand Jorgmund as a wholly homogenous and homogenising force. Mae 
Milton, the pencilneck in question, is by dint of her position on the Planning Horizons Committee, 
likely a type D (possibly, but unlikely to be a type E) pencilneck. According to the classification of 
pencilnecks, this means that she is akin to Dick Washburn and has only ‘vestigial’ humanity which she 
                                                          
58 See pp452-453.  
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is eager and willing to lose in service to the machine. And yet, the description of Mae and the 
interactions that we, through our narrator, are witness to questions this: “Clearly, [Mae’s] making with 
the funny…Mae Milton is moderately charming, and not even Robert Crabtree is immune. She offers 
him a broad, genuine smile. It occurs to me that Mae Milton will not last long as a pencilneck if this is 
how she carries on” (448). Mae here is exhibiting symptoms of a ‘genuine’ humanity that is supposed 
to be incongruous with her status as a mid-high ranked pencilneck; she is not only smiling genuinely – 
this is sharply contrasted against the leering “victory [grin]” (22) that Dick Washburn offers earlier in 
the novel – but she is also revealed to have a sense of humour. More importantly, however, this brief 
representation of Mae Milton overlooks the fact that she clearly already has demonstrated longevity 
as a pencilneck by virtue of her position and implied rank. The humanity that Milton displays, coupled 
with her position on the Planning Horizons Committee, suggests that the organisation of pencilnecks 
is not, perhaps, as rigid and homogenous as our narrator would have us believe.  
 
Piper 90, the behemoth structure which is responsible for “laying the Pipe” (277) – and thus 
the groundwork for Jorgmund’s ascendancy – is another example of the ambiguities inherent in 
Jorgmund’s framework. This is particularly noticeable in the description of its construction and origins: 
 
Piper 90 isn’t called that because it lays Pipe, by the way…The superstructure around which 
this thing was built is a series of retooled oil platforms, and the original Piper 90 is actually just 
the first of these…The people who built it were not worried about aesthetics; they were 
looking to make something survivable and strong. They took those oil platforms and they 
welded on huge, train-sized caterpillar tracks. They stuffed reactors from submarines in the 
basement to power the whole thing, and drive systems ripped out of aircraft carriers, and the 
synched the whole disaster together using matchbook maths, the gears from some defunct 
ultra large crude carriers and a lot of duct tape…There are bits of Piper 90 no one knows about 
because there simply wasn’t time to work out they’d be there. You could hide a city in the 
gaps, below the city that’s already bubbling away in the habitation section.               
                      (279) 
 
In service to a company that is supposedly insistent on uniformity, Piper 90 is – to steal a phrase from 
Foucault – a “heterotopia par excellence” (68, emphasis in original); that is, it appears to be anything 
but regular and consistent, and – by virtue of its inconsistency – undermines from the outset the 
homogeneity of Jorgmund. Assembled from a wide variety of pre-existing and seemingly incompatible 
apparatus (much like the company itself) that range from submarines to aircraft carriers, it contains 
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within itself a multitude of different spaces – or capsules – that have not yet been, and perhaps cannot 
be explored or accounted for in their entirety. Although Piper 90 is still subject to a certain amount of 
encapsulation – “the machine layer” (Harkaway, 279) is distinct from the various layers of the living 
quarters, which in their turn are divided into enclave-like sections; the “execs all have…rooms 
looking…back along the reassuring solidity” of the Pipe (281), whilst non-executives like our narrator 
have rooms that look out at the area still subject to Stuff and its chaos – the boundaries that divide 
the different capsules are easily penetrated; there is no restriction of movement. In stark contrast to 
the rigid hierarchies of Jorgmund proper, the original structure or hierarchy – such as it was – at work 
in Piper 90 is described by our narrator as “somewhere between a mad dictatorship and a sort of daffy 
anarcho-syndicate, a cooperative venture in self-salvation and heroism” (298). Fittingly, the staff and 
inhabitants of Piper 90 are quite diverse; there are “former soldiers, oily rag men” (299), Katiris, as 
well as what our narrator calls “the general population” (298).59 Likewise, although there are 
“executives” in residence that are “actually useful” (280), the man who initially runs Piper 90 is 
“Huster…a grizzled old fart who had managed an oil platform and knew engineers and tolerances and 
red lines and tipping points, and who got on well with just about anyone” (298). Piper 90, then, despite 
that fact that – and, in fact, partially because – it is the means by which Jorgmund is able to establish 
its dominance and the homogeneity that it espouses is, in fact, a particularly ambiguous and 
heterotopian site. 
When Huster and the “friendly quartermasterish [sic] execs” are replaced by “a skein 
of…pencilnecks” (300) led by Hellen Fust and Ricardo van Meents (our narrator tentatively identifies 
these two as type C’s) it appears that the heterotopian potentials of Piper 90 are to be extinguished 
and replaced by the bland Jorgmund uniformity. At first it appears that this is indeed the case, as 
predicted by Zaher Bey:60 
 
 ‘It’s starting,’ he says. ‘I thought it would take longer.’ 
‘What’s starting?’ 
‘The…I don’t know what you would all it. Not rot, exactly. The not-right things are starting 
again.’ He shakes his head. 
‘Because of Huster?’ 
‘No No, no…That’s a consequence. Huster is my canary.’                 
                      (301) 
                                                          
59 The Katiris in question are former inhabitants of Addeh Katir, the war-torn country where our narrator and 
Gonzo are located when the Go Away War begins.  
60 Zaher Bey, known initially to our narrator by his alias Freeman ibn Solomon and affectionately as ‘the Bey’ is 




Here likening Huster to the canaries used by miners to locate potentially fatal underground gas 
pockets, Zaher Bey is predicting that Huster’s removal and the re-establishment of a hierarchy that is 
true to the Company is only the first of many probable actions that Jorgmund intends to take to re-
establish the ‘rot’ of the old world. He is also perhaps the first to recognise the true purpose of the 
Pipe, and, by extension, Jorgmund; as an extension of his fears about what will come to pass now that 
Piper 90 is under the control of the pencilnecks, he goes on to explain to our narrator the machine 
nature of the company and its absolute commitment to what the Pipe truly represents – stagnation 
and entropy, the ability to control the population that is dependent upon it, and an absolute refusal 
to engage with or recognise the possibilities that Stuff offers:  
 
‘Even I miss the old days, and my old days were dreadful. And I don’t believe we should miss 
them. I think we should…strike out!’ He thumps the table. ‘Make a new world! Not the old 
one all over again. But…people are scared.’ He shrugs. 
…‘What is this thing, this Jorgmund? How did it begin? What is FOX? How is it made? Jorgmund 
knows, and no one else.... Jorgmund is a machine for laying, maintaining and defending the 
Pipe. That is its only task. Its only priority. In fact, that is the only thing it can see. It is blind to 
us. It does not even know that we exist, except in so far as we impinge upon that purpose…at 
what point along the way does the executive in charge of Piper 90 let it roll on over someone? 
…How long before the Pipe is more important than a life? Or a home? Or a river which feeds 
a village? How long before the convenience of the Pipe is more important than these things?’
                 (302-303, emphasis in original) 
 
The questions that Zaher Bey asks here of FOX, its origin and the secrecy that surrounds its production 
are of vital importance to not only the plot of the novel, but to the development of Piper 90’s (and our 
narrator’s) heterotopian potential. I would suggest that these are questions that could perhaps only 
be asked on Piper 90 because of its proximity to the Border, to Stuff, and, crucially, the people created 
by Stuff. The suspicion of and contempt for the narrow-mindedness that Jorgmund – and the people 
associated with it – displays, and his belief that it will prioritise the laying of the Pipe over and above 
individual lives and needs is clearly evident in the passage above. I believe that the desire he exhibits 
for revolutionary change, his conviction that people should embrace rather than run from the 
unknown possibilities that Stuff (and the new world that it has created) offers, and his rejection of the 
mechanistic, homogenising forces of Jorgmund is remarkably reminiscent of I-330’s call for infinite 
revolution and her love for and admiration of the ‘forest’ people that exist beyond the Wall. That the 
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Bey eventually heeds his own call and disappears beyond the Border with the Found Thousand in an 
attempt to live with and in the new world compounds, rather than detracts from the similarities 
between the two and the heterotopian impulses that they are both subject to and working with; like 
I-330 before him, he eschews the easy path in order to stay true to his revolutionary principles and to 
create and exist in heterotopian sites of resistance. What is also in evidence in the passage above is 
the Bey’s belief that Piper 90, already made ambiguous thanks to its purpose and now threatened by 
the influx of pencilnecks from Jorgmund proper, will be used merely to prop up the decaying remnants 
of the old world that only Jorgmund profits from. Or, to put it another way, Zaher Bey fears that Piper 
90 is now merely the means by which Jorgmund banishes potential, by playing on people’s fear of the 
unknown and the new.  
 In spite of the presence and leadership of pencilnecks, and the series of events which follow 
soon after this exchange between our narrator and the Bey and appear to substantiate the fears of 
the latter, I would suggest that Piper 90 retains its status as a heterotopian site of resistance. Several 
months after the departure of Huster, the reconnaissance team that includes our narrator and his pal 
Gonzo comes across a small fortified village that “is in a strategically and logistically important 
location” (309); that is, it is directly in the path of Piper 90. Sent by Hellen Fust to inform the 
inhabitants that they’re going to be ‘relocated’ – the Bey puts it a little more honestly when he says 
“‘you mean we should just roll right on over their homes’” (310) – our narrator and his team discover 
that the villagers are all “new” (311): “Tobemory Trent turns his head to take in the whole thing…. His 
gaze takes in the men and women around us, and the children, and then it flicks over them to the 
others huddled in doorways and peering from around corners: the strange haunted eyes and the 
curious hands and all the other little thigs like scales and fur – these are dream people, fake people, 
people made real from someone’s thoughts. Reification people. They are the new” (313, emphasis in 
original). These villagers are the Found Thousand (this is the name given to them by our narrator and 
his friends).61 What is particularly telling about this passage is our narrator’s initial classification of 
these people as ‘fake’; born of the interaction of thought and Stuff, they’re not really people. The irony 
of this is, of course, that our narrator is himself one of these people made real from another’s thoughts 
(although at this point in the narrative he has not yet been separated from Gonzo), but I will return to 
the implications of this in due course. I would suggest that the attempts to label bifurcates as ‘new’ is 
an indicator of the ways in which (narrative) identity is, particularly during Jorgmund’s ascendancy, 
still subject to socially constructed ‘normative’ models of personhood, which is demonstrated by the 
belief, voiced here by our narrator, that those who are made from Stuff are not actually human. This 
view is shared by the pencilnecks Fust and van Meents; the reasoning utilised by the former is 
                                                          
61 Technically speaking, there are in fact one thousand and eight of them. 
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‘translated’ by our narrator: “[The Found Thousand] are not people. They are un-people. Worse, they 
are pretend people. They will come for us, if once we trust them, and we will be destroyed” (315, 
emphasis in original).62 On the basis of this reasoning, which emphasises the otherness of the villagers, 
the order is given for “the village…to be razed, and the inhabitants taken into custody for study” (315). 
At this very moment, when it appears that the worst of Zaher Bey’s fears have become true, Piper 90’s 
heterotopian nature comes to the fore. Led by our narrator, the inhabitants and workers go on strike 
and co-opt the Club Room as their headquarters, creating a capsule of revolution and resistance within 
Piper 90 at the same time as it is being used to enforce the homogeneity associated with Jorgmund’s 
adherence to the utopia / dystopia binary. In this way it gains an ambiguous status similar to the 
Ancient House in We, and especially to the apartment over Charrington’s shop that Winston and Julia 
frequent in NEF. Like Winston, our narrator believes that he understands the nature of Piper 90 and 
its purpose; until the discovery of the Found Thousand, our narrator believes – even if Zaher Bey does 
not – that the creation of the Pipe, the distribution of FOX and the creation of the Liveable Zone is 
“vital” (277), referring at various points in the novel to FOX as a “magic potion” (9), whilst the Pipe 
delivers “solidity and safety” (10) to the remnants of the world. As we have already seen, however, 
Piper 90’s purpose is at least partially Jorgmund’s purpose also, and it can be used for ill as well as for 
good. Like the apartment, the heterotopian nature of Piper 90 betrays our narrator even as it provides 
a kind of sanctuary for him and for those afraid of the changing world.  
Like the Ancient House before it, Piper 90 becomes – and perhaps always has been by virtue 
of its location on the Border – a site of both deviation from the norm as dictated by Jorgmund, and 
crisis and especially of revolution. What is particularly striking about the Club Room capsule and its 
inhabitants is, as our narrator notes, that “almost everyone feels ambivalent about the Found 
Thousand” (318); they are rebelling on behalf of people that they are suspicious of and do not trust 
because of the belief, voiced by one Tommy Lapland, that you “don’t go out and annihilate people just 
because you don’t trust them. That’s how you tell the bad guys from the good guys” (318). The 
implications of this belief are, I would suggest, key indicators of the heterotopian nature of Piper 90, 
and of TGAW more generally. With one simple statement, Tommy Lapland raises two crucial ideas: 
first, that irrespective of their origins, the Found Thousand – and thus, by extension, all ‘new’ people 
– are, in fact, people and deserve to be treated as such; and second, he makes ambiguous the divide 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad.’ The first of these ideas that quietly and without fanfare grants humanity to 
the ‘new’ people marks a significant deviation from the company line, but also throws into crisis 
                                                          
62 This is the kind of reasoning that can probably be found in one form or another in any (anti)utopian – or 
dystopian – text or social experiment one cares to imagine; the parallels with ‘real world’ incitement to 
genocide (think here particularly of (white) Western colonial attitudes, and events before, during and after 
World War II) are both disturbing and, in all likelihood, quite deliberate.  
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normative models of identity and representation. What is important to realise, however, is that the 
Found Thousand are not the first ‘new’ people that have challenged (pre)conceptions on Piper 90 
about what and who is – and isn’t – human. Pascal Timbery is rescued by our narrator and Gonzo, and 
takes up a position on Piper 90 in the horticultural department. Befriended by Larry Tusk and his dog, 
Dora, he is “obsessed with memory” (286) and recalling the people and places that no longer exist. He 
is also, as it turns out when he swallows Dora whole, “a thing which looked human and talked human 
and hugged human, but which could open up and envelop you like a snake” (287). Larry Tusk’s 
reaction, upon finding Pascal Timbery with a distended stomach and Dora’s yelps clearly audible, is to 
“up and hit [him] in the head with a fire extinguisher…until Pascal [is] basically a smear” (288). Our 
narrator’s reaction to Pascal’s death is noteworthy: 
 
On the downside, it raised a question no one was prepared for about the Unreal People and 
what they were. Because we had liked Pascal Timbery, and if someone ordinary and mad had 
eaten Dora the dog, and Larry Tusk had beaten them to death with a fire extinguisher, that 
would have been murder, albeit provoked. And the thing is that for all that Pascal was a 
monster, he was clearly a thinking, feeling monster, and that made him at least most of the 
way to being a person.           
            (288, emphasis in original) 
 
Once again laced with a certain irony, the language that our narrator uses is telling; Pascal is a 
thoroughly likeable chap who, it is important to note, looks a lot like a ‘normal’ human being. 
Particularly notable is his emphasis on the fact that Pascal was a ‘thinking, feeling’ being; this is sharply 
contrasted against his dealings with and impressions of pencilnecks who be believes are not “entirely 
human” (17) due to their ability to subordinate their thoughts and feelings to the Jorgmund machine. 
Pascal’s death creates uncertainty around previously unassailable attitudes about what actually 
constitutes humanity and it is this, I would contend, that sets the groundwork for the strike that 
happens after Fust orders the wholesale internment (and probable death) of the Found Thousand. 
This is borne out by the speech that Larry Tusk gives at the meeting in the Club Room after Tommy 
Lapland speaks: 
 
‘You all know where I come from on this and what I did to Pascal Timbery…. I killed my friend 
because I was afraid and I was shocked and he was attacking something I loved. Well, that’s 
one thing. But this here is another, and it’s a whole other kind of a thing. What they’re talking 
about is taking people – people, same as Pascal – and crushing their homes and handing them 
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over to some science fellas…because we’re afraid. And I don’t know about you,’ says Larry 
Tusk, ‘but I don’t fancy being that person and I won’t have it in my name. I won’t be afraid half 
my life and ashamed the other half.’         
            (319, emphasis in original) 
 
In this stirring speech – all the more effective because he, unlike many other inhabitants of Piper 90, 
has personal associations with the ‘new’ people – Larry reiterates the humanity that Tommy 
previously grants those created in conjunction with Stuff, and also acknowledges the positive aspects 
of the relationship he had with Pascal. The crucial part of Larry’s speech, however, comes when he 
compares what he did to Pascal with what Fust and van Meents intend to do to the Found Thousand; 
he was personally reacting to an immediate threat, whereas Fust and van Meents are, after 
considerable calculation, asking others to complete this distasteful task for them. I do not believe that 
Larry’s use of and emphasis on the word ‘other’ is accidental, and would suggest that his use of this 
word implicitly questions the humanity of those who would destroy the homes of the Reified and hand 
the people themselves over for experimentation. By designating the actions and intentions of Fust 
and van Meents as ‘other’ in conjunction with his acknowledgment of the humanity of the Reified, 
Larry Tusk contributes to the creation of a space that begins the process by which the binaries that 
Jorgmund strives to uphold – in this instance, good and bad, and human and non-human – are 
questioned and, I would contend, eventually dismantled altogether when the true nature of FOX is 
revealed.   
 
These things can happen on Piper 90 because it exists in the space between spaces; in both a 
metaphorical and a literal sense, it is the Border between the Liveable Zone that it helps to create with 
the distribution of FOX and the ‘unreal’ zone where Stuff and its uncertainties and ambiguities reign 
supreme. Piper 90 is also, as I have noted previously, a heterotopia in its own right; containing within 
itself multiple and incompatible spaces and tasked with creating the apparatus that enables Jorgmund 
to uphold the status quo, it is also, as we have seen, a highly ambiguous space that facilitates the 
inversion of the concepts of ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ and begins the interrogation of beliefs around what 
exactly constitutes humanity. It is also, as I have already suggested, the first space in which questions 
can be asked about the origins and nature of FOX; the quest that our narrator sets out on – a quest 
which brings him to self-awareness and fosters the development of a narrative and identity that is 
separate from that which Gonzo initially creates for him – begins first with the doubts about Jorgmund 
and FOX that Zaher Bey plants, and with the inversion of ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ on Piper 90. I would suggest, 
however, that Piper 90 is merely one of the multitude of heterotopian spaces that can be found within 
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the domains of The Gone Away World. Many of these are of a nature similar to those I have identified 
in previous texts. Those that I will examine now are what I consider to be the most important of these 
‘traditionally’ heterotopian spaces, and are both located within Cricklewood Cove; these are the 
Soames School that Gonzo and our narrator attend, the sandpit where our narrator’s story begins, 
and the house of his gong fu master, Master Wu.63 Cricklewood Cove is the birthplace of Gonzo 
Lubitsch, and of our narrator. A highly heterotopian space in its own right, it appears at first to be an 
idyllic space. A consequence, perhaps, of its status as a childhood home, this is reinforced by the 
recollections of our narrator of childhood fishing and Lubitsch family trips to Megg Lake in the winter.64 
The utopian seeming nature of Cricklewood Cove is, however, undermined by the variety of discordant 
capsules that it fosters and contains. One of the more interesting of these is the “Soames School for 
the Children of Townsfolk” (32). Run by Assumption Soames, who is known to students and staff alike 
as “the Evangelist” (32), it is an ostensibly conservative school, the syllabus of which appears to be 
tailored to satisfy the strictly religious mores of the headmistress. The “blazing determination” (34) of 
the Evangelist notwithstanding, her curriculum is continually subverted by her staff, memorably 
described by our narrator as “a flea-bitten and secular motley of brilliant minds culled from institutions 
too prissy to put up with their foibles” (33). Thus it is that “Mr Clisp the gambler teaches…not only 
mathematics but also materialistic ethics,” (33), whilst “Ms Poynter…includes in her biology classes a 
smattering of first aid and natural history, and also sexual education of increasing sophistication as 
the years pass, so that by the age of ten we can recite a list of erogenous zones…and by the onset of 
puberty no one is in fear about the inevitable swellings and expulsions” (33-34). The subversive nature 
of the Soames School is compounded by the revelation that the Evangelist is not, in fact, “just a crazy 
Bible lady” (78): 
 
‘People don’t want children to know what they need to know. They want their kids to know 
what they ought to need to know. If you’re a teacher you’re in a constant battle with mildly 
deluded adults who think the world will get better if you imagine it is better. You want to 
teach about sex? Fine, but only when they’re old enough to do it. You want to talk politics? 
Sure, but nothing modern. Religion? So long as you don’t actually think about it. Well, hell. In 
this town, the evil old lady who tells everyone what they can and can’t read because it isn’t 
                                                          
63 ‘Gong fu’ is another way of spelling / pronouncing what Western audiences typically know as ‘kung fu.’ 
64 Although the explicit examination of childhood in the context of utopian theory is relatively recent, there is a 
tradition of thought that goes back to at least Rousseau that depicts childhood as a kind of golden age in 
human development; there are parallels, I think, to be drawn between Rousseau’s belief (neatly summed up 
here by Roger Neustadter), that “the child [lives] in a utopian state of nature…until the forces of civilization 
[corrupt] their naïve essence” (147), and Plato’s model, as outlined by Karl Popper in his Open Society, of the 
perfect state that declines as it participates in history.   
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decent is me. So I can hire whoever I damn well like to subvert my iron rule and they can teach 
evolution and free speech and the cultural bias of history and all the rest. And I do this because 
you, you are going to leave the path, however much you want to stay on it.’ 
              (79, emphasis in original) 
 
In other words, Assumption Soames deliberately hires staff that she knows will subvert the iron-clad 
conservative agenda that she appears to espouse, and so makes certain that the pupils who attend 
her school are taught what she believes they actually need to know. In this speech Soames reveals 
that the school she presides over is in fact an environment that is carefully designed to enable students 
to ‘leave the path’ that institutions such as Jorgmund might prefer them to take. 
In much the same way that I-330 acts as the embodiment and agent of the Ancient House and 
its heterotopian possibilities, so too is the Evangelist the agent and arbiter of the Soames School and 
the rebellion against socially-normative thinking that it encourages. Because of her intervention, the 
Soames School is, I would suggest, a space of what we might call counter-utopian engineering that 
stands in sharp contrast to the “crash course of management schools and loyalty card deals…pseudo-
spaces, malls and water features” (15) that Jorgmund uses as a (cognitive) blueprint to create 
pencilnecks such as Dick Washburn; it is a heterotopian space that fosters subversion and the 
obstruction of social expectation, and one that is all the more effective as a site of disruption and 
resistance because it appears to be a compliant and regular institution that might churn out 
pencilnecks in the making. In her role as the agent of this heterotopian space, the Evangelist also 
makes apparent the competing narratives of identity at work in this novel, as is indicated by our 
narrator’s comment that he has “totally bought into Assumption Soames’s public persona. This, it now 
appears, was naïve” (75). His use of the phrase ‘public persona’ is, I believe, telling; it implies the 
enactment of a consciously constructed identity that is performed in conjunction and simultaneously 
with the expectations and competing (and complementary) narratives of its audience. This is indicated 
by the two different names that she bears; the Evangelist, and Assumption Soames. As the Evangelist, 
she upholds the conservative status quo, and is “utterly straightforward in the most devious possible 
way, a subtle bludgeon like those computers which play chess by going through every consequence of 
every move there is” (76). Her apparent fixation on all matters spiritual – part of the narrative of her 
public persona – lends itself in turn to the narrative that our narrator constructs for her, one in which 
she “sets an extra place at table every night for God…and eats only gravel and oatmeal in order to 
avoid inflaming the senses” (75).  Assumption Soames, on the other hand, smokes the cigarettes 
“(‘cancerous, blasphemous, steeped in the blood of slaves and mired in the culture of sin and 
sensuality which pervades this modern world’)” that the Evangelist excoriates to her students, and 
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works ceaselessly to give them the tools that they need to be able to leave “the shelter of the path” 
(75, 78). When these conflicting narratives collide, our narrator is left momentarily flummoxed; he has 
no idea of how to address or reconcile what he calls “this rather significant discrepancy” (75). These 
somewhat disparate narratives are not the only ones that inform the identity of Assumption Soames, 
however. She is also the widow of Evander John Soames of Cricklewood Cove, the “stupid sonuvabitch 
[who] came home and died of kuru in [her] house” (80). I would suggest that this particular narrative 
is evidence of the ambiguity at work in heterotopian spaces; the ability to take the path less travelled 
that the education the Soames School cultivates is perhaps to blame for Evander Soames’ foray into 
cannibalism in the Cricklewood Fens. In yet another of her identities, Assumption Soames is also the 
mother of Elisabeth Soames, “the slender, elegant child/woman with whom [our narrator has] been 
practising lethal and exacting modes of pugilism” (75).   
 The existence of multiple – and oft competing – narratives is not confined to the Soames 
School, nor to Assumption Soames herself. The ‘pugilism’ that our narrator mentions is the gong fu of 
the House of the Voiceless Dragon, taught in Cricklewood Cove by Master Wu Shenyang. Master Wu’s 
is both residence and dojo, and is another of the more ‘traditionally’ heterotopian spaces to be found 
within the novel. The living room of Master Wu’s house is described by our narrator as being “a 
treasure house of oddments and curiosities [with] a gold statue of a warlike pig in one corner, a pair 
of Foo Dogs on the mantle, standing lamps from various periods of design, weapons and china ducks 
on all the walls” (46). The somewhat pastiche nature of this room is reflected in the gong fu and 
lessons of Master Wu, who knows “a great many higgledy-piggledy things about a great many 
subjects… [and] almost all of them find their way into the lessons. Thus along with the Elvis Walk, we 
have Lorenz Palace Step (mathematical gong fu) and Vetruvian Fist (da Vinci gong fu), and – until 
Elisabeth intervenes – Fallopian Tube Arm (the name culled from a diagram in my biology textbook, 
chosen for the shape of the elbow in the final posture, but rather alarming” (50, emphasis in original). 
Rather than representing a helplessly postmodern sensibility that grasps at and replicates whatever it 
sees, however, I would contend that the patchwork nature of Master Wu’s home and teachings 
indicate instead a deep-rooted resistance to homogeneity. The above description of his living room is 
in stark contrast to the description of the Jorgmund-approved apartment that our narrator looks at, 
with its “default beige and lifestyled interior” (346) where everything matches, whilst the names of 
the different postures and movements implies a very un-Jorgmund-like willingness to take inspiration 
and meaning from a wide variety of people and places. The idea that Master Wu’s house and the 
teachings of the Voiceless Dragon are sites of resistance to uniformity is confirmed when he reveals 
to Elisabeth and our narrator that his family (and their gong fu) is the hereditary enemy of the 




‘Some time, long time ago, someone paid [the ninjas] or ordered them to kill everyone in my 
family, and make my father’s father’s father’s gong fu disappear. They never quit. They just 
keep trying. It’s what they are. War – for ever…’ Master Wu sighs. 
‘Lots of people were at war in China then. Chiang Kai-shek was chasing Mao all over the 
country…Our war just disappeared into theirs… 
Their war,’ Master Wu goes on, ‘was about who was in control. Ours was about staying alive, 
of course, but it was also about choice. Very much the same thing. We teach gong fu so that 
you have a choice…Whoever paid the ninjas believed we are wrong. Power belongs in one 
place. Nothing should disturb the way things work. No alternatives. Or maybe it was just them: 
the Clockwork Hand Society, ninjas, call them what you like.’  
         (67-68, emphasis in original)  
 
As Master Wu makes clear here, the ability to make choices is central to the philosophy of the 
Voiceless Dragon, and to their disagreement with the Clockwork Hand Society. This is key to 
understanding the Voiceless Dragon as a heterotopian movement (and space, insofar as Master Wu’s 
house is a reflection of the values and teachings of its owner). To offer choice is to allow and encourage 
the exploration of multiple points of view, ways of being and narratives of self. As Master Wu points 
out, this is anathema to the likes of the Clockwork Hand and the status quo based upon the utopia / 
dystopia binary that it, like the OneState, Oceania and L. Bob Rife before it, seeks to uphold.  
 As a heterotopian site of resistance, however, Master Wu’s house is an ambiguous space, one 
which can undermine and betray as readily as it aids and abets, whilst, like some of those that arise 
from the Soames School, the competing narratives that emerge from this space are ambivalent. From 
the story that is told by Master Wu of his birth and early years, it becomes apparent that his family, 
the last of the Voiceless Dragon, were at least semi-nomadic, always “running and hiding” (67). His 
house in Cricklewood Cove, whilst representing a kind of safe haven and stable site of resistance, also 
makes him vulnerable. He is, of course, aware of this; the “low-tech burglar alarm” system (65) created 
with strings of bells makes his awareness of his vulnerability evident. The alarm system, ingenious as 
it is however, is not enough to prevent his death. And it is from the competing narratives of Master 
Wu’s death, the “two truths” that confront Elisabeth and our narrator as they stand “in front of the 
smouldering char which was the House of the Voiceless Dragon” (100) that the ambiguous nature of 
the house, and the way in which it is simultaneously a site of resistance and of betrayal, is made 
evident. The first ‘truth’ that our narrator describes is “simple and bleakly comfortable” (100), and has 
Wu Shenyang dying in an accidental house fire. The second, which is more “fanciful” (100), describes 
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a ninja intrusion and a “fluid and magnificent” fight between Master Wu and “the foot soldiers of the 
Clockwork Hand Society” (103, 102). At some point during the fight, however, our narrator has Master 
Wu come to several realisations: 
 
If he continues this battle much longer, the likelihood is that Yumei and Ophelia will come 
home, and even if they are not killed, they will be exposed. At the moment Master Wu could 
well be a bachelor. The ninjas have no knowledge of his family arrangements, 
because…they’ve only seen this room, and they’ve been kinda busy. Similarly, they do not 
have any idea who his students are. All that information is in the desk. Thus, he is the weak 
link in his enemies’ chain. Without him, they simply cannot find the Voiceless Dragon. It will 
be not only silent, but invisible…. And it is at this point that he makes a decision. 
                      (104) 
 
That decision is to set himself, and the house on fire, and to keep the ninjas at bay until the house, 
with its family photos (Yumei and Ophelia are, respectively, his daughter and granddaughter, and both 
practitioners of the Voiceless Dragon gong fu) and information about the members of the Voiceless 
Dragon, is beyond salvation. Laying the issues of biographical truth and lack of evidence for this 
particular narrative aside for a moment, what this passage makes abundantly clear are the 
vulnerabilities that the house represents, and the ways in which it undermines the sense of safety that 
it appears to exude. Whichever narrative you choose to believe, the house is the cause of Master Wu’s 
death. Even destroyed, however, the house of Wu Shenyang continues to perform some of its less 
ambiguous heterotopian functions. Its destruction, however conversely, assures the endurance of the 
School of the Voiceless Dragon, enabling it to continue as a site of resistance to the Clockwork Hand 
and to Jorgmund. The possibility of the second narrative that arises from its destruction is what fuels 
the quest of Elisabeth Soames, whereby she seeks out Humbert and knowledge of the Clockwork Hand 
Society. More importantly, however, what this second narrative also does is to throw into doubt any 
preconceived notions we as an audience might have about what is real and what is not, foreshadowing 
the birth of the competing and complementary narratives of our narrator and Gonzo Lubitsch in a 
sandpit. 
 The last of the heterotopian spaces within the novel that I will examine here, the sandpit in 
the playground in Cricklewood Cove is perhaps the most important. The space where Gonzo Lubitsch 
creates our narrator, it is also the site of the latter’s awakening, where he finally comes to full self-
awareness in the wake of his Reification. There are, I would suggest, parallels between both the 
Reification of our narrator in the incident at Station 9 when Gonzo is caught in a “waterfall” (340) of 
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Stuff and his subsequent awakening in the sandpit, and the awakening of D-503 in the Ancient House. 
As I noted in chapter two, D-503 relates how he “became glass [and] saw into myself, inside. There 
were two me’s [sic]. One was the old one, D-503…the other used to just stick his hairy paws out of his 
shell, but now all of him came out” (Zamiatin, 56). Although D-503 is speaking here somewhat 
metaphorically, this is the moment when his individual, conscious self is birthed; the imagery that he 
creates is somewhat akin to the process by which a baby bird hatches itself beak first. Our narrator’s 
birth, whilst being a two-step event, is comparable. He is “spun out and separated” (Harkaway, 413) 
from Gonzo when they are “deluged together in the raw, unbalanced Stuff of the universe” (413); the 
‘second me’ of Gonzo is “made flesh” (413). Gonzo’s fear and shame at the actualisation of the secret 
version of his self – which is akin to the fear and anger that D-503 exhibits in the aftermath of seeing 
this second version of himself – leads him to attempt to murder our narrator. It is this attempt on his 
life which eventually leads our narrator back to the sandpit in Cricklewood Cove where he, “across the 
sandpit and thirty years distance… [spies] the infant Gonzo” (408), and is able at last to understand 
that “this sandpit is not where [they] met. It is where [he] was born – or rather, made” (412); this is 
the moment that he recognises that he was Gonzo’s ‘second me,’ and his (re)birth and individuation, 
begun by exposure to Stuff, is completed. To complete the process of awakening and in realising that 
he is now (where he has not been before) a separate individual from Gonzo, our narrator must 
recognise and reconcile the two competing narratives of the origins of his and Gonzo’s partnership.  
The heterotopian elements of the sandpit, which our narrator labels “the Sandpit of Truth” 
(420), not only allow him to come to full self-awareness, but also exposes the ways in which identity 
is an aggregate of the narratives that we construct about and for ourselves, and those complementary 
and competing narratives that are told about us. Consider the two competing descriptions our 
narrator offers of his first meeting with Gonzo: 
 
One of my first memories, in all the world: Gonzo…staring into my face with a stranger’s 
concern. He has been playing a game of indescribable complexity, by himself, in the corner of 
the playground. He has walked from one end of the sandpit to the other and rendered it flat 
in a particular place, and he has marked borders and bridges and areas of diffusion and lines 
of demarcation and now he needs another player and cannot find one. And so he turns to look 
about him and sees a small, lost child: alone in a moment of unfathomable grief. With 
presence of mind he directs his mother’s attention to the crisis, and she trundles over and 
asks immediately what is the matter and am I hurt and where are my parents and where is my 
home? And to these questions I have no answer. All I know is that I am crying.   




This is the narrative of their ‘first meeting’ that our narrator, all unknowingly, has inherited from 
Gonzo; as it continues, Gonzo buys his new friend an ice-cream and allows him to join in his 
“incomprehensible game” (30). I will examine this passage – particularly the parts I have emphasised 
– more thoroughly in conjunction with the second description of this first encounter: 
 
Gonzo stares across the sandpit. It is a wasteland. He can see no one he wants to play with. If 
he cannot find a friend, he will start to cry again. His grief will catch up with him. It stalks him, 
jumps on him in idle moments. Gonzo already has puffy cheeks and raw, red eyes. Hurriedly, 
he takes his father’s advice. 
He makes a new friend.  
A boy (of course) his own age. Smaller. As alone as he is. Someone to share his burdens, racked 
– as children can be, for no discrete reason – with dreadful sadness...We settle down to play, 
and it emerges that I am not quite as good at this as he is but good enough to keep him on his 
toes. In fact, this is almost definitive of me: in all the areas where Gonzo wishes to excel, I am 
just close enough behind to push him harder. In those he chooses to ignore, I am often quite 
talented. I am his foil…Judicious, clever and sensible where he is headlong, intuitive and rash. 
Gonzo splits himself down the middle, and knows that he will never be alone again.   
                 (411-412, emphasis in original) 
 
The sandpit, then, is a site of crisis twice over. Out of Gonzo’s crisis – the searing absence of his brother 
– our narrator, Gonzo’s “invisible companion” (412), is created; when our narrator returns to the 
sandpit in the wake of his reification, it is to come to the realisation that he has only existed as a 
physical presence for a few short months, and that much of what he is, and has been, comes directly 
from Gonzo. What is important to remember is that both of these narratives are ‘true,’ insofar as such 
a concept exists. For Gonzo, the first passage is his narrative of how he and our narrator met; that it 
omits a few key details that the second passage – which is our narrator’s narrative – fills in does not 
mean that it lacks veracity, for Gonzo or, for that matter, for our narrator. As he begins to realise in 
the immediate aftermath of his awakening, “everything I remember is true – except for the very edges 
of Gonzo’s imagined history of me, like the house on Aggerdean Bluff and the parents I never had – 
and everything is false” (412).  
As a heterotopian space, the Sandpit of Truth begins to dismantle binary-derived assumptions 
about truth and falsity as it pertains to autobiographical representation; both of these passages, both 
Gonzo and our narrator’s experiences are true, and both are not. The sandpit, and the multiple 
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narratives that arise from it also begins to demonstrate the ways in which (narrative) identity is 
networked, existing in constant circulation between the narratives that we create for ourselves, and 
those that are created for and about us. Somewhat more literal in the case of our narrator and Gonzo, 
it is still in evidence. The dreadful sadness, the unfathomable grief that our narrator feels in the first 
passage is, in fact, the grief that Gonzo experiences as a result of the death of his older (soldier) brother 
Marcus, but chooses to displace onto his creation; the loneliness of our narrator is Gonzo’s, shifted 
onto the boy he creates from parts of himself. As an extension of this, I would suggest that the borders 
and bridges, and lines of demarcation and diffusion that are associated in the first passage with 
Gonzo’s game are in fact directly applicable to the process that he goes through in creating our 
narrator as his foil; they are the boundaries he chooses to create between himself and his “weedy 
sidekick” (44), the ways in which they are similar and disparate. The narrative and identity that Gonzo 
constructs for our narrator is in many ways the mirror image of his own. As the second passage above 
shows, their abilities and interests are complementary in almost every way – one excels in an area 
where the other does not. What is crucial to remember is that even as Gonzo constructs a narrative 
for his sidekick, he is also constructing his own, in opposition to and correspondence with that of our 
narrator. I would suggest that our narrator is not passive in the construction of their dual (but by no 
means dualistic) narratives; as their time at Jarndice University and our narrator’s (but not Gonzo’s) 
brush with revolutionary activity implies, there are times when Gonzo and his narrative takes a back 
seat, and our narrator’s is the dominant narrative at work. The mirroring operating in their relationship 
is reflected in the family history and home that Gonzo imagines for our narrator. The relationship 
between our narrator and his (equally imaginary) parents is distant; he “lived [his] own, sovereign life” 
(404), feeling that “they were gladder to see [him] go than to return, that they enjoyed their 
unencumbered time” and so received with “unconditional gratitude” (403) the distraction of Gonzo’s 
company. By comparison, the Lubitsch household is one that is close-knit, all the more so perhaps 
because of the death of one child: “Lunch is Ma Lubitsch’s small white witchery, her article of faith – 
if she can provide Gonzo with hearty nutrition and a solid, dependable centre, he will be well-fitted to 
the world. He will conquer, he will survive, he will feel no need to seek adventure. He will not leave 
her. For Ma Lubitsch, lunch defies death” (31). The key word, and the key difference between these 
two family units (however imaginary one of them may be) is ‘centre’ – Gonzo’s family provides this 
where our narrator’s does not. Peculiarly enough, however, in the end it is our narrator for whom the 
Lubitsch household is the most important; it is to there that he journeys after his awakening in the 
sandpit, and it is Gonzo’s parents to whom he first consciously recounts his narrative: 
 
 Old Man Lubitsch sighs. 
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 … ‘What has my son done to you, that he is running so far and so fast?’ 
I cannot answer straightaway, but there is no need. There is no time in this room…This is the 
heart of the world, and I am safe. I draw my thoughts together, and I tell my tale. I do not try 
to separate my memory from Gonzo’s or to make judgements about what actually happened 
in a given room. The past is memory, and no two person’s memories are alike. I know my 
story, and I tell it as it was for me. I do not skimp when the moment of my genesis arrives. I 
do not prevaricate. I make the position clear. I am Gonzo’s shadow. I am his imaginary friend 
made real. I am new.    
                  (421-422, emphasis in original) 
 
As he acknowledges here, the Lubitsch household is at the heart of our narrator’s world. It provides a 
centre for him in a way that it does not for Gonzo (who does not, cannot tell his parents the truth of 
what has happened), indicating, I believe, the ways in which their narratives have intertwined and 
taken on facets of the other.65 In making no attempt to differentiate between the narratives of himself 
and Gonzo, I would suggest that our narrator is, signalling his recognition of the fact that his and 
Gonzo’s narratives are – up until this point, at least – inextricably interwoven and networked, 
acknowledging that one narrative is only ever one amongst many. At the same time, however, he is 
also asserts and privileges his own narrative in a way that he has not – could not – previously, when 
he existed only as an aspect of Gonzo. What is crucial here is that during the telling of his tale to Ma 
and Old Man Lubitsch, he adds an entirely new strand to his narrative, and acknowledges – and 
portrays – himself as one of the ‘new.’ In accepting the fact that he is a bifurcate, a ‘monster,’ our 
narrator completes the process of individuation that was begun and made possible – literally and 
metaphorically – by the exposure of himself and Gonzo to Stuff.  
 
Stuff – also known to our narrator for a time as “Disney Dust or shadow” (272) – is, I would 
contend, the ultimate enabler of heterotopian spaces within The Gone-Away World. The unexpected 
and unintended fallout from what is known as the “Go Away Bomb” which is a weapon designed to 
“[suck] the organising principle, the information, out of matter and energy” (272), it breaks down 
boundaries and the binaries that are supposed to remain impervious, and undermines in new ways 
the encapsulation that Jorgmund strives to uphold, not only on an institutional but also on a personal 
level, by interacting with the “thoughts, and hopes, and fears” (272) of those it encounters. In 
particular, it penetrates the capsules that were ultimately safeguarded and upheld in Snow Crash; it 
                                                          
65 As an extension of this, it is possible to speculate that the feelings of estrangement from his parents that our 
narrator (believes he) experiences are, in fact, Gonzo’s.  
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allows for flow between the body, and the mind, and then between the individual that these two make 
up, and the space(s) that it occupies. In some cases, this means that Stuff effects direct change on 
physical bodies in response to narratives that it perceives; in the case of our narrator and Gonzo – 
who are doused in a large quantity of raw Stuff – it detects the existence of our narrator and his 
separate narrative(s) within Gonzo, and make them (and him) tangible, undermining the 
encapsulation at work within Gonzo’s body and mind. Whilst Stuff may seem like “a blessing in 
disguise; how wonderful to have discovered a substance which responds to thought” (277), it is 
anything but a beacon of utopian potential, as is evidenced by the little girl that our narrator and his 
companions find, who “wished she was a horse, and was immersed while sleeping in a storm of Stuff, 
and wakened to find herself transformed, hopelessly muddled with horsey parts and unable to 
breathe” (272). But neither is it – as Jorgmund’s vigorous attempts to counter it with FOX might 
suggest – a particularly bad substance either. It is instead a deeply heterotopian, and profoundly 
ambiguous substance; it undermines Gonzo, leaving him feeling “so hollow inside” (413), whilst 
enabling the awakening and corporealisation of our narrator. Although the separation of these two 
men that occurs when Stuff disrupts the encapsulation of Gonzo is painful for them both – particularly 
for our narrator, who ends up “shot in the digestive tract” (383) – it allows them to create and enact 
their own separate narratives, independent, for the first time, from the constraints laid upon them by 
the complementary and competing narratives of the other. This change is reflected in the conversation 
between our narrator and Gonzo at the end of the novel: 
 
‘That’s true,’ Gonzo says. ‘I never did [give our narrator a name]’ He ponders. ‘Are you…going 
to do more of that?’ 
‘Of what?’ 
‘Derring-do.’ 
‘I don’t know.’ 
‘I’m not,’ Gonzo says definitely. ‘I’m done. I want to be…I don’t know. But I want it. I need to 
be quiet for a while.’ 
‘Oh.’ 
‘So…if you want…you could be Gonzo Lubitsch.’ 
I think about it. 
‘No. But thanks.’ 




Up until the reification of our narrator, Gonzo Lubitsch had always been the one with the bravado, 
with our narrator as his trusty sidekick. What the conversation between the two reveals, and what our 
narrator – and Gonzo himself – may not have been / is not aware of, are the constraints that these set 
narratives place upon the both of them. With the binaries that bound them broken by their exposure 
to Stuff, Gonzo is finally free to be quiet for a time, whilst our narrator – who was bound to be the 
reflective one of the pair – is free to, if he so chooses, to explore his boldness and capacity for hero-
like action. Fittingly, neither of them wish to be the Gonzo Lubitsch of old; as Zaher Bey notes when 
he is rescued by our narrator, “you are he and he is you and neither of you is who you were before” 
(515).   
 As well as exposing the possibility of multiplicity in narrative, via the medium of our narrator 
Stuff also completes the inversion of good and bad that began on Piper 90, dismantling this and other 
of the core binaries that Jorgmund trades upon. In particular, it makes irreparably ambiguous the 
divide between ‘man’ and ‘monster,’ a binary that the narrative of Pascal Timbery and Larry Tusk had 
already cast aspersions upon. Whilst Stuff does indeed create monsters from the dreams and fears 
and thoughts of men and animals alike – the ‘mermaids’ that feed on the spinal fluid of humans are a 
particularly good example – it also (re)creates people as well. When recounting his story to Old Man 
and Ma Lubitsch, our narrator takes pains to make his position as one of the ‘new’ clear: 
 
Neither one of them seems terribly upset at the idea of having a bifurcate in the house. 
‘I am a monster,’ I tell them, in case they haven’t understood. 
‘Are you?’ Old Man Lubitsch wants to know. 
‘Yes.’ 
‘What is the most monstrous thing you have done?’ 
Well, now that he mentions it, I can’t recall the last terrible crime I committed…I suggest that 
being a monster is a matter of fact, rather than action, and Old Man Lubitsch says ‘Bah.’ 
Since that seems to be all they have to say about it, I carry on with my story. 
                      (422) 
 
This conversation re-establishes and reaffirms two key points, both of which I have already touched 
upon. Even though he was reified by Stuff, our narrator is most definitively not a monster; as Old Man 
Lubitsch’s dismissal makes clear, monsters are made, rather than born. This tallies with the views 
demonstrated by the crew of Piper 90 during their strike against the policies of van Meents and Fust, 
who are, by virtue of their desire to eradicate the Found Thousand for no reason other than the fact 
that they are ‘new,’ more monstrous than the beings they denounce. As I have already alluded to, 
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however, the distinctions between human and monster is not as clear-cut as simply distinguishing 
between pencilnecks and everyone else; consider the case of Mae Milton, the pencilneck who appears 
to exhibit genuine warmth and humanity. Thus, the heterotopian rationality that aids our narrator and 
questions the humanity of pencilnecks whilst asserting that of the reified also undermines the 
dualisms that he (however unwittingly) also perpetuates. Closely associated with the man/monster 
binary is that of ‘good’ and ‘bad.’ Although our narrator is at first ambivalent about Jorgmund and the 
Pipe – he does not like the pencilnecks – he believes the “good, clean FOX” (9) that it controls and 
delivers is both benign and necessary, whilst viewing Stuff as nightmares incarnate. As he eventually 
discovers, however, the inverse is truer. Although Stuff can and does create horrors, that is not the 
extent of its possibilities, as the reification of our narrator and the Found Thousand (who appear to 
be fundamentally peaceful) reveal. Conversely, the way in which FOX is created, however ‘safe’ it 
might make the world, is more horrendous than anything that Stuff can call forth. Our narrator, upon 
discovering this secret in the Core of Jorgmund relates how the original FOX is created organically by 
a boy called Bobby Shank, who suffered horrific brain injuries in the “un-war” (160) in Addeh Katir that 
precedes and precipitates the Go Away War. The specific nature of his injuries means that any Stuff 
that comes within a few feet of him changes and becomes harmless. He is found by Humbert Pestle, 
who steals him away from his caregiver and begins building an empire around the substance that 
Bobby Shank creates; Jorgmund, and FOX. This works out just fine until Jorgmund begins expanding: 
 
Humbert Pestle had to keep looking, but wherever he looked, he couldn’t find another Bobby 
Shank. So he looked into his heart and listened to the music, and he knew what he had to do. 
He had to make people like Bobby Shank… 
At first he used bandits…. He got fifteen like that. Some of them he just locked away until the 
EEG readings went like Bobby’s. Others he did things to, sharp, messy things. They didn’t last 
long, not like Bobby, but the worked. They produced. But not fast enough. The new towns 
were springing up faster than he could increase his production.  
That’s when he went to Heyerdahl Point with the whole of the Clockwork Hand, and turned it 
into Drowned Cross…. And when they were all used up, he took another town, and then 
another…. That’s how Jorgmund saves the world. It uses people up. Feeds the princess to the 
dragon. 
                   (506-507, emphasis in original) 
 
In other words, Jorgmund and FOX consume and destroy the very people they’re supposedly saving. 
The production of FOX is perhaps the quintessence of the utopian engineering that is demonstrated 
106 
 
by the Party and by the OneState and abhorred by Karl Popper; the sacrifice of a few thousand lives 
in service of the machine is measured against ‘the greater good’ for millions more, and found to be 
acceptable.  The result of this revelation is that our narrator “can’t think about FOX any more without 
shuddering. Time was when it gave [him] a warm glow” (511); FOX, which saves people from the 
corporeal nightmares wrought by Stuff, is revealed to be the more nightmarish of the two – the 




 The Gone-Away World ends with our narrator defeating Humbert Pestle in single 
combat; by virtue of this, he becomes the owner of Jorgmund: “the ownership of Jorgmund is vested 
in the Clockwork Hand. The Clockwork Hand is controlled by the present master. That master is chosen 
by acclamation, or by combat” (528). I consider it important to note that although he considers trying 
to use Jorgmund “to do good” (528), he chooses instead to wind the company up, exposing the ‘truth’ 
about FOX and its origins; I would suggest that he recognises the futility of trying to ‘do good’ – 
whatever that might be. What he believes to be good and right might (and probably will be) at odds 
with what many other people conceive to be good and right; although one might not agree with his 
methods, Humbert Pestle believed he was doing right by the human race with the creation of FOX. In 
winding Jorgmund up, our narrator ensures that the production of FOX ceases, and that “people will 
have to choose how to live” (529) in conjunction with the unreal world. By offering all people that 
choice, by putting aside all conceptions of the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ way to live, our narrator creates 
what I consider to be the first entirely heterotopian world; ambiguous and not without risk, both 
morally and physically – it is, after all, entirely likely that a great many people will die when the Stuff 
rolls back over them – it is a world in which established binaries have finally been dismantled, and 
where people are free to create their own narratives in conjunction with the spaces that surround 
them. This lack of enforced (and enforceable) ideas about normative behaviour is also at work in the 
final text I will examine here, Michael Marshall Smith’s Only Forward. Much like the other texts that I 
have analysed here, OF is often placed within a dystopian framework; although Matthew Hills notes 
the “generic instability” (77) of several of Smith’s novels, including Only Forward (a trait of 
heterotopian fiction that I have previously remarked upon), he nonetheless remarks upon the ways in 
which these novels are “clearly indebted to the cyberpunk subgenre” (77), reinforcing the perception 
that OF is another novel in the “dystopian ‘hard’ sf” (78) tradition, irrespective of how much it is also 
influenced by fantasy and detective fiction. Adding to the notion that OF is just another depiction of a 
fragmented dystopic society, there are striking resemblances between Only Forward and Snow Crash, 
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particularly in the depiction of a mega-city that has splintered into Neighbourhoods (akin to the 
‘Burbclaves in SC) that are “self-governing and regulating states, each free to do what the hell they 
[like]” (Smith, 27). Many of the Neighbourhoods of OF are as ambiguous as the ‘Burbclaves of SC; Red 
Neighbourhood experiences continuous gang warfare, which frequently involves “arson and random 
napalming” and where a bar fight might involve “fists, guns or chemical weapons” (30). Additionally, 
like many of the heterotopian spaces that I have previously identified, Neighbourhoods are subject to 
varying degrees of encapsulation. Some Neighbourhoods, such as Stable, refuse all contact with the 
outside world – the wall which surrounds them is “unbreachable by anything short of a nuclear 
weapon” (76) – whilst others are more open; Stark lives in Colour, which is open to anyone who 
appreciates colour (unless they’re prone to epileptic seizures).  
However, although OF appears analogous to The Gone-Away World and to Snow Crash 
especially, I would suggest that the heterotopianism of OF is far more developed and more pervasive 
than the latter, and builds on those elements that I identified in the former. In particular, I would 
contend that the heterotopian elements of OF demonstrate a continuous and complete repudiation 
of the dualisms that were upheld in SC, and eventually denied in TGAW.  I will begin my exploration of 
OF by analysing some of the minute but crucial differences between the Neighbourhoods and 
‘Burbclaves, focusing in particular on the Neighbourhood known as ‘Stable,’ and the ways in which the 
heterotopian nature of this space, which is reminiscent of the Ancient House, demonstrates elements 
of encapsulation and flow even as it undermines expectations around these notions. As the second 
half of my analysis will demonstrate, the individual known as Stark is central to the deconstruction of 
dualisms and the expectations that these concepts entail. The first-person narrator of OF, Stark acts 
throughout the novel as the agent of the space known as Jeamland and is the only person able to 
consciously enter this space. Unequivocally heterotopian, and representing a culmination of the 
features of the heterotopia that I have attempted to depict throughout the course of this thesis, 
Jeamland is at once a highly encapsulated and yet readily accessible space that is shaped by those who 
enter it even as it wreaks change – both good and bad – simultaneously upon them; this is 
demonstrated not only by Stark’s association with Jeamland, but by the quest that he undertakes 
within this space with the Actioneer Fell Alkland.66 Contributing heavily to its ability to destabilise and 
undermine binaries is the somewhat ironic position held by Jeamland; it is the land of dreams, which 
are, as Alkland and Stark’s experiences in this space reveal, certainly not utopian.  As my analysis of 
the experience of Stark – who, like Winston Smith before him, makes the mistake of believing that he 
understands the nature of the space that he inhabits – will show, Jeamland, like Stuff before it, has an 
                                                          
66 ‘Actioneer’ is the term used to indicate an inhabitant of the Action Centre.  
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almost boundless capacity to deceive and undermine the individual even as it allows them to explore 
new and pre-existing narratives.  
Like Snow Crash before it, Only Forward depicts a city that has first grown monumentally large, 
and then splintered into a series of loosely connected enclaves, each of which is consciously and 
deliberately different from the others around it. I would contend, however, that there is a loose sense 
of coherency at work in SC that is not found anywhere in OF. The Burbclave that Hiro, in his final outing 
as the Deliverator, attempts to deliver pizza to – The Mews at Windsor Heights – is not unique, but 
rather just one of the many capsules known by the same name, that has exactly the same layout no 
matter where it’s located geographically; as Hiro knows, “a Deliverator can go into a Mews at Windsor 
Heights anywhere from Fairbanks to Yaroslavl to the Shenzhen special economic zone and find his way 
around” (Stephenson, 12). The homogeneity that lingers in SC’s society is hinted at throughout the 
novel; the Mafia-owned pizza delivery vendor that Hiro is assigned to is known as “CosaNostra Pizza 
#3569” (6) – suggesting that the franchise is just one amongst several thousand – whilst the 
description of the living conditions of most “people of America” (178) is similarly telling: 
 
They have fled from the true America, the America of atomic bombs, scalpings, hip-hop, chaos 
theory, cement overshoes, snake handlers, spree killers, space walks, buffalo jumps, drive-
bys, cruise missiles, Sherman’s March, gridlock, motorcycle gangs, and bungee jumping. They 
have parallel-parked their bimbo boxes in identical computer-designed Burbclave street 
patterns and secreted themselves in symmetrical sheetrock shitholes with vinyl floors and ill-
fitting woodwork and no sidewalks, vast house farms out in the loglo wilderness, a culture 
medium for a medium culture. 
                      (179) 
 
The ‘true America’ that has been given up may have been one of pandemonium, but, from the 
description offered above, also appears to have contained and given voice to – if not reconciled – a 
multitude of different and conflicting spaces and attitudes. This unruliness has been replaced by large 
swathes of sameness, a series of intermediary spaces which are ‘identical’ and ‘symmetrical.’67 
Similarly, the roles that Y.T. and Hiro occupy – pizza delivery driver and Kourier – demonstrates the 
lingering unity within SC, even as the tools of their job (travel visas, skateboards and cars) enable them 
to undermine the rules of encapsulation at work within the novel. Because there is still an underlying 
                                                          
67 This is not to say that the same level of homogeneity that exists within We and NEF is prevalent in SC – the 
heterotopian spaces of the latter are far more pervasive than those found in the former, and provide far 




coherency within Hiro’s Los Angeles, there is still a continuous need for those who can penetrate 
boundaries and move between the different capsules. In particular, Y.T.’s role as Kourier demonstrates 
that communication between the different capsules of LA is continuous, however incompatible the 
world-views that they propound may seem. She makes deliveries to the Mafia, to various Burbclaves, 
to Fedland, and to one of the branches of the franchulate known as “The Reverend Wayne’s Pearly 
Gates” (180). Similarly, Hiro’s hacking abilities afford him almost unlimited access to the various 
capsules located in the Metaverse.  
The rules of encapsulation, rupture and flow at work in OF are more problematic than they 
were in SC, and the society – if it can even be called that – that it depicts is, I would suggest, more 
reminiscent of the world hinted at in the closing chapter of TGAW; one in which any sense of 
underlying cohesion has been dismissed and where there are instead endless possibilities, many of 
which are highly ambiguous: 
 
Everything is compacting, accelerating, solidifying, but not all of it in the same direction. 
There’s a loose collection of Neighbourhoods that are pretty much on the same planet, and if 
any country-wide decisions need to be made, they get together and have a crack at it. 
Everyone else? Well, who knows, basically. I’ve seen a lot of The City, I’ve been around. But 
there’s a lot of places I haven’t been, places where no one’s been in a hundred years, no one 
except the people who live there. Some places you don’t go because it’s too dangerous, and 
some places don’t let outsiders in.  
              (Smith, 28, my emphasis) 
 
In other words, each Neighbourhood within The City is highly unique. Each has gone in a completely 
different direction from its neighbour, and any sense of real cohesion is gone; it’s “a hell of a big place, 
split into hundreds of places that have no idea what’s going on in all the other places” (43). Unlike Y.T., 
who – by virtue of her Kourier visa – can travel to almost any capsule within her city, even Stark, who 
“can look like a guy who belongs” (29) and so is able to rupture the boundaries that separate different 
Neighbourhoods with more ease than most, has not been and cannot travel to many of them. The lack 
of uniformity within The City is underlined by the complete absence of any sense of hierarchical 
organisation. The loose collection of like-minded Neighbourhoods that Stark mentions above is almost 
the antithesis of the intrusive governance of the OneState or the Party, and does not seem conducive 
to the domineering and homogenising mind-set of the likes of L. Bob Rife or Jorgmund. The only 
Neighbourhood that we encounter that demonstrates anything like the organisation and regularity 
demanded and enforced by the latter is the Action Centre. This Neighbourhood is rigidly hierarchical, 
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with “43 grades of monorail attendant alone” (15), whilst the upper echelons of management are 
known by alphabetical designations reminiscent of pencilneck taxonomy that also denote their rank,  
and demands absolute adherence to the endlessly detailed rules by which it governs its inhabitants – 
there are even “compulsory tanning regulations in the Centre” (20). However, despite the presence 
of a sub-plot in which it appears that the Centre is looking “to dominate the decision-making of 
[another] major Neighbourhood” (331), like the other Neighbourhoods in The City the Action Centre 
is inwardly focused; as Stark notes, “the emotional support for world domination” (331) does not exist 
in this time, and the sub-plot is eventually revealed to be, quite literally, a figment of his imagination. 
The heterogeneity of The City is further emphasised by descriptions of the different Neighbourhoods; 
although, as the above passage notes, there are some Neighbourhoods which have vaguely similar 
outlooks, in most cases each Neighbourhood is markedly different from the others. Thus, whilst there 
are spaces such as Brandfield – which is a “Neighbourhood for rich people… [where] every single adult 
is…either a doctor, lawyer, orthodontist or wife, and their beautifully poised daughters just float 
around, having parties, power shopping and waiting for their turn to be a doctor, lawyer or 
orthodontist’s wife” (149) – and Sound, where the inhabitants live in complete silence for twenty three 
hours of every day, there are also spaces such as Red. A space controlled by warring gang factions and 
so subject to the further, internal encapsulation that comes with the demarcation of various 
territories, Red encompasses a variety of unpleasant-seeming spaces such as Hu, a “small sub-section 
pretty much at the centre of red” (48). As Stark rather grimly notes, “Hu is the very end of the line. If 
you’re in Hu you’re either dead, about to be dead, or squatting in a dark abandoned building, chewing 
on the bodies” (48). What the above passage, and the various descriptions of the different 
Neighbourhoods scattered throughout Stark’s narrative also hint at is the near-complete 
fragmentation and encapsulation at work throughout The City; it appears that flow between the 
boundaries of the different capsules is almost non-existent: 
 
A lot of people only visit three or four Neighbourhoods in their whole lives. I can’t understand 
that, but it’s true…I guess there’s not the same need to search any more: somewhere there’ll 
be a place that’s right for you, and so you go there, and you stay. The majority remain in the 
Neighbourhood where they were born, in fact. They’re so distinct now, so specialised, that if 
you grow up in one nowhere else ever feels comfortable. A few people still feel the need to 
roam, to travel for its own sake…but not many. If you’ve found the best, why try the rest? 




Stark, along with those occasional nomadic types, appears to be an exception to this rule, moving 
between many of the different Neighbourhoods with relative ease. As he demonstrates on his initial 
mono ride into Red, Stark has the ability to look like he belongs anywhere: “It’s in the face. I don’t look 
like…I’m about to wet myself in fear. I don’t look like I’m disgusted with what I see. I look like the kind 
of guy who’d have a knife in your throat before you got halfway through giving him a hard time…like 
the kind of guy who pimps his sister not just for the money, but because he hates her” (29). Like Y.T., 
and without ever needing her all-access Kourier visa, Stark understands the rules of the capsules 
through which he moves. He understands that the rules of each Neighbourhood are different, and 
that in order to move about freely between different Neighbourhoods, he has to reflect those 
differences. So, whilst in Red, he looks dangerous and when he is in Stable he embraces the mind-set 
of a Stablent. Because of the ambiguous nature of the spaces of The City, however, his understanding 
of them is of necessity often limited – much like our narrator’s rigid and dehumanising taxonomy of 
pencilnecks, Stark’s insistence on and belief in the inviolability of many Neighbourhoods and the lack 
of movement between them is, on occasion, misleading. Throughout the novel, the reader encounters 
several characters who transgress and challenge Stark’s depiction of inertia operating in The City: 
Zenda, Stark’s contact in the Action Centre, grew up in Idyll, and travels on occasion between these 
places, Colour and Cat, whilst another character known as Spock Bellrip transfers from the Action 
Centre to Natsci. Similarly, his emergency transport is provided by an inhabitant of Brandfield 
Neighbourhood, Shelby – she owns a heliporter capable of flying over the roofs (and thus avoiding 
completely the boundaries) of Neighbourhoods.68 The surprisingly high frequency of movement 
between the supposedly impenetrable capsules of The City is also demonstrated by Stark’s depiction 
of, and experiences in, the Neighbourhood known as Stable.  
 Known as one of the “forbidden Neighbourhoods” (61), Stable “maintains an absolute 
blockade on the outside world. Nobody is allowed in, and nobody is allowed out. All information on 
the outside world is blocked, and the inhabitants have no idea what exists outside their world” (55). 
Like the Ancient House before it, Stable is “like a time capsule, a living museum of life”; it is the only 
place in The City where “life is still lived the way it was” (89). It too is “clad all about” (We, 26) in a 
shell of a kind – the domed roof and thick walls that surround it ensure that Stable is a veritable (time) 
capsule, one that it is opaque and impenetrable to outside eyes. And, much like the Ancient House 
was a curiosity in the OneState, Stable is – for all its seeming normality – one of the more unusual 
spaces within The City: “This was all they knew. As far as they were concerned, this is how things were. 
They still had neighbourhoods with a small n” (OF, 89). In other words, Stable is a beacon of what Stark 
                                                          
68 I would contend that Stark’s abilities to befriend people from a variety of different Neighbourhoods is yet 
another indicator of his capacity to penetrate an assortment of capsules with ease. 
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(and the reader) recognises as ‘normality’ in a City teeming with – to use Stark’s terminology – “weird 
shit” (66). In this regard, Stable – much like the Ancient House – performs at first glance as a throwback 
to traditionally utopian spaces, inducing feelings of nostalgia in Stark who comes from a time when 
the kind of life that is lived in Stable would have been customary. Not quite so utopian, however, is 
the means by which the authorities in Stable deter intruders. Outsiders caught in Stable are subjected 
to “death by DNA expiration” (55) – their DNA is altered so that they die exactly a year later. 
Compounding the peculiar nature of Stable is the fact that its inhabitants are kept ignorant of the fact 
that the outside world exists at all by the authorities who run their Neighbourhood:  
  
When The City reorganisation had started to take place, Stable had simply built a wall all 
around itself, shut out the sky, severed all connections with the outside world and pretended 
it didn’t exist. The first generation knew it did, of course, but they were forbidden to tell their 
children. They were happy not to: the first generation stayed in Stable because they liked it 
that way. They were all long dead now, and the sixth and seventh generations had no idea the 
outside world existed…The very last thing [the] authorities want is for anyone to make it in 
from the outside: it would blow the whole thing and trash hundreds of years of desired 
deception. Desired, because I’m not talking about repression here. The Stablents aren’t kept 
in ignorance against their will. It’s all they know, and it’s all they want to know. 
                     (66-67, my emphasis) 
 
This description of Stable and the circumstances of its creation is almost uncannily similar to the 
circumstances which bring about the dystopian society depicted in We. A society builds a wall around 
itself and induces belief in its inhabitants that they are the only surviving human beings and indeed, 
there have been several dystopian novels recently written along similar lines.69 However, as Stark 
notes, the inhabitants of Stable appear to be quite happy and even complicit in their ignorance – they 
don’t want or need to know anything beyond their Neighbourhood.  
Rather than being utopian or dystopian, I would suggest that, like the Ancient House before 
it, Stable functions as a discreetly heterotopian space. That it is heterotopian, rather than utopian or 
dystopian, is suggested not only by its demonstration of characteristics frequently associated with 
both utopia and dystopia, but also by its inherently and unexpectedly transgressive nature. Stable is 
determinedly ‘normal’ in a City that practically demands difference: “there were no alternatives here, 
no wildly different ways of being. Everything was just the way it was, and that was the only way it 
                                                          
69 See especially Hugh Howey’s Silo series, or Fleur Beale’s Juno of Taris. There are also echoes of this device in 
Suzanne Collin’s Hunger Games novels.  
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could be” (90). Stable is also recognisably heterotopian in the manner of Stuff, in that it neatly 
questions and makes problematic the binary of ‘normal’ and ‘different.’ Where Stuff made 
problematic the arbitrary divide between ‘human’ and ‘monster,’ contact with Stable exposes the 
highly subjective nature of what we perceive as typical; although the lifestyle of the inhabitants of 
Stable seems to be more or less ordinary to the reader (and also to Stark – although he is accustomed 
to The City and its oddities, he comes from a time not dissimilar to that preserved by Stable), it is wildly 
different to, and far more constrained than any other lifestyle to be found in The City. The narrative-
based, temporary identity that Stark constructs for himself and endeavours to enact whilst in Stable 
in an attempt to blend in is reflective of this:  
 
I paused for the briefest of moments, forgetting about the Centre, about Red, about Sound 
and Natsci, and just thinking Stable, Stable, Stable. 
The world is very small, I thought, and I like it that way. I’m very lucky and content to be here, 
because outside the wall is a lethal wasteland. I know, because I’ve seen it, heard about it, 
learnt about it in school. We tried expansion, tried to go further than we should, and look 
what happened…No, I’m really very happy where I am. 
           (86) 
 
In trying to appear as though he belongs Stark here both captures what passes for normal within – 
and only within – Stable and also demonstrates how inimical it is to life outside of that particular 
Neighbourhood; in The City, the ‘normal’ of Stable is the new ‘weird.’ What his Stablent persona also 
reveals is the arbitrary nature of the normative models and ‘truthfulness’ associated with narratives 
of identity. The identity of Stablents is based at least in part around the narrative of the destruction 
of the outside world; although this is only an illusion maintained by their government, this does not 
mean that it is any less true for the majority of Stablents.   
The heterotopianism of Stable is compounded by the fact that the seemingly rigid 
encapsulation that it appears to maintain is – Stark’s protests to the contrary – undermined at 
surprisingly frequent intervals, and by people who do not always have Stark’s specialised skill set. 
Somewhat intriguingly for a Neighbourhood that not only shuns contact with the outside world but 
officially rejects its existence entirely, there are clearly several points at which the boundaries of Stable 
can and are supposed to be penetrated. The first and most obvious of these is revealed by the actions 
of Alkland, the Actioneer who hides in Stable, and whom Stark is contracted to find. As Alkland reveals, 
the authorities of Stable maintain lines of communication – this can also be considered a rupture of 
the encapsulation of Stable – with the Natsci Neighbourhood, from whom they periodically order 
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technology vital to the upkeep of their Neighbourhood. Alkland, who discovers this from a friend in 
Natsci and so is able, in his own small way, to undermine the divide between the Action Centre and 
Natsci in a manner that is vaguely reminiscent of Stark, exploits this small rupture in the boundaries 
of Stable and has himself smuggled into the Neighbourhood within the computer that is developed by 
Natsci for Stable. That Natsci Neighbourhood is able to deliver their computer to Stable indicates that 
the wall surrounding Stable is actually designed to be penetrated at specific sites for specific purposes, 
even if it is kept secret and is “guarded to the gills” (127). This is also true of the point at which Stark 
– and, before him, Snedd – ruptures Stable’s boundaries: an “external wastepipe” (75) built by Stable 
which, although long since replaced by a new outlet system, is still “used by Stable police to gain access 
to the outside of the wall for maintenance work, and…to eject intruders once they’d had their 
biological time-bomb set” (75).70 Much like the tunnels underneath the Ancient House, this pipe 
facilitates movement between Stable and between the outside world that it officially denies the 
existence of, the difference perhaps being that unlike the Benefactor’s government, the authorities in 
Stable are not only aware of the presence of the wastepipe – it is protected by “a couple of cops” (84)” 
– but occasionally utilise the access to the outside world that it offers. Both the wastepipe and the 
official door that Alkland enters through make problematic the notion that Stable is an entirely 
isolated space. Not only are there means of movement between it and the outside world, but these 
points of rupture are sanctioned and maintained by a government transgressing and undermining the 
rigidity of its own encapsulation even as it strives simultaneously to uphold it; once their presence in 
the Neighbourhood is discovered, Stark and Alkland are hunted mercilessly by the Stable police, who 
portray Alkland as a “loathsome thief, child molester, animal hurter and defiler of graves” (126) in 
their media (without ever mentioning the fact that he is an outsider). On the run from the Stable police 
with Alkland and unable to use either of the entry points that were used by the two men to penetrate 
Stable in the first instance, Stark demonstrates more comprehensively his ability to penetrate 
boundaries when he uses the water piping system of Stable to gain access to what essentially functions 
as the Neighbourhood’s attic. He then uses “square well” (141) that allows rain to flow into Stable to 
move himself and Alkland through the wall and onto the domed roof of Stable. From the roof, Stark 
and Alkland are rescued by the former’s Brandfield contact, Shelby, whose heliporter allows them to 
circumvent completely the boundaries surrounding the various capsules and return undetected to 
                                                          
70 Snedd is the brother of Ji, Stark’s friend and contact in Red who also happens to a “psychotic ganglord” (34) 
in charge of one of the largest territories in Red. Both Snedd and Ji are also more proof that the encapsulation 
at work between the different Neighbourhoods in The City is not as complete as it would seem. Born in Turn 
Again Neighbourhood – which, according to Stark, is the “second weirdest Neighbourhood” (30) he’s ever set 
foot in – they both end up living in Red, whilst Snedd also breaks into Stable some eight years before the 
action of the novel; interestingly, it is only by virtue of his information and prior penetration of Stable’s 
boundaries that Stark is able to gain entry.  
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Stark’s home in Colour. Unlike the wastepipe and the (un)official door of Stable, where the authorities 
control the flow, the access hatch and the instance of rupture that it facilitates undermine completely 
the encapsulation of Stable and subverts the control that the Stable authorities exert over the 
boundaries they maintain between their Neighbourhood and the rest of The City. 
 
As his incursion into Stable demonstrates, Stark is especially proficient at finding points at 
which he can rupture the boundaries of different capsules. This becomes particularly apparent in the 
events leading up to, and is vital to the plot development of the second half of the novel. Having 
rescued Alkland from Stable, and then from an incursion of the ACIA (the Action Centre Intelligence 
Agency) into Colour, Stark and Alkland take the “thru-mono” (202) to the Eastedge Neighbourhood. A 
derelict and largely abandoned sea-side Neighbourhood that looks exactly like the “ghost town” (205) 
it is, Eastedge is one of the points from which Stark is able to penetrate the capsule that he calls 
Jeamland, bringing Alkland with him. A definitively heterotopian space, Jeamland’s position as 
heterotopia is both problematized and reinforced by the fact that it is the place “where everyone 
comes to dream” (242); it is a site that exists at once as a separate space and at the nexus of an 
unimaginable number of overlapping spaces and narratives. Much of his ability to rupture the 
boundaries of different capsules stems from the fact that Stark acts in many ways as the agent of 
Jeamland throughout the novel, in much the same way as I-330 is the agent of the Ancient House in 
We. Like I-330, Stark embodies many of the more notable characteristics of Jeamland and is himself a 
“very strong dreamer” (220), able to shape not only the spaces around him – particularly Jeamland – 
but also the perceptions of other individuals inhabiting those spaces. This is how he takes other people 
into Jeamland – by showing them a plain of grey mud where the ocean is supposed to be.  That Stark 
is able to appear to belong in any given space, even ones as mutually exclusive as Red and Stable, is, I 
would suggest, a due to the hybrid and ever-changing (and yet constant) nature of Jeamland itself. As 
Stark explains to Alkland:  
 
‘Dreams are a reflection. But as you can see, they’re also a reality. When you dream, you come 
here: this is where they happen.’ 
‘Would this place still be here if nobody dreamed?’ 
‘Yes. That’s exactly the point,’ I said, pleased. ‘Jeamland persists. It’s the way it is partly 
because of the dreams that take place here. But the dreams people have are shaped by the 
place too. They affect one another…Dreams aren’t just in the mind,’ I continued. ‘They exist, 
and they’re part of you. Like memories, they make up much of what you are, whether you 
remember them or not. Again, you affect each other. 
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                      (256) 
 
In other words, Jeamland is both a space in its own right, as well as being a composite space that is 
created as it is dreamed, a capsule that is accessible to everyone who sleeps and dreams – even if they 
do not realise that they enter it – but which most people will not and cannot enter consciously as Stark 
does; in its own way, it functions very much as a mirror, reflecting (aspects of) the personality of the 
dreamer who inhabits it, whilst always retaining its own identity and function. Jeamland is a highly 
dynamic space that is affected by the individual even as it affects the individual in turn; this is not just 
true of the spaces that dreamers inhabit and shape, but also of Jeamland itself, the Jeamland that 
would persist even if everyone ceased to dream. What we might think of as the core of Jeamland 
appears to be particularly responsive to those who enter it whilst awake – that is, Stark (along with, 
in the beginning at least, his friend Rafe). As Stark notes towards the end of his narrative, “Jeamland 
changed us as much as we changed it” (441) – he realises that his and Rafe’s presence in Jeamland 
changes it “right from the beginning, even before Rafe started to do it on purpose” (440). More 
crucially, however, Jeamland is – similar to the space that exists between the Street in the Metaverse 
and The Black Sun – a liminal zone, a space between spaces. It makes visible those who believe 
themselves to be unobserved – whilst in a forest, Alkland and Stark see a “glowing” figure who passes 
them on the path without ever seeing them; she is a dreamer, someone who is “lying in bed, or 
sprawled on a sofa, asleep” (242). Stark and Alkland are able to see her because they are not, in fact, 
asleep or dreaming. Instead, they too, like Jeamland, occupy a kind of middle ground. Stark tries, 
somewhat impatiently, to explain this to Alkland: “‘we are not dreaming. We are awake. That’s the 
whole fucking point…If I’d wanted us to dream I would just have let you fall asleep. But I couldn’t, 
could I? Because when you sleep, and when you dream, bad things happen to you’” (245, emphasis in 
original). However, although Stark is at pains to point out to Alkland that they are, in fact, awake, not 
only does he wake up on his sofa in Colour when he inadvertently leaves Jeamland, but informs his 
audience that “if you happen to wake up, you can only rejoin the track you were on by falling asleep 
and dreaming” (300). As Stark’s location when he wakes up – Colour is across the other side of The 
City from Eastedge, which is where he and Alkland enter Jeamland – intimates, Jeamland is also a 
space between spaces somewhat more literally. It eventually transpires that Stark is originally from a 
time not unlike our own, when The City was still known as London, and neighbourhoods, like those in 
Stable, were neighbourhoods with a small n. In discovering first how to enter Jeamland, and then how 
to push through the boundaries of Jeamland into The City, Stark becomes an inadvertent time-
traveller and is subsequently unable to return to his own world. As becomes apparent with the 
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eventual unravelling of Stark’s tale, Jeamland exists as a space that is situated in and between all times 
and spaces simultaneously, a part of them, and apart from them.  
Despite the fact that it is the place where dreams occur, however, Jeamland is definitely not 
a ‘”Dreamland’” (245), and neither is it a utopian space despite the long standing and generally 
incorrect conflation of dreams with utopia. There are certainly good places contained within Jeamland 
– Stark and Alkland come upon one at the beginning of their journey; a cottage with a “middle-aged 
woman, fat and jolly, rosy-cheeked and wholesome” where they are “welcomed and fed” ham 
sandwiches before moving on again (238, 244). Within Jeamland, however, horrible places exist 
alongside of – and sometimes in the same space – as the positive ones. An excellent example of this 
is the castle in Jeamland that Stark enters on two separate occasions. The first time he encounters the 
castle, he is in the company of Alkland. Welcomed into the hall of the King, they are invited to a feast 
and offered the services of the possibly euphemistic BufPuffs, “shower attendants…[who] shower with 
you to mute the sound of falling water and stop there being too much space in the cubicle” (292). 
Although Stark finds the “sword and sorcery things” (290) that the castle represents somewhat tedious 
and thinks of the King and his courtiers as “a bunch of drongos” (290), they nonetheless offer a 
pleasing respite from the horrors of the jungle they have just traversed. When Stark enters the castle 
a second time on his own, however, his experience is considerably different. The King and his courtiers 
take on aspects of his past, confronting him with old guilt and embarrassments, whilst he is also 
subjected to one particularly horrific scene in which a BufPuff systematically mutilates herself: “The 
BufPuff’s other hand still raked at her leg, her fingers now bloody and covered with flecks of meat as 
her nails scraped audibly against naked bone. When she shoved her hand into the hole and pulled the 
head of her femur out of the hip joint with a wet popping noise, I fainted” (342). This is one of the 
more disturbing examples of the ways in which Jeamland can turn itself against any inhabitant, even 
Stark; a space which was a refuge an hour previously can quickly transform into the site of a (waking) 
nightmare. And yet, as Stark notes, in Jeamland it is possible to “remember what it was like to be 
stupidly happy, when happiness wasn’t something you had to search for, when it knew where to find 
you by itself…You can remember how it felt to have your mother’s arms around you when she was 
hugging you just because he loved you, and you weren’t too old to be embarrassed” (326). The 
equation of childhood, dreams and utopian longing that Stark here seems to initially encourage is 
misleading, however: 
 
Jeamland holds that window open, jams it wide, and lets the child escape. That’s where it got 
its name. Imagine you were four years old, and trying to say the word ‘Dreamland.’ 
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But that isn’t all you can remember there. Being a child was not all wonderful, not all light and 
sweetness…some of it was terrifying...Maybe everything you do, everything you feel, is 
touched by something terrible that you don’t want to remember. Out of things said or not 
said, things that did or didn’t happen, out of all those tiny fragments something coalesces for 
a Bad Thing to breathe dark life into. That’s what monsters are, and why they can never really 
die: because they are the distinctive part of you, the shadows behind your eyes that make you 
different to other people. 
                      (328) 
 
In Jeamland, there are dangerous places and spectres of childhood trauma as well as idyllic 
farmhouses. Consider for a moment the sandpit in Cricklewood Cove through the lens of Jeamland; 
for Gonzo, as well as containing happy memories of time spent playing with his brother, it is also a site 
that undoubtedly provokes feelings of profound loneliness and unhappiness – this is, after all, what 
leads to the creation of our narrator. As for the latter, the sandpit is at first a site of happiness – it’s 
where he ‘meets’ his best friend and ‘finds’ a new family – and then, later, of intense confusion (for 
him, and for the teenagers observing his anguish) and personal crisis. Like the sandpit, Jeamland and 
the dreams that it contains, are tangible, real spaces; because of this it is, as Stark notes, possible to 
get in amongst a person’s dreams, and “stir them round, tangle them, pervert them, disease them” 
(257). This statement, which is Stark’s explanation for Alkland’s nightmares and illness (which is the 
reason why he brings Alkland into Jeamland in the first place), can also be considered a straightforward 
– if harsh – assessment of the flaws and dangers inherent in utopian engineering, and also a rejection 
of the conflation of dreams and utopia; as I have already noted in my discussion of TGAW, whilst the 
goals of Humbert Pestle may have originally been, if not benevolent then noble in intent, somewhere 
along the way those good intentions became, as Stark would have it, perverted.  
 The effect that the perversion of dream streams in Jeamland can have on people physically 
also demonstrates the ways in which Jeamland breaks down the encapsulation that is supposed to 
exist between the mind and the body of an individual, and between the individual and the space that 
it inhabits. When Stark first meets Alkland (who is asleep in his hotel room in Stable), he observes him 
having a nightmare: “As I watched him I felt the hairs on the back of my neck rise and my chest cooled 
as if ice water was dripping slowly through my lungs. I know about nightmares, you see. By that I don’t 
just mean I have them myself: I mean I know about them…I knew that he was not having an ordinary 
bad dream” (110). Later, on the roof of the Neighbourhood whilst waiting to be rescued by Shelby and 
her heliporter, Alkland has another nightmare, and Stark observes that he looks “very ill…his skin was 
extremely pale beneath the vestiges of his compulsory tan, and the patches under his eyes were dark 
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and sallow” (147). His bad dreams are, in effect, “‘written all over’” his skin (210). Although, at first, 
he only appears ill and exhausted whilst in the waking world, when in Jeamland the physical effect of 
his nightmares manifest somewhat – startlingly – differently: “large patches of his face had a 
variegated green tinge and in places it was a virulent shade of purple” (234), whilst in a couple of 
places the skin on his face feels “a little infirm.” As Alkland’s condition worsens, the skin on his face 
becomes “horribly stretched and degraded” (363); while the green mottling is no longer visible when 
Stark forcibly returns him to the waking world, his hands are “covered in liver spots that had not been 
there before” (364) and his cheek has an “open sore” on it (364). Although Stark reassures Alkland 
that “‘the colour [in Jeamland] doesn’t mean anything in itself: it’s just a read-out, like an energy level 
indicator’” (253), what it, along with the deterioration of the skin does signify is the fact that once a 
person’s dreams become perverted and diseased by what Stark calls a Something, that person 
“‘becomes ill, and they die’” (257).71 In Jeamland, nightmares do not exist purely in the mind; they are 
able to rupture the boundaries that are supposed to exist between the mind and the body, causing 
the body to physically deteriorate. The link between corporeal nightmares and the direct effect that 
they can then have on the body of the individual they are tormenting is reinforced when Alkland 
encounters his monster, which is “thirty feet high” with a “dripping red shape on its back…that was 
the churning remains of everyone who hurt you when you were too young to remember” (270). 
Attempting to run from this manifestation of long-suppressed pain and fear with the aid of Stark (who 
is at this stage literally carrying him), Alkland begins to “[weigh] more and more with every step” whilst 
the “purple in his faces [spreads] visibly, cell by cell” (271-272). I would suggest that the physical effect 
that Jeamland and it’s Somethings can have on dreamers is comparable to the effect that Stuff has on 
the thoughts and dreams of those it touches; Jeamland reifies the “rotted and foul” memories of its 
inhabitants, turning them into nightmares that physically stalk them through its bounds (276). That 
rot is then reproduced in the body, causing the symptoms that Alkland exhibits. However, it is 
important to remember that Jeamland is not, for all the horror that it can and does contain, just a land 
of nightmares; it is a heterotopian space. Thus, even as it undermines the individuals who inhabit it by 
manifesting their fears, it also reifies positive memories and experiences which aid and sustain them. 
This is demonstrated by the cottage that Stark and Alkland come across at the beginning of their 
journey in Jeamland – it is, in fact, transplanted directly from books that Alkland loved as a child:  
 
                                                          
71 A “Something” (257) is Stark’s name for the monsters that he describes as “vicious little powerboats, stirring 
up the water and creating waves in Jeamland. You don’t see them so much as experience their effects” (344); 
they get in amongst the streams of dreamers and stir them up, creating the nightmares that cause them to 
become ill. They are personal monsters in that they take on forms that are unique to each dreamer, and 
torment them according to their fears. Thus, the Somethings that Stark encounters when on his own in 
Jeamland are significantly different to those that he confronts when assisting Alkland. 
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‘When I was young,’ he said, ‘I used to read books by a woman called Meg Finda. They were 
really old, belonged to my grandmother when she was a girl…These books…were all about 
these children who used to have adventures…Whenever there was a hiatus in the story they’d 
somehow come upon an aunt or something who’d taken them back to her cottage for high 
tea…And one of them I particularly remember. A farmer’s wife took them in and gave them 
ham sandwiches. Exactly like this one.’ He indicated the fast-disappearing remains of his. 
‘Exactly like this.’ 
              (242-243) 
 
Fittingly representative of a brief hiatus in the events of OF, the respite offered by the cottage allows 
Alkland to regain his confidence and his composure, and allows Stark to explain to him where they are 
and what they are doing in Jeamland. The ability of Jeamland to actualise positive, as well as negative, 
spaces is also replicated in its direct effect on the physical bodies that inhabit it. The cottage has a 
healing effect on Alkland, “fading the colours in his face until they [are] barely noticeable” (240). 
Similarly, in the wake of turning and facing the monster that comes after him, Alkland’s face “actually 
[looks] slightly better” (277).   
 
 As has already been hinted at with the appearance of Alkland’s monster, Jeamland does not 
just actualise spaces; it, like Stuff, is able to make corporeal what I choose to think of here as hidden 
or suppressed narratives. Stark puts it rather more poetically: “out of things said or not said, things 
that did or didn’t happen, out of all those tiny fragments something coalesces for a Bad Thing to 
breathe dark life into” (328). Irrespective of whether they are ‘true’ or not, Jeamland has the capacity 
to reify narratives that the individual seeks to avoid or tries to repress. And as the agent of Jeamland, 
it is Stark’s responsibility, when this happens, to guide the individual into Jeamland and offer them 
the opportunity to reconcile themselves with aspects of their own selves that they have attempted to 
eschew. This is the case with Alkland, whose narrative is supplied for him early in the novel in the form 
of a CV cube given to Stark by the Action Centre: 
 
The Actioneer was sixty-two years old, born and bred in the Centre. His father had been B at 
the Department of Hauling Ass for seven years, and then A for a record further thirteen. His 
mother had revolutionised the theory and practise of internal memoranda. Alkland’s career 
leapt off the CV like an arrow or some other very straight thing: he wasn’t just a man who was 




                   (32-33) 
 
According to this (mini)societally-endorsed narrative, Alkland is the model Actioneer, a ‘perfect 
product’ of the Action Centre, where what an individual does during “office time” (33) is the sole 
definition of who they are. However, as Stark – who, as the agent of Jeamland is well aware of the 
power and existence of multiple and alternative narratives – notes, the CV cube tells you “everything 
you needed to know about Alkland unless you weren’t an Actioneer” (33); the narrative of Alkland as 
Actioneer is only one aspect of his identity, rather than the sum of it. And as the events of OF progress, 
other – counter – narratives of Alkland surface, the most important of which he has been attempting 
to supress for the majority of his life, and which Jeamland actualises in the form of his thirty-foot 
monster. Fell Alkland is a picture-perfect Actioneer, a senior and “much-valued member of the Central 
Planning Department, involved in ground-breaking work in the furtherment of Really Getting to the 
Heart of Things” (22). Alkland is also the older brother of Suzanna, who died violently when she was 
around three years old when someone took her “laughter and smashed it against a wall, smashed it 
until it bled, smashed it until there was nothing left in his filthy hand but silence, a silence that grew 
between Alkland and Suzanna because of all the things they couldn’t say to anyone, because of all the 
ways they never felt again” (402). The parallel narrative to that of his dead sibling is the narrative of 
an older brother who couldn’t prevent her death: “if you were that little girl’s brother, and you 
couldn’t protect her, and you couldn’t heal her, and you couldn’t make her smile, could you ever 
forgive yourself?” (403). This is the narrative that Jeamland reifies and that Alkland attempts to 
confront with the assistance of Stark. Although the narrative of Alkland’s guilt and grief that Jeamland 
reifies undermines him and eventually results in his death, this is not the only possible outcome; as 
the example of Ji (who Stark successfully guides through Jeamland eight years prior to the events of 
the novel) shows, an individual is able to confront a suppressed narrative that has manifested in 
Jeamland and emerge not only unscathed, but whole and, perhaps, a little more reconciled to all of 
the narratives that constitute their identity, both ‘good’ and ‘bad.’  
  This is true even – and particularly – of Stark himself, who, much like Gonzo Lubitsch, has long 
since divested himself of the narratives and aspects of his self that he prefers not to acknowledge. But 
where Gonzo befriends the half that contains the narratives he rejects for himself, Stark strives to 
divorce himself from them entirely: “It had been eight years since I’d had to face myself, eight years 
in which I’d been able to lead the occasional sufferer safely through Jeamland, secure in the 
knowledge that I was relatively safe, at risk only from other people’s monsters. I wasn’t any longer. I 
wasn’t safe at all. The person I’d been for so long wasn’t there any more [sic]. It was undercut, pre-
dated, its veils torn asunder. I was just me again, and I was afraid. I was out of practice at being me” 
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(343). Although Stark acts as the agent and gatekeeper of Jeamland, he is not immune from its ability 
to undermine and deceive; rather, because of the strength of his connection to it – and the strength 
of his ability to dream – I would contend that in some ways he is more vulnerable to its caprices than 
others even though he is, at the same time, better equipped to withstand them. This is demonstrated 
by the way in which the narratives that he attempts to disassociate himself from are reified by 
Jeamland; specifically, in the apparent resurrection and subsequent actions of his once-friend and 
eventual foe, Rafe. Although he is only referred to infrequently at first and usually as an aside, Rafe is 
in fact central not only to OF, but to the narrative of Stark’s self that he attempts to deny and that 
Jeamland eventually manifests. Just prior to their entry into Jeamland, Stark tells a story to Alkland 
about “this guy, on a plane…whose name was Krats” (217) and his lover who, “a long, long time ago, 
back when people still travelled between countries fairly regularly” (217) accidentally discover how to 
consciously enter Jeamland. This story, as Stark states towards the end, is a lie: “There were no lovers, 
just me and Rafe. The lovers version is for customers” (434).72 Not only is Stark the agent of Jeamland, 
but he – along with Rafe – is in fact the one who discovers how to rupture the boundaries of Jeamland 
whilst still awake. The “designated bad guy” (409) of the story, Rafe is eventually killed by Stark, eight 
years prior to the events of the novel, before he can “tear down the veils” (409) between Jeamland 
and The City (416). But whilst Stark manages to kill Rafe’s physical body, he is unable to destroy the 
memories, dreams and emotions associated with him: “we were strong dreamers, Rafe and I, and so 
I didn’t kill him at all” (416).73 Rafe is a representative of Stark’s past – in particular, he is a reminder 
of a friendship that is destroyed by circumstance, and also of the parents that Stark inadvertently 
abandons when he discovers the way into Jeamland; when Stark encounters Somethings in Jeamland, 
they play upon his guilt over his parents, and the fact that he just disappeared one day and never got 
to say goodbye to them. In much the same way as Alkland represses memories of his sister and her 
death whilst forever feeling guilt about it, Stark is revealed to have disconnected from and repressed 
not only the memories of his parents and the emotions related to them, but also the narrative of his 
self and Jeamland that Rafe is central to. It is a narrative that Stark finally faces – revealing it gradually 
to his audience – only under extreme duress. By avoiding that part of his narrative of self that Rafe is 
central to, by “hating him until the columns of [his] memory were so diseased that all they could 
support was a nothing” (452), and imbuing him with all the rage and “fury” that he himself feels 
without ever acknowledging his grief over the sundering of their friendship and the loss of his parents 
(403), Stark creates the circumstances that lead to him being forced to confront himself: “In the end 
                                                          
72 Observant readers may notice that ‘Krats’ is just ‘Stark’ spelt backwards. 
73 Technically, Rafe is actually killed by Ji, who pulls the trigger and “[spreads] Rafe’s face over three square 
yards of rotting concrete” (405), but as Stark acknowledges, this is a technicality: “I pulled it really, and I felt a 
savage rip of joy” (450). 
123 
 
I’d dreamed stronger than anyone, strongly enough to bring my monster to life again so I could finally 
face him” (451). And face him – or, more accurately, his self – he does, moving across the border from 
Jeamland into Memory, which is “not so different from Jeamland, really. [It’s] simpler, more stark” 
(423), and reconciling himself with the “past [he can] do nothing about, [can] never go back and 
change” (452), the (narrative of the) past that is represented by Rafe and reified by Jeamland. I would 
contend that, even more so than our narrator, Stark is representative of the burgeoning (if slightly 
broken) individual that heterotopian spaces foster. By resurrecting Rafe and allowing him to wreak 
havoc on Alkland and within its own confines, Jeamland forces Stark to confront a narrative of his self 
that he has long avoided and is “out of practise” (343) at enacting, and so compels him to begin the 
process of reconciling with his self and all of the aspects of his narrative that comprise his identity; it 
sets him up “to remember things he would die to forget” (416). That he is eventually successful at 
reconciling the narratives that comprise his identity is indicated by the fact that the novel ends with 
Stark finally, for the first time in the novel, moving forward and talking about the future, rather than 
past events: “And Zenda? She still works in the Centre…But she got a dispensation from C, and she 
lives in Colour with me. It’s been a year now, and it’s working out very well. I think it will stay that way. 
I hope so. Everyone deserves a happy ending. Even me” (455). Fittingly, this is not, of course, an ending 
(although it does conclude one narrative arc), but rather representative of the beginning of a new 
aspect of Stark, one that incorporates and acknowledges the fact that he is a man out of his own time, 
and that his parents – and Rafe – are dead.  
Without the interference of Jeamland, without it pushing him and forcing him to finally 
confront Rafe – and so, himself – it is possible that Stark would never have managed to move forward, 
bringing “the whole of [his self” (452) with him. Because Jeamland is a heterotopian space, however, 
it does not just enable the growth of Stark as an individual; it is also responsible for the circumstances 
that lead to the dissolution of the relationship between himself and Rafe – a friendship which is central 
to Stark’s narrative prior to his time in The City – and to his disassociation from elements of his self in 
the first instance: “Jeamland changed us as much as we changed it. Rafe changed it far more than I, 
and I think that’s why he went insane, and I only became what I am today. I have no idea who got the 
better deal” (441). Even though his association with Jeamland grants Stark a kind of agency and 
abilities beyond those of other individuals, it also undermines him, aiding in the creation of a new 
narrative of self that he appears to be highly ambivalent about – being insane, it seems, might just be 
better than being Stark. The ambiguity of Jeamland is also encapsulated in and demonstrated by the 
124 
 
dynamics of the relationship that it fosters between the two men, who, prior to their discovery of 
Jeamland, are represented by Stark as sharing an incredibly close bond:74  
 
I like to think that I saved Rafe from something…That’s probably true…But what is also true is 
that Rafe saved me, too. 
What I had was thought, and reflection, an interest in things that went beyond the here and 
now...I knew that there were worlds beyond the one we lived in…But I had no drive. I was an 
armchair romantic, someone who sat and thought and might have done so with increasing 
pointlessness until the end of his days. Rafe was the opposite: he was a maelstrom of activity, 
of will…What happened as we grew up was that we grew together, intermeshed until the two 
of us were really a one and a half. Rafe taught me to act, and I taught him to think. I was 
someone he could drag along with him, and he was someone I could bounce ideas off, and in 
time I learnt to do the dragging occasionally, and he sometimes had the ideas. 
                      (424) 
 
In a manner that is decidedly reminiscent of our narrator and Gonzo Lubitsch, the narratives of Rafe 
and Stark are intertwined and complementary; even though they occupy different bodies, their 
narratives and personalities complete each other. And, much like Gonzo and our narrator, certain 
aspects of one begin to effect the other; even as our narrator begins to demonstrate the “derring-do” 
(Harkaway, 530) that has previously been the preserve of Gonzo, Stark develops the ability to act as 
Rafe develops the capacity to think. And, at first, it appears that (the discovery of) Jeamland cements 
the bond between them: “Can you imagine what that felt like?...The world had tilted on its axis, and 
we were the only ones who knew” (Smith, 435). At the same time as it brings them even closer 
together, however, Jeamland also undercuts the relationship between the two. As Stark observes, the 
first few days that he and Rafe spend together in Jeamland “were the last days of summer, the last 
times we had when we were really friends, when we were together as one and a half” (440). In a 
manner that is at once similar to and vastly different from the experience of our narrator and Gonzo, 
the exposure of Rafe and Stark to the heterotopian space that is Jeamland sunders the connection 
that has previously held them together; as they begin to change – each in their own ways, according 
to the changes that they are each bringing about in Jeamland – their narratives, their selves and their 
                                                          
74 If we consider the version of the story that Stark reserves for customers, Rafe and Stark are, in many ways, 
as close as – and perhaps even closer than – lovers. And although he dismisses the lovers tale first as a lie, and 
then indicates that he wishes he had discovered Jeamland with his girlfriend, Rachel, I also think that this 
narrative is more truthful than Stark would have us believe – I believe that this story is his way of trying to 




interests diverge, becoming less complementary and more and more conflicting. The idea that 
Jeamland is responsible for severing the bond between the two is reinforced by Stark, who articulates 
the belief that “things between us wouldn’t have gone the way they did if we hadn’t discovered 
Jeamland” (441). Fittingly, it is Jeamland itself that is at the centre of the final disagreement between 
the two; completely “insane” after spending close to two years in Jeamland, Rafe decides “to try to 
bring the whole thing crashing down, to break down the wall between Jeamland and The City”, forcing 
Stark to finally confront and kill him (449). 
 Somewhat conversely, it is the opposition that it creates between Stark and Rafe that allows 
Jeamland, like Stuff before it, to blur the distinctions between what is ‘good’ and what is ‘bad,’ what 
is ‘right’ and what is ‘wrong.’ I would suggest that the arbitrary nature of these dualisms, and the 
ability of Jeamland to undermine and destabilise them, has already been revealed by the nature of 
the monsters that it reifies from suppressed fears and narratives. As I have already noted, although 
the monster that gives Alkland nightmares makes him ill, it also presents an opportunity for the 
Actioneer to heal his self, as per the example of Ji. Similarly, confronting the nightmare version of Rafe 
also provides Stark with the opportunity to reconcile the narratives of his self; that he does so 
successfully allows him to move forward, creating a new life in “the light” (452). What is crucial to 
realise, however, is that it is not actually Rafe, or a Something under his control, that terrorises Alkland 
or even Stark, who gradually comes to the realisation that “the twist of Jeamland that had pushed 
Alkland, the Something that had killed Bellrip in Rafe’s distinctive way, the shadowy figure that asked 
questions in Red and shot at me in Royle, the whole nightmare: that was me. I did it” (450). In other 
words, even as Stark is the hero of his narrative, he is also the villain; as I have already noted, he quite 
literally creates the circumstances – at the expense of others – that allow him to reconcile with the 
aspect(s) of his self that have come to be represented by the image of Rafe. Much like Gonzo divests 
himself of those aspects of himself that that he doesn’t want and gives them instead to our narrator, 
Stark (re)creates Rafe in the image of all that is ‘wrong:’ 
 
All I had to make me feel good in those days was what Rafe was doing, because he was the 
designated bad guy. With him around I could pretend to myself that I was on the right side, 
could magic up a white charger to ride on. Everybody needs to be a hero in their own life. 
Everybody needs to be the good guy, however many lies that takes. And the truth is you just 
do what you want to do, you protect yourself, and you kill the people who try to screw up 
what you want. 
I never said that I was the good guy. 




In accepting those narratives that include Rafe, Stark is not only reconciling himself with aspects of his 
self that he has tried to forget, but he is also acknowledging, however tacitly, that his role as the good 
guy is tempered by the fact that he is also the bad guy. Unlike our narrator, who attempts to do what 
he believes is the right thing by exposing FOX and Jorgmund, Stark is well aware of the arbitrariness 
that governs who – and what – is ‘right’ and doing ‘good’ things. In its capacity as a heterotopian 
space, Jeamland enables Stark as an individual to reconcile himself with all aspects of his self. But like 
Jeamland itself, and the many and varied heterotopian spaces that comprise The City, Stark is a 
(conscious) composite of events and experiences both positive and negative. He may, as he notes at 
the very end of his tale, deserve a happy ending, but so too did Alkland, whose life is first negatively 
impacted and then lost during the course of events that lead to Stark flourishing. As Stark notes, “there 

























Conclusion: I, Heterotopia 
 
The imperfect is our paradise. / Note that, in this bitterness, delight, / Since the imperfect is so hot in 
us, / Lies in flawed words and stubborn sounds. 
 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Poems of Our Climate’ 
 
Throughout the course of this thesis and through the analysis of my selected texts, my primary 
purpose has been to question and make problematic the arbitrary dualisms associated with the utopia 
/ dystopia binary, and to underline the stagnation of thought that it encourages, promoting in place 
of this binary recognition of (a) space(s) that encompasses and encourages traits that are neither 
utopian or dystopian, but an inherently transgressive mixture of both. That the questioning of this 
binary needs to take place is, to my mind, confirmed by the rhetoric and the arguments that have 
emerged over the course and in the wake of the recent U.S. Presidential elections. The milieu against 
which much of this thesis has been researched and written, the current political situation in the United 
States provides, to my mind, a fascinating and pointed ‘real-life’ study-in-miniature of not only the 
problems inherent in any attempt at ‘utopian’ engineering, but also of the polarisation that can occur 
when attempts are made to define anything or anyone in terms of either utopia or dystopia.   
One of Donald Trump’s main campaign slogans was the particularly utopian (if somewhat 
vague) “Make America Great Again,” and it is telling that many commentators cast both his 
presidential campaign and month-old presidency in terms of this binary; Matthew Ryan (somewhat 
ironically) compares Trump to Marx in his article ‘Dystopian Donald: The Horror and Hope in Trump’s 
Political Campaign,’ whilst Dr. David Hitchcock explicitly casts Trump in the role of utopian engineer, 
musing that Trump was elected  
because he promised a specific set of American voters a kind of Utopia; a ‘no-place’ that does 
not exist but which could. A return to the values, comforts and stereotypes and inequalities 
of an imagined past. This is what his slogan ‘Make America Great Again’ actually means. This 
place comes complete with walls to keep out foreigners, an aggressive foreign policy, the 
apparatus of a police state, and the strict reinforcement of community social values in a 
manner that valorises white, male, ‘middle-class’, Christian, and heterosexual norms. 
                 (para. 3) 
 
All the (negatively perceived) key concepts that have become associated with utopia and utopianism 
can be found in the above quotation. The land – ‘complete with walls’ – that Trump ‘promises’ does 
not exist; it is located in an imaginary past and is rigid in its outlook and in what it deems socially 
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acceptable. On the other side of the coin, reinforcing in the first instance my observation at the outset 
of this thesis that one wo/man’s utopia is another’s dystopia, and confirming its popular status as a 
dystopian novel to which anyone can “attach any fear” (Shklar, 5), Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four 
became the best-selling book on Amazon.com in the week following Trump’s inauguration (Broich, 
para. 1); a month into Trump’s presidency, it’s still in the top twenty.75 Additionally, aspects of his 
administration have been called “conspicuously Orwellian” (Willmetts, para. 2), whilst Jean Seaton 
deepens the comparison – and potential for panic – when she writes that “Drumpf is not O’Brien. He 
is more like a cut-price version of Big Brother himself. Instead of the elite of Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
who keep Big Brother’s identity a mystery while they keep total control, this Big Brother, with his 
direct Twitter relationship with his followers, is fully on show. And as Orwell foresaw, his slogan could 
be ‘Ignorance is strength’” (para. 7).   
 What this rhetoric – the conflation of Trump and his fledgling presidency with utopia or 
dystopia – achieves is opposition and polarity; you are either in favour of Trump and the goals of his 
administration, or you are not. You either believe that he is bringing about an all-American utopia, or 
that he is going to be responsible for plunging the world into a (probable) post-apocalyptic dystopian 
nightmare. What I also see emerging from Trump’s America, however, are multiple (counter) sites of 
resistance and accepted, deliberate difference – what we might think of as heterotopias similar to 
those I identify in my texts that are being enacted in the ‘real world.’ One example of this is the ‘Calexit 
Movement’ in California, which states on its website that this movement is, in part, an attempt to 
maintain the diversity that it believes to be central to its culture, and that it sees as threatened by 
Trump’s policies.76 The Woman’s March on Washington movement, which orchestrated protests 
around the globe the day after Trump’s inauguration is another, whilst the so-called ‘Sanctuary Cities’ 
– including metropolises such as New York, Chicago and Los Angeles – of the United States have been 
vocal in re-affirming their commitment to protecting illegal immigrants living within their confines in 
defiance of Trump’s attempts to begin mass deportation and to curtail the entrance of immigrants 
into the United States. Much like the heterotopian spaces I identified in my chosen texts, the 
heterotopian spaces that I see as emerging in the U.S. in direct response to the election of Donald 
Trump are spaces of conscious difference and heterogeneity that grant new licence to the individuals 
that reside within and create them. And even though these spaces may appear ambiguous at best and 
are seemingly poised to send America spinning into a chaos not unlike that which reigns in the Los 
                                                          
75 As of 26 February, 2017: https://www.amazon.com/gp/bestsellers/books/ref=sv_b_2/156-0188133-
8147329  
76 Named after the ‘Brexit’ movement that saw the United Kingdom vote to leave the European Union in 2016, 
Calexit is the first step in the process which, should it be successful, will see Californians vote on whether or 
not the state should secede from the U.S. in 2019. http://www.yescalifornia.org/  
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Angeles of Snow Crash or The City of Only Forward, I would suggest that they also provide the hope 
that has always been the foundation of utopia. 
 
 As I have just discussed, however, the usage and even the definition of the term utopia is 
problematic, at best, and almost always contentious. This formed the main focus of my introduction, 
where I examined the composition and the critical (theoretical) history and reception of the utopian 
literary tradition. By focusing on the works of prominent and influential theorists of the literary utopia 
– including, but not limited to Lyman Tower Sargent, Darko Suvin, Lucy Sargisson and Ernst Bloch – I 
attempted to provide a working definition of the utopia (and its other, the dystopia) and of 
utopianism, one that recognises the heuristic potential and the positive social implications of the 
utopia even as it rejects the conflation of utopia with perfection; in particular, I recognised that literary 
utopias are almost always written in conjunction with or as a reflection of the social climes that 
influence and inform their authors. Arriving at a definition of utopianism as the articulation of a 
yearning for a better way of being in the world, I identified the tensions at work between the 
expression and enactment of utopia. Acknowledging both the concerns of theorists such as Karl 
Popper, who is unstinting in his denunciation of all forms of the utopian engineering that he holds 
directly responsible for some of the worst atrocities of the twentieth century, and the attempts of 
literary theorists to rehabilitate the (literary) utopia, I concluded that the utopia – if not the drive and 
desires that it encapsulates – is irreparably tarnished. In the second section of the first chapter, I began 
to examine Michel Foucault’s heterotopia as a space that does not offer an alternative to the utopia 
/dystopia binary so much as it reconciles and encompasses both of these spaces, providing a more 
accurate representation of the grey-shaded postmodern age. The model of the heterotopia that I 
theorise differs at times quite significantly from that proposed by Foucault; whilst his heterotopia is, 
in the end, static and enclosed upon itself, I arrived at a model of the heterotopia that is characterised 
by semi-permeable boundaries, and which depicts these spaces as unsettled and ambiguous, and 
inherently transgressive in that they represent and facilitate both ‘utopian’ and ‘dystopian’ tendencies 
and traits.  
 In chapter one, I began to demonstrate the ways in which the heterotopia can be conceived 
of as representing counter-sites of resistance to the homogenising forces that are associated with the 
adherence to the strictures of the utopia / dystopia binary. Situating the heterotopia within the larger 
utopian literary tradition, I contended that it not only displays many of the features commonly 
associated with the dystopian novel, but that George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four and Evgeny 
Zamiatin’s We, two texts that are traditionally viewed as foundationally dystopian are, in fact, 
prototypically heterotopian, offering both the bleak vision of the dystopia and elements of the hope 
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more usually associated with the utopia. Beginning my examination of We and situating it within not 
only the broader utopian tradition, but within a specifically Russian literary tradition, I reaffirmed what 
Phillip Wegner quite accurately calls the “complex heterogeneity” (149) of the novel, and establish 
that the multiple concerns of the author feed into the heterotopianism that is at work within this text. 
This heterotopianism is exemplified by the way in which Zamiatin makes problematic and, I 
contended, eventually rejects three key dualisms; these are individual / society, happiness / freedom, 
and revolution (or energy) / perceived perfection (or entropy). I explored these themes in relation to 
the Ancient House and the character that I see as its agent within the novel, I-330, and the ways in 
which I-330 and the Ancient House facilitate and encourage the transgressive behaviours of D-503, 
the main character and narrator. The ambiguity inherent in heterotopian sites is made manifest by D-
503’s continued anxiety and misery; even when he is exploring opposite viewpoints to those enforced 
by the OneState, he is unable to find happiness. I concluded my examination of We by observing that 
Zamiatin, through D-503 and I-330, advocates for a middle – heterotopian – ground, one that makes 
allowances for both the individual and society, and that allows both happiness and freedom. 
Through my analysis of NEF – which is, as I acknowledged, considerably bleaker in outlook 
than We – I demonstrated that even in a society that is as subjugated and uniform as Oceania under 
the OneState, there are still heterotopian sites of resistance. Depicting it as a site similar to the Ancient 
House in We, I focused on the apartment that Winston Smith and Julia use for their liaisons, 
demonstrating the ways in which this space enables Winston in particular to find safety, freedom and 
happiness in a society that would deny him all of these. Once again, however, the treacherous and 
ambiguous nature of the heterotopian space comes to the fore; even as it provides a refuge for 
Winston and Julia, the apartment is also the instrument of their downfall, as their arrest in this space 
and subsequent revelations about it reveals. I concluded chapter two by noting the heterotopian 
potentiality of the appendix and footnotes in NEF and the ways in which it questions the closure that 
many critics see as the final indicator of the fundamentally dystopian nature of this text.  
 In the second chapter of my thesis, I began to consider more fully the notion of the individual 
– particularly the individual whose subjectivity is constituted by means of narrative – in conjunction 
with the heterotopia, focusing on the ways in which heterotopian spaces enable the individuals within 
them to explore and enact multiple narratives of self that, whilst still being networked, are less likely 
to be burdened by expectations around normative and truthful representation – dualistic notions that 
are usually arbitrary and socially determined. This was the basis for the beginning of my examination 
of Snow Crash, which I – contrary to critical consensus, which has long since deemed it a 
representative of dystopian and cyberpunk fiction – situated as largely heterotopian. I demonstrated 
that whilst there were similarities between the Metaverse and the sprawling and supposedly 
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fragmented cityscape that Stephenson depicts, each space privileges different users. Thus, the abilities 
of Hiro Protagonist – who, in his capacity as the “last of the freelance hackers” (Stephenson, 17) is 
able to move with ease throughout the different capsules of the online Metaverse – are exceeded in 
Reality by those of the Kourier, Y.T. As demonstrated during my analysis of these similar and yet 
contrasting spaces, both Reality – which appears, at first glance, to be highly dystopian – and the 
Metaverse – which is initially depicted as utopian – are distinctly heterotopian spaces that are 
comprised of both utopian and dystopian elements, and enable the individuals within them the 
freedom to explore alternative narratives of self. The heterotopianism at work within SC is more 
pervasive than that which I identified in NEF and We; as I established during my exploration of the 
online space known as The Black Sun, in SC, individuals are not just at the mercy of the caprices of the 
heterotopian spaces that they inhabit, but rather are also able to effect change in and to those spaces, 
creating a far more dynamic and reciprocal, if no less treacherous, relationship between individual 
and heterotopia. This is also demonstrated by the virus known as Snow Crash, which, by virtue of its 
ability to infect both the brain and the computer of the hackers exposed to it, begins to first break 
down the binary of mind / body, and then that of the body and the space that it inhabits. This is, 
however, where the heterotopianism of SC diminishes; as I revealed during my exploration of the 
figure of the gargoyle, Stephenson’s narrative, despite the preponderance of heterotopian spaces and 
the agency that these spaces grant to the individuals that inhabit them, fails to completely dismantle 
the dualisms that are still associated, in the end, with the utopia / dystopia binary.  
 In the final chapter of this thesis, I examined two distinctly heterotopian texts. Both The Gone-
Away World and Only Forward, like SC before them, depict ostensibly dystopian worlds characterised 
by fragmentation and encapsulation. In TGAW, however, this is undermined not only by the 
preponderance of heterotopian spaces such as the Soames School and the home of Master Wu which 
not only transgress societal expectations but actively foster and encourage transgressive behaviour, 
but also by the remarkably heterogeneous structure of the supposedly uniform and ‘dystopian’ 
organisation known as Jorgmund. As I demonstrated, heterotopian spaces do not have to be ‘spaces’ 
per se, as the existence of the substance known as Stuff revealed. Stuff, which Jorgmund attempts to 
suppress, is particularly heterotopian in that it interacts directly with the individuals that it comes into 
contact with, literally (re)creating them and the various narratives of their selves. Decidedly 
ambiguous in nature – it can just as easily destroy life and narratives as create them – Stuff begins to 
break down the dualisms associated with the utopia / dystopia binary, destabilising previously 
concrete notions of what is human, and what is monstrous and, concomitantly, what is ‘good’ and 
what is ‘bad.’ The narrator of TGAW who is, in the end, literally constituted by the interaction of his 
narrative with Stuff, acts as a forerunner for Stark of Only Forward. The burgeoning individual in what 
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is possibly the definitively heterotopian novel, I contended that Stark, who is able to move through 
the various capsules that make up The City and acts as agent of the treacherous and heterogeneous 
space known as Jeamland, is in the end both fundamentally undermined and eventually reaffirmed by 
his association with this space; it wreaks havoc upon his life – and the lives of others – but eventually 
provides the means by which he is able to reconcile with all aspects of his self, and so finally move 
forward. Jeamland, by virtue of its role as the place “where everyone comes to dream” (Smith, 242), 
rejects once and for all the conflation of utopia with (a) dream-land; as our narrator noted of Stuff, 
Jeamland is “nothing if not truthful” (Harkaway, 277), and thus is capable of reflecting both the best 
and worst of those that inhabit and constitute it; it is, in short, heterotopian. And it is in this role as 
heterotopia that Jeamland breaks down once and for all the dualisms associated with the utopia / 
dystopia binary. It is neither a good place – although it has the capacity to be good – nor a bad place 
– even though it can and does produce nightmares. In turn, the individuals that are constituted by and 
simultaneously constitute Jeamland are similarly hybrid and ambiguous.  
 
 As I acknowledged at the outset of this thesis, the literary utopia has always been – and quite 
probably always will be – first and foremost a reflection of and commentary upon the context in which 
it is written. It is a rich and varied tradition and one that, I believe, has even more relevance now than 
it has at any time previously. What is problematic, however, is the way in which the utopia / dystopia 
binary has become polemical; as I attempted to demonstrate at the beginning of this section, it has 
become all too easy to use not only the language of utopia, but also literary works in this tradition to 
promote or denigrate a particular cause, movement, or even an entire way of life. In particular, the 
static dualisms that have – rightly or wrongly – become associated with utopia and utopianism are 
inimical to an increasingly globalised, mediated and ‘postmodern’ (whatever that actually means) 
society that not only enables individuals to creates narratives of their selves that incorporate aspects 
of cultures far different to the ones in which they are raised, but which is also placing an ever-
increasing emphasis on hybridity and multiplicity. What I have attempted to do throughout the course 
of this thesis, therefore, is to reconfigure the ways in which we think about utopian literature and the 
language that we use to describe it. The version of heterotopia that I postulate and identify in not only 
current ‘dystopian’ science fiction but in what are popularly thought of as representatives of more 
traditionally utopian / dystopian novels is meant, then, to function not as a rejection of utopia, but as 
a natural extension of it. There will – and should – always be a place for the literary utopia, but the 
term utopia is itself increasingly a reflection of a black-and-white world which only exists now in 
memory. The heterotopia as I conceive of it, and as it is demonstrated in the texts that I have analysed 
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here offers a way in which we can retain the purpose of the (literary) utopia, whilst leaving behind the 
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